European Support for Israeli and American Attacks on Iran – Short-Sighted and Dangerous
The recent U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran come with major risks, including strengthening the incentives for Iran to build nuclear weapons. The only viable path forward is to negotiate a settlement where Iran keeps its nuclear program but cannot weaponize it. European leaders must push, both publicly and through diplomatic backchannels, to achieve such a deal. The alternative is more war and the prospect of a nuclear Iran.
Earlier this year, the IAEA and U.S. Director of National Intelligence reported that Iran had enough highly enriched uranium to produce nuclear weapons. In response to this assessment and to Israeli lobbying, President Trump wrote a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei asking for negotiations to end Iran’s nuclear program and threatening the use of force should Iran refuse. Negotiations began on April 12 and with a 60-day American imposed deadline. On May 31, the IAEA announced that Iran had a record amount of enriched uranium. On June 12, German, France, the US, and the UK and others passed a motion on the IAEA board declaring Iran guilty of breaching its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. On June 13th Israel attacked Iran and on June 22, the U.S. attacked three Iranian nuclear sites.
These major U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have drawn mixed reactions from European leaders. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claimed Israel was doing Germany’s “dirty work.” UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer called on Iran to return to negotiations. French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged the strikes were illegal while urging Iranian restraint.
This approach – offering passive and sometimes active support for US-Israeli attacks on Iran – may seem like a smart policy because it avoids breaking with the Americans while critical NATO negotiations are underway and because the Trump administration seems unlikely to repeat such attacks and seems to want the current cease fire to hold. However, such a policy will create serious problems in the short, medium, and long term. More importantly, European leaders are missing clear opportunities to help de-escalate the conflict and push towards a more lasting agreement. Such efforts would likely enjoy broad political support and could help prevent a larger crisis.
Short-term: Risk of Escalation and Regime Change
In the short term, there is significant risk that the conflict will continue or escalate. After Iran’s telegraphed attack on U.S. air bases in Qatar, the U.S. announced a ceasefire. This response – combined with Iran’s immediate willingness to negotiate, the poor performance of its air defenses, its restraint toward Israel over the past two years, and domestic conditions that could worsen already severe socioeconomic problems – suggests Iran does not want war with Israel or the U.S. Nevertheless, if the Europeans support current military actions against Iran, it may encourage both the U.S. and Israel to pursue more military actions in the future.
Additionally, Israeli and American officials have recently spoken about regime change, while members of the Israeli government have publicly hinted at the implausible plan to reinstall the son of the last Iranian monarch. However, given the central political role of Iran’s security forces and the influence of Islamic revolutionaries, any collapse of the government is likely to result in the most hardline elements of the state taking power. Furthermore, as the recent regime change and regime destruction policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, such policies have significant negative long-term consequences.
Medium-term: Strengthening Iran’s Case for Nuclear Weapons
In the medium term, European support strengthens the political case for Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. Before the conflict, U.S. intelligence and the IAEA concluded that despite concerning uranium enrichment levels, Iranian leadership had not decided to build nuclear weapons. Iran instead relied on conventional deterrence and regional allies for security.
With many allies now weakened, the “Axis of Resistance” failing as a deterrent, and unprovoked U.S.-Israeli attacks, the internal case for nuclear weapons has grown significantly stronger. When conventional deterrence fails and allies cannot provide security, nuclear weapons become a more attractive option for regime survival.
Long-term: Undermining International Law and European Credibility
In the long term, the current approach undermines the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and weakens Europe’s global standing. The UN Charter clearly prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” unless in “individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack.”
Most countries, legal scholars, and the International Court of Justice limit self-defense to cases of military attack or credible imminent threat. However, the U.S. has long argued for a much broader understanding of “defense” that includes virtually any case involving a history of force or potential future threat. European legitimization of this position would render the prohibition on force largely meaningless.
Prohibiting force between states – and enforcing these norms – reduces conflict. When leaders support the offensive use of force to settle disputes without UN Security Council authorization or the justification of an imminent threat, countries begin acting as if they might be attacked and resort to preemptive action. The Islamic Republic, from its very beginning, has been shaped by the perception that, if attacked, Iran would stand alone, and that international law would not protect it. These attacks will likely re-enforce this position and reduce its willingness to negotiate or act within the boundaries of international law in the future. It will also increase the perception by other states that international laws and norms will not protect them.
Viable Political Alternatives
The striking aspect of German and European leaders’ failure to firmly oppose U.S. and Israeli action is that this policy lacks solid domestic political support. The attacks do not appear popular in Germany, where opposition parties Die Linke, AfD, and Green politicians have all condemned the strikes, along with some SPD factions. The response to the Ukraine war also confirmed that many Germans oppose war and support diplomacy regardless of conflict dynamics.
Crucially, the attacks are unpopular in the U.S., and prolonged bombing campaigns or escalation would likely decrease support further. Before the attacks, YouGov found 60% of Americans and 53% of Republicans opposed U.S. military involvement in an Israel-Iran conflict, with Republicans most likely to support negotiations with Iran. After the strikes – despite largely positive media coverage – snap YouGov polling showed 46% of Americans still oppose the strikes compared to 35% who support them.
Despite the risks associated with openly confronting U.S. actions while seeking to maintain American commitment to NATO, European leaders face a strategic opportunity. The lack of solid support for the strikes or a broader war with Iran means German push-back against U.S. actions, particularly as part of a joint European effort, has a good chance of success, especially since domestic U.S. support – including among the administration’s base – remains low. The Trump administration’s goal seems to have been returning to negotiations with Iran. While this strategy is questionable, it indicates that European pushback might push the Americans to avoid repeating similar strikes and to commit to negotiations. European leaders could stop making public declarations supporting the American and Israeli attacks and then engage in behind-the-scenes negotiations to ensure American cooperation.
Back to Zero-Weaponization
Europeans can help create space for successful negotiations by publicly advocating for “zero-weaponization” rather than “zero-enrichment” as the foundation for talks. Before recent strikes, President Trump appeared to embrace Israel’s “zero-enrichment” goal – demanding Iran completely eliminate its nuclear program. Israel likely adopted this maximalist position to build American support for military strikes on Iranian facilities. While Iran’s destabilizing regional actions warrant significant concessions in any deal, zero-enrichment is both unrealistic and unnecessary. Iran will never accept dismantling its entire nuclear program, and preventing weaponization is sufficient to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Publicly advocating for ’zero-weaponization” offers European leaders a strategic advantage. It signals to Iran that Europe is serious about negotiations while avoiding a public confrontation with the US – an important aim given Europe’s security dependence on America. By consistently advocating for zero-weaponization and building European unity around this position, German and European leaders can work to convince the Trump administration that diplomacy offers the only real alternative to war.
Pressuring Israel Against Further Escalation
In addition, Europeans must make clear to Israel that continued escalation of the conflict with Iran will not have European support. Currently, figures within the Israeli cabinet are hinting at regime change. Such talk is extremely dangerous, not least because they encourage the existing government in Iran to undertake drastic actions in the face of a perceived existential threat.
European condemnation of Israeli actions, or even sanctions, may not be sufficient to force the Israeli government to back down without U.S. support. However, a clear stance in opposition to escalation, threats to restrict weapons sales, UN votes, and other forms of pressure, combined with the strategy of lobbying the U.S. to return to the “zero-weaponization” position, may prove fruitful. It is also the best option available.