{"id":13124,"date":"2021-03-18T08:56:46","date_gmt":"2021-03-18T07:56:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/"},"modified":"2021-03-18T08:56:46","modified_gmt":"2021-03-18T07:56:46","slug":"a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/","title":{"rendered":"A New Framework for Dealing with Venezuela: From Democracy to Conflict Resolution"},"content":{"rendered":"

Venezuela is mired in a prolonged, multifaceted crisis, to which no solutions are in sight. In the wake of the country\u2019s December 2020 parliamentary election, the EU needs to rethink some of the basic premises of its policy toward Venezuela. Instead of quarreling about which domestic actors and political institutions should be recognized as democratic, the EU should approach the country through a lens of conflict resolution. While a democracy-based framework divides the EU and a broad range of other external actors, a framework focused on conflict resolution may increase the chances of a more coordinated international response. That approach may be more likely to lead\u2014eventually and indirectly\u2014to some kind of inclusive political settlement in Venezuela.<\/strong><\/p>\n

A Fresh Approach to a Protracted Stalemate<\/h2>\n

On December 6, 2020, Venezuela held a parliamentary election, which was widely regarded as deeply flawed<\/a>. Important parts of the opposition, including the party of Juan Guaid\u00f3, the then president of the National Assembly, refrained from participating in the vote. That led to both a very low turnout<\/a>\u2014around 30 percent\u2014and a comfortable win for President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s governing party, which secured 91 percent of the seats in the parliament.<\/p>\n

In terms of domestic politics, the new situation in Venezuela offers little promise. With Maduro strengthened institutionally and the opposition fragmented, there seems to be no way out of the protracted political stalemate that began with the opposition\u2019s victory in the 2015 parliamentary election. The country\u2019s economic collapse, which started with the decline in oil prices in 2014, continues unabated, as does the resulting humanitarian emergency. The impasse should prompt external actors to reassess their approaches to the Venezuelan crisis.<\/p>\n

So far, the EU and others have operated on the premise that the challenge in Venezuela is either to save a democratic regime in the process of erosion or to help restore democracy after a temporary crisis. An alternative to this democracy framework would be to understand that Venezuela now has an entrenched authoritarian regime confronted by a long-running intrastate conflict and a deep humanitarian crisis. This situation calls for efforts at peace mediation and conflict resolution accompanied by international humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n

Such a shift in framework would mean rethinking three key elements of recent international debates and responses vis-\u00e0-vis Venezuela: the recognition of individual leaders, the normative evaluation of political institutions and processes, and the emphasis on competitive elections as a way out of the crisis.<\/p>\n

Individual Leaders<\/h2>\n

The election of Venezuela\u2019s new parliament presents an opportunity to move beyond a focus on the status of Guaid\u00f3. The controversy since 2019 over whether to recognize the opposition leader as interim president of the country has not helped the situation in Venezuela. And it has divided the EU, Latin America, and the broader international community.<\/p>\n

Whatever observers may think of the newly elected parliament, there is no question that it exists and that Guaid\u00f3 is not a member of it. Correspondingly, in a declaration on behalf of the EU<\/a> on January 6, the union\u2019s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, referred to Guaid\u00f3 merely as one of the \u201crepresentatives of the outgoing National Assembly elected in 2015.\u201d In acknowledging that Guaid\u00f3 is one\u2014albeit prominent\u2014representative of a broad range of \u201cpolitical and civil society actors,\u201d Borrell\u2019s statement also responded to the fragmentation of the Venezuelan opposition and the fact that the personalization of the conflict<\/a> between Maduro and Guaid\u00f3 has not helped the cause of democracy.<\/p>\n

Yet, while EU foreign ministers<\/a> on January 25 explicitly confirmed the framing of Borrell\u2019s declaration, it is far from unanimously shared in the EU. Only a few days earlier, an overwhelming majority in the European Parliament had adopted a resolution calling on ministers and EU member states to \u201cunequivocally recognise<\/a>\u201d Guaid\u00f3 as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela.<\/p>\n

Statements by the new U.S. secretary of state, Antony Blinken<\/a>, suggest that the administration of President Joe Biden will continue to recognize Guaid\u00f3 as Venezuela\u2019s head of state. In contrast, the Lima Group, which brings together several Latin American countries and Canada and has been very critical of the Maduro regime, on January 5 issued a statement in which it referred to Guaid\u00f3 no longer as Venezuela\u2019s interim president but merely as the head of a \u201cDelegate Commission<\/a>\u201d established by the National Assembly.<\/p>\n

Political Institutions and Processes<\/h2>\n

International actors need to abandon an interpretive framework that treats Venezuela as a case in which democracy is under threat and requires protection. Such a framework apparently continues to guide the EU\u2019s approach to the country. The January 25 statement by EU foreign ministers<\/a> lamented \u201cthe deteriorating situation of . . . democracy in Venezuela\u201d and emphasized the EU\u2019s willingness to \u201cadopt additional targeted restrictive measures against those undermining democracy and the rule of law.\u201d<\/p>\n

This position assumes that the remnants of a previously democratic regime are still evident and are being undermined. To be sure, Venezuela could for some time be described as undergoing a process of democratic erosion or decay<\/a>. But this characterization is now out of touch with political realities on the ground. Assessments of Venezuela\u2019s political regime by research outfits such as the V-Dem Institute<\/a>, Freedom House<\/a>, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index<\/a>, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance<\/a> make this clear.<\/p>\n

Since the 2020 election, the status of Venezuela\u2019s political regime should be obvious. There are no democratic institutions left to protect\u2014neither a government nor a parliament that would comply with even minimal democratic standards. The Maduro government is the official executive with which external actors, including the EU, have to deal. Recognizing this political reality does not imply that the EU or its member states should acknowledge either Maduro or the new parliament as democratically elected. It only means accepting Venezuela\u2019s political regime for what is it and not what one might hope for.<\/p>\n

Offering diplomatic recognition to a state without democratic legitimacy is nothing remarkable for the EU. It is what the union routinely does in its foreign relations, as openly cooperative ties with authoritarian regimes around the world show. In addition, this approach does not mean ignoring the existence of opposition forces, such as those led by Guaid\u00f3 and others\u2014even if the democratic credentials<\/a> of at least part of the Venezuelan opposition are ambiguous.<\/p>\n

So far, the question has been how far the EU supports Venezuela\u2019s opposition against the regime, and this has focused debates on who is democratic and who is not, and who should decide this. A framework of peace mediation and conflict resolution would instead enable the EU to focus on the dynamics of the political conflict, the major stakeholders and their interests and values, and the question of what a promising process of negotiations<\/a> toward an inclusive political settlement could look like. As the EU\u2019s official concept on peace mediation<\/a> puts it, \u201cmediation requires being open to speaking to all peace and conflict stakeholders whose positions have a bearing on the prospect for sustained peace.\u201d<\/p>\n

To be sure, in the past, the EU has shown its willingness to speak to all stakeholders. But the urge to classify them first according to their democratic standing has not been helpful in this regard. No one had to consider the former FARC-EP guerrilla group a democratic opposition before welcoming and supporting peace negotiations with the Colombian government. The EU was not bothered whether Iran\u2019s government\u2014or its parliament, for that matter\u2014was democratically elected when it came to negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal.<\/p>\n

Shifting the framework for the EU\u2019s relations with Venezuela would also mean that the \u201ctargeted restrictive measures<\/a>\u201d threatened by the union should not focus on \u201cthose undermining democracy or the rule of law\u201d but be considered as potential means to push the Maduro regime\u2014or parts of it\u2014toward meaningful negotiations. In the same vein, a conflict resolution framework would not imply that external actors should ignore Venezuelan civil society. Yet, instead of encouraging the democratic opposition<\/a> in an immediately political sense, the EU\u2019s priority would be to foster inclusive civic mechanisms and capacities that deliberately cut across sociopolitical cleavages with a view to improving the foundations for longer-term democratization. Such a shift in focus might well open up new possibilities for EU engagement and support for civil society actors on the ground.<\/p>\n

Competitive Elections<\/h2>\n

This is categorically not to suggest that the EU should not care about Venezuelan democracy. Indeed, any lasting solution to the current crisis will most probably require a return to some kind of democratic regime. Yet, it is far from obvious that early competitive elections would offer a plausible path forward. Again, the 2020 vote provides an opportunity for a shift in emphasis.<\/p>\n

Statements by Blinken reiterating the aim to \u201crestore Venezuela to democracy<\/a>, starting with free and fair elections\u201d suggest continuity on the part of the United States. Yet, for the EU, the situation looks somewhat different. Before the 2020 election, the EU tried\u2014and, ultimately, failed\u2014to enable a reasonably free and fair process. Right after the vote, the International Contact Group<\/a>, in which the EU and some member states play a key role, reiterated a previous statement that \u201ccredible, inclusive and transparent legislative and presidential elections\u201d are \u201cthe only sustainable solution to the Venezuelan crisis.\u201d More recently, however, the EU has suggested that elections will instead be the outcome of \u201ca Venezuelan-led dialogue and transition process<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Within a conflict resolution framework, the question of competitive elections and, thus, the restoration of democracy would be matters for future negotiations aimed at fostering an inclusive political settlement. Such a settlement might well deliberately limit electoral competition, for instance by introducing some kind of power-sharing agreement with mutual protections.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

In and of itself, a shift from a democracy-based framework to one focused on peace mediation and conflict resolution would offer no solution to Venezuela\u2019s protracted, multidimensional crisis. A fresh approach would neither solve the substantial issues that stand in the way of promising negotiations between the Maduro regime and opposition groups nor end the conflicts that divide the range of external actors that are engaged in Venezuela. Yet, such a shift might contribute to breaking the current stalemate. Since early 2019, the controversy over the recognition of Maduro or Guaid\u00f3 as the legitimate president of Venezuela and the broader challenge of how to deal with the competing political institutions that were temporarily in place have distorted efforts to coordinate an international response to the crisis<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Of course, even a united EU cannot, by itself, sideline the democracy question\u2014in particular as the new U.S. administration seems inclined to continue recognizing Guaid\u00f3\u2014and this should not be the union\u2019s ultimate objective. Still, if at least a core of international actors around the EU and the International Contact Group agrees to lay to rest the controversies outlined here, this could enable a new initiative that aims at bringing together a broad and politically balanced group of governments and international organizations. These stakeholders might jointly have more leverage and entry points to push for meaningful negotiations and, eventually, contribute to paving the way out of the current impasse. At the same time, getting past some of the more explicitly political international disputes would help expand global efforts to address Venezuela\u2019s dramatic humanitarian crisis.<\/p>\n

This article is part of the\u00a0European Democracy Hub<\/a>\u00a0initiative run by Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy. It was originally published by Carnegie Europe on 17.03.2021.<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Venezuela is mired in a prolonged, multifaceted crisis, to which no solutions are in sight. In the wake of the country\u2019s December 2020 parliamentary election, the EU needs to rethink some of the basic premises of its policy toward Venezuela. Instead of quarreling about which domestic actors and political institutions should be recognized as democratic, the EU should approach the country through a lens of conflict resolution. While a democracy-based framework divides the EU and a broad range of other external actors, a framework focused on conflict resolution may increase the chances of a more coordinated international response. That approach may be more likely to lead\u2014eventually and indirectly\u2014to some kind of inclusive political settlement in Venezuela.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":11117,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1125],"tags":[1186,1230,1244,1375],"coauthors":[71],"class_list":["post-13124","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-english-en","tag-democracy-promotion","tag-european-union","tag-political-conflicts","tag-venezuela-en"],"acf":[],"views":377,"yoast_head":"\nA New Framework for Dealing with Venezuela: From Democracy to Conflict Resolution - PRIF BLOG<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A New Framework for Dealing with Venezuela: From Democracy to Conflict Resolution - PRIF BLOG\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Venezuela is mired in a prolonged, multifaceted crisis, to which no solutions are in sight. 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In the wake of the country\u2019s December 2020 parliamentary election, the EU needs to rethink some of the basic premises of its policy toward Venezuela. Instead of quarreling about which domestic actors and political institutions should be recognized as democratic, the EU should approach the country through a lens of conflict resolution. While a democracy-based framework divides the EU and a broad range of other external actors, a framework focused on conflict resolution may increase the chances of a more coordinated international response. That approach may be more likely to lead\u2014eventually and indirectly\u2014to some kind of inclusive political settlement in Venezuela.","og_url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/","og_site_name":"PRIF BLOG","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HSFK.PRIF","article_published_time":"2021-03-18T07:56:46+00:00","og_image":[{"width":750,"height":410,"url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/Jonas-Venezuela-EU-BLOG.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Jonas Wolff","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@HSFK_PRIF","twitter_site":"@HSFK_PRIF","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Jonas Wolff","Est. reading time":"9 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/"},"author":{"name":"Jonas Wolff","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/5902fa33bae9ebfd74019ff43c0ecd2f"},"headline":"A New Framework for Dealing with Venezuela: From Democracy to Conflict Resolution","datePublished":"2021-03-18T07:56:46+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/"},"wordCount":1914,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/03\/Jonas-Venezuela-EU-BLOG.jpg","keywords":["Democracy Promotion","European Union","Political Conflicts","Venezuela"],"articleSection":["English"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2021\/03\/18\/a-new-framework-for-dealing-with-venezuela-from-democracy-to-conflict-resolution\/","name":"A New Framework for Dealing with Venezuela: From Democracy to Conflict Resolution - 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Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Demokratie und politischer Wandel, soziale Proteste und Konfliktdynamiken sowie au\u00dfen- und entwicklungspolitische Fragen. Sein regionaler Schwerpunkt ist Lateinamerika. \/\/ Prof. Dr Jonas Wolff is Member of the Executive Board and Head of the Research Department \u201cIntrastate Conflict\u201d at PRIF and professor of political science at the Goethe-University Frankfurt. His research focuses on democracy and political change, social protests and conflict dynamics, and foreign and development policy issues. 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