{"id":15280,"date":"2026-03-06T16:51:19","date_gmt":"2026-03-06T15:51:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/?p=15280"},"modified":"2026-03-06T17:26:04","modified_gmt":"2026-03-06T16:26:04","slug":"hezbollah-is-weak-but-not-yet-defeated","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/03\/06\/hezbollah-is-weak-but-not-yet-defeated\/","title":{"rendered":"Hezbollah is Weak, but not yet Defeated"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hezbollah has been severely weakened since 2024, having lost its longest-serving Secretary General and numerous founding-generation commanders. Now, faced with escalating war against its main backer Iran and potential disarmament by the Lebanese government, Hezbollah\u2019s prospects are bleak. However, the organization is not defeated yet and can still cause havoc. Though weak, Hezbollah\u2019s strategy of preventing its adversaries from winning over pursuing its own success means the organization remains dangerous.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah launched missiles at Israel in retaliation. Having been severely weakened by the 2024 conflict with Israel and its aftermath, Hezbollah\u2019s move looks, at best, like a strategic miscalculation. Following confirmation<\/a> of Khamenei’s death on March 1, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Naim Qassem expressed solidarity<\/a> with the Iranian regime: “We will fulfill our duty in confronting the aggression [\u2026]. Whatever the sacrifices, we will not leave the field of honor, resistance and confrontation.” Soon after, Hezbollah launched<\/a> rockets into northern Israel, in its first major military action since the 2024 ceasefire. Israel retaliated by striking targets in Beirut and South Lebanon, while Hezbollah responded by deploying drones in subsequent attacks.<\/p>\n

Hezbollah\u2019s retaliation was a response to a disintegrating regional security architecture that is collapsing on the \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d, a regional network of armed non-state actors and partners led by Iran. On February 28, amid deteriorating talks on Iran\u2019s nuclear development program, the US and Israel launched an attack<\/a> on Iran that continues today. The attack targeted high ranking Iranian leadership and government infrastructure to degrade the regime and possibly to make room for new governing forces. Iran retaliated<\/a> with missile and drone attacks aimed at US military bases in multiple neighboring countries, including Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE. The offensive against the Islamic regime has also disrupted Iran\u2019s network of allied non-state actors and political movements in the region, of which Hezbollah has been the strongest and most enduring.<\/p>\n

Already Compromised<\/h2>\n

Hezbollah\u2019s retaliatory strikes after Khamenei\u2019s assassination came at a time when the organization had already incurred major losses. Following the October 7 attacks on Israel, Hezbollah made a similar show of solidarity by launching rockets at Israel, prompting a devastating response. In the autumn of 2024, it lost its longest-serving Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike on its headquarters in Beirut. As the conflict intensified, the organization also lost extensive senior military leadership, including figures<\/a> like Fuad Shukr, Head of the Military Apparatus, and commanders of its major military units, Badr, Nasr, Aziz, and Radwan, and of tactical units like Drone Unit 127. Beyond senior commanders, estimates placed Hezbollah\u2019s losses by the November 28 ceasefire. Prior conservative estimates claimed it had a total<\/a> fighting force of roughly 45,000-60,000 fighters, including reservists.<\/p>\n

Since the ceasefire, pressure on Hezbollah has intensified on multiple fronts. Lebanon and Israel held<\/a> their first direct talks in decades. Israeli strikes have hindered Hezbollah\u2019s rebuilding in South Lebanon and the Lebanese Army took over<\/a> some of its weapons caches. In the meantime, the Lebanese government has put Hezbollah\u2019s disarmament at the top of its agenda, while the organization\u2019s key supply routes have also been compromised. This comes as the new Syrian regime is cracking down on Hezbollah\u2019s cash and weapons supply lines, while the Lebanese government has tightened security at the Beirut airport, even banning<\/a> commercial flights between Beirut and Tehran. In a groundbreaking move, on March 2 Lebanon\u2019s PM announced<\/a> that Lebanon will ban Hezbollah\u2019s military activity.<\/p>\n

Therefore, Hezbollah\u2019s decision to join the war seems irrational, insofar as doing so means it is likely to further sacrifice its political legitimacy. The Lebanese public is exhausted and patience with Hezbollah is running thin. Lebanon has faced successive crises since 2019\u2014from a deep financial crisis to the Beirut port explosion, \u00a0war, and displacement. Now, Lebanese roads are once again jammed as tens of thousands flee<\/a> a war that should have nothing to do with them. Lebanon\u2019s population, largely divided into Christians, Shia and Sunni Muslims, and Druze, remains split over Hezbollah\u2019s legitimacy. Support among Hezbollah\u2019s hardline Shia base has been steadfast, yet as this crisis escalates and sectarian tensions mount even this support may begin to falter.<\/p>\n

Survival Against All Odds<\/h2>\n

Despite this, so far Hezbollah has survived and remains capable of causing havoc. As of March 3, a senior Hezbollah official declared<\/a> that the group remained ready to fight, saying the \u201cenemy wanted an open war [\u2026] let it be an open war.\u201d Though diminished, Hezbollah still has missile stockpiles and some launch<\/a> capabilities. It also retains at least around 50,000 fighters, including reservists\u2014enough manpower to fight.<\/p>\n

Despite all its setbacks, Hezbollah has demonstrated organizational resilience. The rapid succession that followed Nasrallah\u2019s death reflected careful preparation and its impact on fighters\u2019 morale seems to have been modest. Hezbollah\u2019s organizational culture rests on fighter zeal and its flat, cellular structure reduces dependency on traditional leadership. While it is centralized, Hezbollah\u2019s leadership is distributed; units can operate independently, reliant on contextual decision making and personal initiative. This flexible command structure helps prevent the disintegration of its forces amid heavy losses among unit leaders. Alongside horizontal cadre rotation this architecture mitigates institutional memory loss following the deaths of many experienced cadres.<\/p>\n

Hezbollah first drew attention worldwide in 1983, when it attacked the US Embassy in Beirut, and few months later the compounds of US Marines and French peacekeepers stationed there. The latter attack killed 241 US personnel, becoming the deadliest<\/a> attack on US Marines since WWII. In 1994 Hezbollah conducted the deadliest<\/a> bombing in Argentina\u2019s history, killing 85 in an attack targeting e Jewish center in Buenos Aires. In a more recent successful attack<\/a> it targeted Israeli tourists in Burgas, in 2012. The organization\u2019s track record also includes high profile hostage taking, assassinations, and plane hijackings, some involving direct Iranian involvement.<\/p>\n

Today, Hezbollah retains its global infrastructure and know-how for leveraging this experience. Since its inception, Hezbollah\u2014often in close cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGCs)\u2014has developed global cells<\/a> in Latin America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and to a lesser extent in North America and South-East Asia. These international structures have experienced the least disruption from recent escalations. The leader of Hezbollah\u2019s operations abroad, Talal Hamiyeh, remains one of the most senior surviving members of Hezbollah\u2019s security structures.<\/p>\n

Hezbollah is also capable of intensifying its information and cyber operations. Hezbollah developed a Cyber Unit with Iranian assistance. It has employed capabilities from mobilizing an \u2018electronic army\u2019 on social media to sophisticated offensive<\/a> campaigns characteristic of an Advanced Persistent Threat actor. Some investigations<\/a> highlight an increase in Hezbollah-linked cyber activity since 2024.<\/p>\n

Pursuing Denial, No Matter the Cost<\/h2>\n

Despite being weakened, Hezbollah retains capabilities to prevent or spoil gains made by its adversaries. Its retaliatory attack on Israel and its commitment to fight may seem to turn strategic thinking on its head.\u00a0 As of March 3, alongside airstrikes, Israeli forces responded to Hezbollah by pushing<\/a> North into Lebanon in the dawn of a new ground invasion. There is little doubt that Hezbollah leadership expected this response. Hezbollah can still fight, yet what it can achieve in an open front with Israel is limited and risks bringing about the conditions of its own destruction. However, Hezbollah\u2019s leadership is not irrational; it prioritizes the denial of adversary objectives over the pursuit of its own strategic ambitions. This strategy of asymmetric conflict is the bedrock of \u2018resistance\u2019\u2014fighting not to win, but to prevent the adversary\u2019s victory.<\/p>\n

Symbolically, Hezbollah\u2019s retaliatory attack on Israel reconfirmed its commitment to the Iranian regime in the new regional context. The organization emerged from the coalescence of several Shia factions opposing the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, with the support of the IRGCs. Since then, Iran has consistently provided funding, weapons, and training. The organization also recognizes the Islamic Republic\u2019s Supreme leader as the guardian of the Islamic jurisprudence that lies at the heart of its ideology. Yet the extent to which Hezbollah\u2019s is autonomous from the IRGCs has long been debated. Some deem it a proxy with limited<\/a> ability to make decisions, while others see it is as capable of acting<\/a> autonomously. Regardless of which view is closer to the truth, Hezbollah has signaled it remains loyal to the Iranian regime.<\/p>\n

Strategically, Hezbollah\u2019s engagement in the war aims above all to prevent Israel and the US from achieving their objectives. Strategic denial entails deterring or exhausting the enemy by making victory too costly. This reflects the asymmetric warfare paradigm, where the weaker party prioritizes preventing the stronger opponent from winning, rather than pursuing victory. Within this logic, Hezbollah can pursue three relative gains by fighting. It can ease pressure on Iran by forcing Israel to concentrate greater forces on its Northern front; it can prolong the conflict\u2014ideally turning it into a protracted one\u2014by preserving sufficient force to continuously harass the enemy. It can then simply wait\u2014in Mao Zedong\u2019s words\u2014for the total effect of many local successes to eventually change<\/a> the relative strengths of the opposing forces.<\/p>\n

In this asymmetric logic, Hezbollah\u2019s objectives become feasible. For now, it must focus on preventing Israel from gaining operational freedom in Lebanon, rather than achieving any broader victory. It can block enemy advantage, keep the battlefield contested, avoid decisive battles, stay mobile, and continuously harass the enemy. At its worst, Hezbollah may pursue denial by chaos<\/em>\u2014both at home and abroad. This approach is reflected in the Iranian response to the US and Israel strikes over the past days, a strategy devised<\/a> to spread chaos in the region. Hezbollah is weaker than it has ever been, but as long as it can deny its adversaries victory it is not yet defeated: it remains capable of sowing destruction.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Hezbollah has been severely weakened since 2024, having lost its longest-serving Secretary General and numerous founding-generation commanders. Now, faced with escalating war against its main backer Iran and potential disarmament by the Lebanese government, Hezbollah\u2019s prospects are bleak. However, the organization is not defeated and can still cause havoc. Though weak, Hezbollah\u2019s strategy of preventing its adversaries from winning over pursuing its own success means the organization remains dangerous.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":453,"featured_media":15276,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1125],"tags":[1508,1308,1245,1315,1143],"coauthors":[1509],"class_list":["post-15280","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-english-en","tag-armed-non-state-actors","tag-iran-en","tag-israel-en","tag-lebanon","tag-usa-en"],"acf":[],"views":271,"yoast_head":"\nHezbollah is Weak, but not yet Defeated - PRIF BLOG<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/03\/06\/hezbollah-is-weak-but-not-yet-defeated\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Hezbollah is Weak, but not yet Defeated - PRIF BLOG\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Hezbollah has been severely weakened since 2024, having lost its longest-serving Secretary General and numerous founding-generation commanders. 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Now, faced with escalating war against its main backer Iran and potential disarmament by the Lebanese government, Hezbollah\u2019s prospects are bleak. However, the organization is not defeated and can still cause havoc. 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Zu ihren Forschungsschwerpunkten z\u00e4hlen terroristische Organisationen und Netzwerke, europ\u00e4ische Verteidigung und Sicherheit sowie Politiklernen und Innovation. \/\/ Dr. Elisabeta Dinu is a Researcher in the Research Group Radicalization, Terrorism, and Extremism Prevention (RTEP) and in the Research Depart\u00adment Transnational Politics at PRIF. 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