{"id":15547,"date":"2026-04-09T09:20:58","date_gmt":"2026-04-09T07:20:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/?p=15547"},"modified":"2026-04-09T16:25:08","modified_gmt":"2026-04-09T14:25:08","slug":"fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/","title":{"rendered":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 10 April, Djibouti will kick off one of the four elections in the Horn of Africa in 2026\u2014Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Conflict trends across the region indicate that these upcoming elections <\/span>will act as stress multipliers, amplifying existing tensions rather than creating new ones. This has the potential to worsen ongoing insurgencies and unresolved political disputes, and to significantly increase the risk of electoral violence. Drawing on recent peace and conflict research and data from the region, this article provides a comparative assessment to anticipate the risk of election-related instability and violence<\/span> in this region.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

In 2026, four countries in the Horn of Africa\u2014Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan\u2014are scheduled to hold elections. Most of these elections are not expected to change the incumbent governments, as these countries are either electoral democracies or liberalized autocracies. Elections in Ethiopia and Djibouti are held with the participation of symbolic oppositions, and political power remains concentrated in the executive branch. There are strict limitations on the press, civic organizations, and political parties. Leaders of the strongest opposition parties are imprisoned or prevented from participating in elections under either previously or newly adopted rules. In Somalia, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, may lose his seat due to the indirect voting process. Somalia\u2019s clan structure makes it difficult for incumbents to build the broad coalition needed for re-election. Though elections have never been held in South Sudan yet, the political environment indicates that power is centralized at the executive branch, while strong opposition leaders have been imprisoned.<\/p>\n

Thus, why should we care about these elections? Conflict trends across this region indicate that elections act as stress multipliers, amplifying existing tensions rather than creating new ones. Across the Horn, insurgencies and unresolved political disputes significantly increase the risk of electoral violence. Peace and conflict researcher Kristine H\u00f6glund argues<\/a> that electoral violence is part of political violence, and its enabling conditions and triggering factors can be identified by analysing three issues: political environment, nature of the election, and framework of electoral institutions. Drawing on H\u00f6glund\u2019s work, this article provides a comparative assessment to anticipate the risk of election-related instability and violence in these countries,<\/p>\n

Political Environment: Armed Insurgencies and Persistent Insecurity<\/h2>\n

The political environment encompasses the broader political context in which these elections are embedded. It includes the existence of ongoing violent conflict, the conditions under which elections are contested, such as elites with a history of using violence, levels of political exclusion, and polarization.<\/p>\n

At present, there are ongoing insurgencies aimed at replacing the governments of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Djibouti, with insurgent groups exercising varying degrees of territorial control. These insurgencies are linked to political exclusions and polarization. The ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan are particularly intense. In Ethiopia, several insurgent movements are active across major regions: the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), also known as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane, in Oromia, and the Fano militias in Amhara, while the Tigray People\u2019s Liberation Front (TPLF) is preparing for a possible renewed confrontation in Tigray.<\/p>\n

Islamist groups in Somalia, particularly al-Shabaab, have fought the government for decades. \u00a0Although the current government launched a counter-insurgency campaign in August 2022 and initially retook territories, al-Shabaab has since regained ground by making use of political infighting and weak control over liberated areas to mount retaliatory attacks.<\/p>\n

The current conflict in South Sudan stems from renewed violence within the fragile 2018 power-sharing arrangement. The root causes of the conflict are linked to ethnic-based elites focused on political power, seeking to undermine rivals and strengthen their economic interests, which blocked the implementation of the 2018 power-sharing agreement.<\/p>\n

Djibouti faces a low-intensity insurgency led by the armed wing of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD-A). The FRUD-A took up arms largely in response to the political and economic marginalization of the Afar community, combined with the highly centralized and Issa-dominated state structure that restricted power-sharing. The FRUD-A sporadically clashes with the government, which conducts drone strikes targeting the group.<\/p>\n

The 2026 elections are held in countries with a history of elites using violence. As we will see below, electoral competition interacting with unresolved tensions and armed conflict dynamics makes electoral periods especially prone to escalation. However, when analysing the political environment as an independent triggering factor for electoral violence, the level of electoral violence in Djibouti is low, while in Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan it is high (see Table 1 below<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Table 1: Political Environment Risk Level<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\nIndicators<\/td>\nDjibouti<\/td>\nEthiopia<\/td>\nSomalia<\/td>\nSouth Sudan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Political Environment<\/td>\nOngoing violent conflict<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Elites with a history of using violence<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Political exclusion and polarization<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

1.0\u20132.0 = Low structural risk<\/p>\n

2.1\u20133.0 = Moderate structural tension<\/p>\n

3.1\u20134.0 = High structural risk<\/p>\n

4.1\u20135.0 = Severe conflict-prone environment<\/p>\n

Nature of the Election: Political Deadlock and Opposition Exclusion Sustain Latent Grievances<\/h2>\n

The nature of the election entails the competitiveness of the election and includes historical patterns of electoral competition\u2014whether elections have previously been peaceful or have seen controversy and manipulation\u2014as well as the perceived stakes of competition, i.e., the extent to which political actors fear losing access to state resources, privileges, or security.<\/p>\n

In previous elections, Ethiopia alternated between controlled contests and highly disputed polls. In Djibouti, elections have been largely peaceful but have been characterized by boycotts, ruling-party control, and allegations of fraud, limiting genuine competition. Meanwhile, Somalia’s indirect elections have pitted clans against one another, with reports of sporadic incidents in which candidate-supporter militias clash with security forces. South Sudan has not held elections since it gained independence in 2011, but violence has still marked political competition and power struggles.<\/p>\n

Looking forward, the 2026 elections in these countries are surrounded by political disputes, low competitiveness, and a closed political space. Ethiopia and Somalia are facing a political deadlock. In Ethiopia, the disagreement between the government and the TPLF over restoring the TPLF’s political status, which lost its party status after taking up arms against the government in November 2020, is creating an impasse. This stalemate has blocked the election commission from beginning the process of setting up polls in Tigray. In the meantime, the House of Federation<\/a> instructed the commission to hold federal House of People\u2019s Representatives elections only in five disputed territories in Tigray \u2014 Humera, Adi Remets, Korem Afla, Tselemt, and Raya Alamata. The House of Federation’s decision on these disputed territories sparked a backlash<\/a> from Tigray-based elites<\/a>, while political parties based in neighboring Amhara<\/a> and elites in the disputed territories supported it. These territories are disputed between the Tigray and the Amhara regions, with some of these areas being under the pro-Amhara government since the start of the northern Ethiopia conflict in November 2020.<\/p>\n

The political dispute in Somalia centers on the federal government\u2019s push to replace the indirect voting system with a direct system for the 2026 elections and for constitutional amendments. Opposition leaders, along with the Puntland and Jubaland state presidents, view these changes as an unlawful and unilateral power grab designed to extend President Mohamud\u2019s mandate and marginalize regional autonomy. Critics highlight that persistent insecurity from al-Shabaab and the lack of a national census make universal suffrage technically unfeasible, risking a legitimacy crisis and potential fragmentation of the federal state. Without any general consensus, the constitutional amendments\u2014including changes to the federal government’s term from four to five years, along with universal suffrage\u2014were approved by the parliament and became law<\/a> on 8 March. According to the speaker of the House<\/a>, the new amendment automatically extends the federal government’s term from four to five years, meaning the election will be held in May 2027. This was not the first time a Somali administration attempted to bypass the indirect system. In the 2021 elections, former President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo” sought to introduce a similar form of universal suffrage. However, the move was branded as a pretext for an illegal term extension, triggering a constitutional crisis that saw exchanges of gunfire between opposition-aligned militias and government forces in Mogadishu on 19 February 2021, along with further demonstrations. The Somali political arena is intertwined with the clan system, thus consensus among clan leaders is a foundation for Somalia\u2019s stability.<\/p>\n

In South Sudan, controversy has broken out around the government\u2019s decision to proceed without fulfilling prerequisites set in 2018. The 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan required a permanent constitution, census, and other reforms to be completed before elections. The amendments in December 2025<\/a> remove these requirements, allowing elections to go ahead without fulfilling them as prerequisites. Opposition leaders and civil society groups have rejected<\/a> the December 2025 unilateral amendments, arguing that holding a vote under these conditions is a \u201cpolitical performance\u201d designed to entrench the ruling elite\u2019s power.<\/p>\n

The controversy around Djibouti\u2019s 2026 presidential election is primarily linked to the November 2025 constitutional amendments<\/a> that scrapped the 75-year age limit, enabling 78-year-old President Ismail Omar Guelleh to seek a sixth term. It also introduced strict eligibility requirements for candidates and removed the referendum requirement for the adoption of a new constitution. For example, the five-year continuous residency requirement is intended to disqualify exiled rivals. Opposition groups<\/a> opposed these amendments<\/a>, emphasizing the need to return to democratic principles.<\/p>\n

Thus, in Djibouti and Ethiopia, competitiveness is low due to dominant ruling-party systems and systematic blockage of opposition groups (see Table 2 below<\/em>). While in Somalia and South Sudan, competition is greater, but there is no agreement over the electoral process. The history of elites using violence as a means of resolving political disputes and the current conflicts heighten the risk of further violence during the election period.<\/p>\n

Table 2: Nature of Election Risk Level<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\nIndicators<\/td>\nDjibouti<\/td>\nEthiopia<\/td>\nSomalia<\/td>\nSouth Sudan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nature of the election<\/td>\nHistorical patterns of electoral competition<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n\u2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
The degree of competitiveness of the current election<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

1-2 = Low competitiveness or dominant-party systems score lower<\/p>\n

3-4 = Highly competitive, zero-sum elections score higher<\/p>\n

Framework of Electoral Institutions<\/h2>\n

A framework of electoral institutions includes three pillars: the independence of the electoral commission, transparency of the electoral process, and impartiality of security forces. This framework is weak across all four countries, as it is partial and controlled by incumbent governments. The electoral management bodies across the three countries are considered partial and controlled by incumbents. The electoral commissions in Somalia and South Sudan are new and have not fully adopted electoral rules, as they are still drafting them.<\/p>\n

Transparency in the process is low in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, while in Somalia it is moderate. This is because in the aforementioned three countries, the transparency is hampered by media restrictions, while the playing field is heavily tilted in favour of the incumbents.<\/p>\n

In Djibouti, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, the security forces are also controlled by the executive branch and highly politicized, while the Somali security sector tends to align with clan affiliations, and each federal state has its own security forces. Hence, the rules of the game have not yet been set and opposition groups do not trust these institutions.<\/p>\n

Since there are weak and politicized institutional frameworks in all four countries, the risk of electoral violence is high (see Table 3 below<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Table 3: Institutional Risk Level<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\nIndicators<\/td>\nDjibouti<\/td>\nEthiopia<\/td>\nSomalia<\/td>\nSouth Sudan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Framework of electoral institutions<\/td>\nIndependence of Electoral Commission<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Transparency of Electoral Process<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military\/police impartial or politicized?<\/td>\n5\/partial<\/td>\n5\/partial<\/td>\n5\/politicized<\/td>\n5\/partial<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Strong, independent institutions = lower risk<\/p>\n

Politicized or weak institutions = higher risk<\/p>\n

Conclusion: Elections Amplify Existing Tensions in the Horn of Africa<\/h2>\n

The 2026 electoral cycle in the Horn of Africa is positioned not as an incumbent government transition but as a stress multiplier for a region already defined by fragmentation and armed insurgency. Elections are being utilized by incumbents to formalize power, thereby exacerbating the grievances of excluded elites and marginalized populations.<\/p>\n

In Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia, the lack of institutional independence and the ongoing presence of powerful armed movements ensure that any move toward the ballot box remains inseparable from the battlefield. The insurgencies in these countries undermine elections in two ways: 1) Geographic feasibility risk in which elections may not be held in insurgent-controlled or highly contested areas, resulting in partial polls; and 2) election process disruption risk, in which sustained or escalating violence increases the likelihood of election delays, or postponements, particularly. In Somalia and South Sudan, the rules of the game are not yet agreed upon nor trusted.<\/p>\n

The electoral violence risk matrix indicates heightened risk of election-related instability across the Horn of Africa (see Table 4 below). The risk of electoral violence in Djibouti is low, with isolated incidents predicted. In Ethiopia, there is a risk of organized violence, especially in the Tigray and Amhara regions, where we are currently observing large mobilizations by all actors.<\/p>\n

In Somalia and South Sudan, the risk of election-related violence is severe, with a high probability of widespread violence. It is clear that the election in Somalia will be delayed, as none of the pre-election activities have begun. To avoid a repeat of the instability surrounding the 2021 election it is essential for the elites to reach a consensus before the mandate of the current government ends in mid-May. Similarly, in South Sudan, the election scheduled for December 2026 is highly unlikely to occur. Despite government rhetoric, critical prerequisites like a census and a permanent constitution remain unaddressed, while the detention of the main opposition leader, Riek Machar, has paralysed political dialogue.<\/p>\n

To address the risks associated with the 2026 electoral cycle, it is important to pivot from an election process-focused approach to one that prioritizes political settlement and civilian protection. A mere act of holding elections without security and inclusivity often functions as a catalyst for organized violence.<\/p>\n

Table 4: Election violence risk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\nDjibouti<\/td>\nEthiopia<\/td>\nSomalia<\/td>\nSouth Sudan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Political Environment<\/td>\n2.67<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nature of the election<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1.5<\/td>\n3.5<\/td>\n4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Framework of electoral institutions<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total Score<\/td>\n2.89<\/td>\n3.38<\/td>\n4.05<\/td>\n4.33<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Risk Level<\/td>\nModerate<\/td>\nHigh<\/td>\nSever<\/td>\nSever<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Interpretation<\/td>\nIsolated incidents possible<\/td>\nSignificant risk of organized violence<\/td>\nVery high probability of widespread violence<\/td>\nVery high probability of widespread violence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Election violence risk interpretation level:<\/strong><\/p>\n

Overall Electoral Violence Risk Calculation:<\/p>\n

Total Risk Score<\/span><\/b>= (Political Environment Avg\u00a0+\u00a0<\/b>Nature of Election Avg\u00a0+<\/b>\u00a0Institutional Avg)\/3<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Final score<\/strong><\/td>\nRisk Level<\/strong><\/td>\nInterpretation<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1-2<\/td>\nLow<\/td>\nElectoral violence unlikely<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2-3<\/td>\nModerate<\/td>\nIsolated incidents possible<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3-4<\/td>\nHigh<\/td>\nSignificant risk of organized violence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4-5<\/td>\nSever<\/td>\nVery high probability of widespread violence<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On 10 April, Djibouti will kick off one of the four elections in the Horn of Africa in 2026\u2014Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Conflict trends across the region indicate that these upcoming elections will act as stress multipliers, amplifying existing tensions rather than creating new ones. This has the potential to worsen ongoing insurgencies and unresolved political disputes, and to significantly increase the risk of electoral violence. Drawing on recent peace and conflict research and data from the region, this article provides a comparative assessment to anticipate the risk of election-related instability and violence in this region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":150,"featured_media":15563,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1125],"tags":[1116,1524,1223,1386,1362,1525],"coauthors":[580],"class_list":["post-15547","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-english-en","tag-africa","tag-djibouti","tag-elections","tag-ethiopia","tag-somalia-en","tag-southsudan"],"acf":[],"views":17,"yoast_head":"\nFragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"On 10 April, Djibouti will kick off one of the four elections in the Horn of Africa in 2026\u2014Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Conflict trends across the region indicate that these upcoming elections will act as stress multipliers, amplifying existing tensions rather than creating new ones. This has the potential to worsen ongoing insurgencies and unresolved political disputes, and to significantly increase the risk of electoral violence. Drawing on recent peace and conflict research and data from the region, this article provides a comparative assessment to anticipate the risk of election-related instability and violence in this region.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"PRIF BLOG\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HSFK.PRIF\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2048\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1120\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Jalale Getachew Birru\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@HSFK_PRIF\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@HSFK_PRIF\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Jalale Getachew Birru\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"14 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Jalale Getachew Birru\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/0f6fea1b411f5857167fbd2d3d816dca\"},\"headline\":\"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\"},\"wordCount\":2364,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Africa\",\"Djibouti\",\"Elections\",\"Ethiopia\",\"Somalia\",\"South Sudan\"],\"articleSection\":[\"English\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\",\"name\":\"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg\",\"width\":2048,\"height\":1120,\"caption\":\"Addis Ababa Street View. | Photo: Stefan Geens via flickr | CC BY-NC-SA 2.0\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Startseite\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/\",\"name\":\"PRIF BLOG\",\"description\":\"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/cropped-blog_rgb.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/cropped-blog_rgb.png\",\"width\":750,\"height\":226,\"caption\":\"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HSFK.PRIF\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/HSFK_PRIF\",\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/8912786\/\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/0f6fea1b411f5857167fbd2d3d816dca\",\"name\":\"Jalale Getachew Birru\",\"description\":\"Dr.des. Jalale Getachew Birru works as a Senior Analyst covering East Africa at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and is a Non-resident Policy Fellow at Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt. Her research interests are peacebuilding, post-conflict countries, democratization, elections, traditional peacebuilding, and international law. \/\/ Dr.des. Jalale Getachew Birru ist Senior Analyst f\u00fcr Ostafrika bei Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) und Non-resident Policy Fellow an der Willy Brandt School of Public Policy der Universit\u00e4t Erfurt. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Friedensf\u00f6rderung, Postkonfliktl\u00e4nder, Demokratisierung, Wahlen, traditionelle Friedensf\u00f6rderung und V\u00f6lkerrecht.\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/author\/jbirru\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG","og_description":"On 10 April, Djibouti will kick off one of the four elections in the Horn of Africa in 2026\u2014Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Conflict trends across the region indicate that these upcoming elections will act as stress multipliers, amplifying existing tensions rather than creating new ones. This has the potential to worsen ongoing insurgencies and unresolved political disputes, and to significantly increase the risk of electoral violence. Drawing on recent peace and conflict research and data from the region, this article provides a comparative assessment to anticipate the risk of election-related instability and violence in this region.","og_url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/","og_site_name":"PRIF BLOG","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HSFK.PRIF","article_published_time":"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00","og_image":[{"width":2048,"height":1120,"url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Jalale Getachew Birru","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@HSFK_PRIF","twitter_site":"@HSFK_PRIF","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Jalale Getachew Birru","Est. reading time":"14 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/"},"author":{"name":"Jalale Getachew Birru","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/0f6fea1b411f5857167fbd2d3d816dca"},"headline":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa","datePublished":"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00","dateModified":"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/"},"wordCount":2364,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg","keywords":["Africa","Djibouti","Elections","Ethiopia","Somalia","South Sudan"],"articleSection":["English"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/","name":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa - PRIF BLOG","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg","datePublished":"2026-04-09T07:20:58+00:00","dateModified":"2026-04-09T14:25:08+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Addis-Ababa_1875x1025.jpg","width":2048,"height":1120,"caption":"Addis Ababa Street View. | Photo: Stefan Geens via flickr | CC BY-NC-SA 2.0"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/04\/09\/fragile-polls-political-deadlock-and-insurgencies-cloud-elections-in-the-horn-of-africa\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Startseite","item":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Fragile Polls: Political Deadlock and Insurgencies Cloud Elections in the Horn of Africa"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/","name":"PRIF BLOG","description":"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#organization","name":"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/cropped-blog_rgb.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/09\/cropped-blog_rgb.png","width":750,"height":226,"caption":"Peace Research Institute Frankfurt \/ Leibniz Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HSFK.PRIF","https:\/\/x.com\/HSFK_PRIF","https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/8912786\/"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/0f6fea1b411f5857167fbd2d3d816dca","name":"Jalale Getachew Birru","description":"Dr.des. Jalale Getachew Birru works as a Senior Analyst covering East Africa at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and is a Non-resident Policy Fellow at Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt. Her research interests are peacebuilding, post-conflict countries, democratization, elections, traditional peacebuilding, and international law. \/\/ Dr.des. Jalale Getachew Birru ist Senior Analyst f\u00fcr Ostafrika bei Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) und Non-resident Policy Fellow an der Willy Brandt School of Public Policy der Universit\u00e4t Erfurt. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Friedensf\u00f6rderung, Postkonfliktl\u00e4nder, Demokratisierung, Wahlen, traditionelle Friedensf\u00f6rderung und V\u00f6lkerrecht.","url":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/author\/jbirru\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15547","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/150"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15547"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15547\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15551,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15547\/revisions\/15551"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15563"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15547"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15547"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15547"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=15547"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}