{"id":15906,"date":"2026-07-15T10:23:04","date_gmt":"2026-07-15T08:23:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/2026\/07\/15\/minerals-at-the-negotiating-table-resource-politics-and-peace-in-eastern-drc\/"},"modified":"2026-07-15T10:59:04","modified_gmt":"2026-07-15T08:59:04","slug":"minerals-at-the-negotiating-table-resource-politics-and-peace-in-eastern-drc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/07\/15\/minerals-at-the-negotiating-table-resource-politics-and-peace-in-eastern-drc\/","title":{"rendered":"Minerals at the Negotiating Table: Resource Politics and Peace in Eastern DRC"},"content":{"rendered":"

The United States brokered a strategic partnership deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2025, co-signing a DRC\u2013Rwanda peace agreement on the same day. Whether a mediator with a strategic interest can also be neutral is a question the Washington Peace Accords have yet to answer. Critical minerals are no longer a backdrop to negotiations in eastern DRC but they are increasingly the point of concern. Yet understanding their role requires looking beyond the well-worn “conflict minerals” narrative and asking a harder question: whose resource interests are actually shaping the path to a negotiated settlement?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Beyond the Myth of ‘Conflict Minerals’<\/h2>\n

Observers with long memories of eastern DRC will recognise a familiar reflex. Conflict in the region has typically been framed as resource-driven\u2014a war of naked greed in which armed groups fight over coltan, wolframite, cassiterite, and gold. Christoph Vogel, co-founder of the Congolese research institute Ebuteli and author of Conflict Minerals Inc.<\/a>, has argued compellingly that this framing is not just incomplete but actively harmful, reducing a complex conflict driven by regional geopolitics, identity, and governance failures to a simple morality tale for Western consumers. Writing with Judith Verweijen in early 2025, Vogel cautioned that most reporting on the M23 rebellion uses questionable framings<\/a>, suggesting it is purely driven by a desire to plunder the region’s mineral wealth. The M23 rebel group, which revived its insurgency in 2021, did not initially advance on major mining sites. Its seizure of the Rubaya coltan mine came only on 30 April 2024<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Yet if minerals do not cause the war, they have demonstrably become pillars of the war economy, and now of the current negotiations themselves. The distinction matters.<\/p>\n

WHO IS M23?<\/div>
The March 23 Movement (M23) takes its name from a 2009 peace agreement<\/a> between the Congolese government and its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)<\/a>, a Tutsi-led rebel group that had been fighting in North Kivu since 2006. When Kinshasa failed to implement the terms of that deal, ex-CNDP fighters mutinied and founded M23 in May 2012. Within months, M23 had seized Goma<\/a>, the capital of North Kivu. Following a UN-backed intervention<\/a>, the group was defeated in late 2013 and appeared to disband.<\/p>\n

M23 revived its insurgency in late 2021<\/a>. By early 2025 it had captured Goma<\/a> and Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. M23 operates as the military core of the Congo River Alliance (AFC)<\/a>, led politically by Corneille Nangaa, a former head of the DRC’s electoral commission. The group is primarily composed of Congolese Tutsi (Banyarwanda) fighters and publicly frames its struggle around the protection of Tutsi communities from Hutu militias, above all the FDLR. Multiple UN Group of Experts reports<\/a> have documented direct Rwandan military support \u2014 in weapons, personnel, and logistics \u2014 which Rwanda consistently denies.<\/p>\n

M23 is one of over 120 armed groups<\/a> active in eastern DRC. Its current scale and military sophistication are unprecedented, but the political dynamics driving it \u2014 disputed citizenship, unimplemented peace agreements, and cross-border interference \u2014 are not new. They are the latest iteration of a conflict that began with the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide<\/a>.<\/div><\/div>\n

Rubaya and the Arithmetic of Occupation<\/h2>\n

Rubaya, in North Kivu, accounts for around 15 percent of global coltan output<\/a>, all dug manually by miners toiling in dangerous conditions. Since M23 seized the site, the financial returns have been substantial. Traders pay $4 per kilo in taxes to M23 and a further $3 per kilo to the Rwandan government once the coltan crosses the border. According to UN estimates<\/a>, M23 has generated at least $800,000 per month since May 2024 by imposing taxes on the monthly trade and transport of around 120 tonnes of coltan.<\/p>\n

A June 2026 investigation by Global Witness<\/a> found that at least five of the seven companies responsible for 85 percent of Rwanda\u2019s coltan exports were purchasing conflict material from the DRC, tracing more than 2,000 tonnes that may have reached global supply chains. That revenue helps sustain an armed group whose backers in Kigali officially deny any connection to it. Between 2017 and 2024, Rwanda’s mineral exports grew by nearly 500 percent<\/a> \u2014 from $373 million to $1.75 billion\u2014with gold the dominant category, as Rwanda has become a processing and re-export hub for minerals whose origin increasingly lies across its western border. Rwandan official figures show that coltan exports have increased more than 2.5 times between 2021 and 2025<\/a>, reflecting the smuggling boom.<\/p>\n

The Congolese government has now decided to turn this logic on its head. Kinshasa added the rebel-held Rubaya mine to a shortlist of strategic assets<\/a> being offered to the US under a minerals cooperation framework, presented at a DRC\u2013US meeting in Washington in February 2026. By dangling rebel-controlled territory before Washington, Kinshasa is betting that US commercial interests will translate into security pressure on Kigali.<\/p>\n

THE WASHINGTON ACCORDS<\/div>
\n

The Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity are a framework agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, signed in stages throughout 2025<\/a> and finalised on 4 December, when Presidents F\u00e9lix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame signed the full package in Washington in the presence of Donald Trump. They were preceded by two failed African-led efforts: the EAC-brokered Nairobi Process<\/a>, and the Angola-led Luanda Process<\/a>, launched in July 2022 under President Jo\u00e3o Louren\u00e7o.<\/p>\n

The Washington process itself began in March 2025 when the two presidents met in Qatar; foreign ministers signed a first agreement on 27 June 2025<\/a>; a Regional Economic Integration Framework followed on 7 November<\/a>; and a DRC\u2013M23 framework was signed in Doha on 15 November.<\/p>\n

The accords comprise five instruments: a peace agreement, a regional economic integration framework, a declaration of principles, a US\u2013DRC strategic minerals partnership<\/a>, and a US\u2013Rwanda framework for shared economic prosperity. The central security commitments are Rwanda’s withdrawal of its troops within 90 days<\/a> and the DRC’s commitment to neutralise the FDLR militia. However, the accords are better understood as a framework for economic integration<\/a> than a resolution of the political and military dynamics driving the conflict. Since December 2025, the US has issued four rounds of sanctions \u2014 against the Rwanda Defence Force<\/a> (2 March 2026), former president Kabila<\/a> (30 April), and commanders from both the FDLR and M23<\/a> (2 June 2026) \u2014 reflecting the difficulty of translating a signed accord into compliance on the ground.<\/div><\/div>\n

Aid, Leverage, and the Price of Denial<\/h2>\n

Rwanda’s position has long been sheltered by diplomatic respectability and genuine development performance. In 2021 alone, Rwanda received $1.3 billion in foreign aid<\/a>. That dependence has now become a lever. Germany became the first EU member state to suspend aid to Rwanda<\/a> amid the conflict. The UK suspended direct bilateral aid in February 2025<\/a>, halting high-level diplomatic engagements and initiating a review of defence cooperation. The European Parliament voted to suspend the EU’s Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with Rwanda<\/a> until Kigali ceased all interference in the DRC, including the export of minerals extracted from M23-controlled areas.<\/p>\n

The mineral dimension of Western leverage is structural. Both tantalum (the refined product of coltan) and tungsten are listed as critical raw materials under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act<\/a>, which entered into force in May 2024. The United States maintains its own Critical Minerals List<\/a>, which similarly identifies tantalum as a strategic material. Both frameworks reflect a structural Western interest in stable, traceable supply chains\u2014an interest that should align with pressure for M23 withdrawal, but that has in practice complicated the neutrality of both the EU and the US as mediators.<\/p>\n

Rwanda’s response has been defiant. It suspended diplomatic ties with Belgium<\/a> in 2025 after Brussels led efforts to block Kigali’s access to international development finance. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s deployment of over 2,500 troops to Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province<\/a> had bolstered its image as a responsible security provider. Yet the International Crisis Group has noted<\/a> that the investment arm of Rwanda’s ruling party holds stakes in Mozambican mining and private security, and that Kigali was counting on renewed EU funding for that mission at the very moment EU\u2013Rwanda relations were fracturing over the DRC.<\/p>\n

Washington as Arbiter\u2014and Interested Party<\/h2>\n

The Trump administration stepped into this landscape with characteristic transactionalism, framing minerals explicitly as the economic foundation for peace. As an initial confidence-building measure, M23 withdrew from Uvira in February 2026<\/a>, enabling the Kavimvira\u2013Gatumba border crossing to reopen. But it did not hold; on 2 March 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force<\/a> and four of its senior officers for what it described as blatant violations of the accords.<\/p>\n

US mediation faced a direct challenge. In a letter dated 7 May 2026 to Secretary of State Marco Rubio<\/a>, Corneille Nangaa, leader of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), of which the M23 is the principal member, accused Washington of asymmetric mediation. Nangaa cited the non-release of 317 prisoners<\/a> promised within ten days of the 18 April Montreux Agreement, and questioned whether the US minerals agreement with Kinshasa had compromised American neutrality.<\/p>\n

The US responded on 2 June 2026 with its most symmetrical action yet: the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed simultaneous sanctions<\/a> on commanders from M23 and the Forces d\u00e9mocratiques de lib\u00e9ration du Rwanda (FDLR) \u2014 Gustave Kubwayo of the FDLR\u2019s intelligence and special operations unit, and John Imani Nzenze, M23’s chief of intelligence. Yet critics have noted<\/a> that as long as the US simultaneously supports Rwanda as a hub for re-exporting smuggled Congolese minerals, there is no structural incentive for M23 to relinquish the mines that fund its operations.<\/p>\n

The Geopolitics of Supply: China, the West, and Congo’s Minerals<\/h2>\n

There is a structural context that shapes these negotiations from the outside. The DRC sits at the centre of a geopolitical scramble for critical minerals driven as much by rivalry with China as by commercial interest. Chinese companies control over half of cobalt production in the DRC<\/a>\u2014which accounts for around 74 percent of global output\u2014and dominate the downstream processing and refining chain<\/a> for critical minerals. China entrenched this position through resource-backed finance deals, with Chinese partners now controlling 68 percent of Sicomines, the DRC’s largest mining joint venture. China demonstrated the strategic value of this position during the US-China tariff escalation of 2025 when, in direct retaliation for Trump’s initial 10 percent tariffs, China restricted exports of five critical minerals in February 2025<\/a> and expanded those controls further in April<\/a>. Analysts have subsequently warned that cobalt could be next.<\/p>\n

The US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement<\/a> was explicitly designed to reduce that exposure. Underscoring the synchronised economic and diplomatic strategy of the negotiations, the full package of the Washington Peace Accords<\/a> and the Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were officially finalised and signed on the exact same day, 4 December 2025. Notably, the first US sanctions against Rwanda\u2014imposed on the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) on 2 March 2026\u2014came less than three months after the minerals deal was finalised, suggesting that securing supply chain access and exerting security pressure were, from the outset, two sides of the same policy. That dual logic does not make Western engagement illegitimate, but it does mean that deals structured around raw material access rather than Congolese processing capacity risk reproducing the extractive hierarchy that has left the DRC poor amid its own abundance.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Minerals did not start the war in eastern DRC, a conflict that long predates the current M23 rebellion. What they have done is give the current cycle of violence a specific political dimension: one in which Rwanda and M23 have a structural interest in continued occupation, and in which Western powers pursuing supply chain security have their own reasons to engage selectively. The Washington Accords formalised that logic by tying minerals to diplomacy. Whether that translates into meaningful pressure on the parties, or merely reorganises access to resources under a different flag, remains to be seen.<\/p>\n

For the millions of people displaced across North and South Kivu, the test is not whether minerals are on the negotiating table. They already are. The test is whether the terms of any deal reward occupation or end it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The United States brokered a strategic partnership deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2025, co-signing a DRC\u2013Rwanda peace agreement on the same day. Whether a mediator with a strategic interest can also be neutral is a question the Washington Peace Accords have yet to answer. Critical minerals are no longer a backdrop to negotiations in eastern DRC but they are increasingly the point of concern. Yet understanding their role requires looking beyond the well-worn “conflict minerals” narrative and asking a harder question: whose resource interests are actually shaping the path to a negotiated settlement?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":472,"featured_media":15907,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1125],"tags":[1554,1355,1272,1555,1143],"coauthors":[1549],"class_list":["post-15906","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-english-en","tag-democratic-republic-of-congo-drc-2","tag-raw-materials","tag-resource-conflicts","tag-rwanda-2","tag-usa-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nMinerals at the Negotiating Table: Resource Politics and Peace in Eastern DRC - PRIF BLOG<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/07\/15\/minerals-at-the-negotiating-table-resource-politics-and-peace-in-eastern-drc\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Minerals at the Negotiating Table: Resource Politics and Peace in Eastern DRC - PRIF BLOG\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The United States brokered a strategic partnership deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2025, co-signing a DRC\u2013Rwanda peace agreement on the same day. 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His work examines how infrastructures become arenas of contestation in conflict\u2011affected settings, and how a range of actors leverage diverse power strategies to establish and maintain order. Last year, he was a Visiting Fellow at PRIF, working with the Research Group African Intervention Politics. \\\/\\\/ Julian Neef hat am Institute of Development Studies der University of Sussex promoviert und zur Infrastruktur und Governance-Dynamiken im Osten der Demokratischen Republik Kongo geforscht. In seiner Arbeit untersucht er, wie Infrastrukturen in Konfliktgebieten zu Schaupl\u00e4tzen von Auseinandersetzungen werden und wie verschiedene Akteure unterschiedliche Machtstrategien einsetzen, um Ordnung zu schaffen und aufrechtzuerhalten. Im vergangenen Jahr war er als Gastwissenschaftler am PRIF in der Forschungsgruppe \u201eAfrican Intervention Politics\u201c.\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/blog.prif.org\\\/en\\\/author\\\/j-neef\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Minerals at the Negotiating Table: Resource Politics and Peace in Eastern DRC - PRIF BLOG","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/blog.prif.org\/en\/2026\/07\/15\/minerals-at-the-negotiating-table-resource-politics-and-peace-in-eastern-drc\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Minerals at the Negotiating Table: Resource Politics and Peace in Eastern DRC - PRIF BLOG","og_description":"The United States brokered a strategic partnership deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2025, co-signing a DRC\u2013Rwanda peace agreement on the same day. Whether a mediator with a strategic interest can also be neutral is a question the Washington Peace Accords have yet to answer. Critical minerals are no longer a backdrop to negotiations in eastern DRC but they are increasingly the point of concern. 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His work examines how infrastructures become arenas of contestation in conflict\u2011affected settings, and how a range of actors leverage diverse power strategies to establish and maintain order. Last year, he was a Visiting Fellow at PRIF, working with the Research Group African Intervention Politics. \/\/ Julian Neef hat am Institute of Development Studies der University of Sussex promoviert und zur Infrastruktur und Governance-Dynamiken im Osten der Demokratischen Republik Kongo geforscht. In seiner Arbeit untersucht er, wie Infrastrukturen in Konfliktgebieten zu Schaupl\u00e4tzen von Auseinandersetzungen werden und wie verschiedene Akteure unterschiedliche Machtstrategien einsetzen, um Ordnung zu schaffen und aufrechtzuerhalten. 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