Violence in a Warming World

Organized violence influences both the impacts of climate change and the politics of its mitigation. While questions often focus on whether climate hazards will spark new conflicts, a more effective approach – highlighted in a recent Geopolitics article – prioritizes reducing the vulnerability of populations already affected by conflict, adopting climate‑mitigation strategies for an increasingly violent world, and coordinating the disruptive effects of the energy transition for fossil‑fuel‑exporting nations.

There is a widely held view among policymakers, journalists, and concerned citizens that climate change will lead to an increase of organized violence. Prominent figures – such as former UN Secretary‑General Ban Ki-moon, the current British monarch, or the Obama administration – have suggested a link between climate change and armed conflict. However, the empirical support for this claim is weak.

A 2019 survey of scholars studying climate‑conflict dynamics found that most see climate change as playing only a minor role in conflict risk, and that its impact would remain limited unless global warming reaches about 4 °C – far beyond the 2 °C target of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, a 2023 book by PRIF researcher Tobias Ide examined major disasters (earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, etc., not all climate‑related) and found they were just as likely to coincide with reductions in conflict intensity as with increases.

However, while climate change itself may play only a minor direct role in sparking armed conflict, the two threats can amplify one another. Nations most vulnerable to climate impacts are often small island states or low‑income countries with recent histories of conflict. War devastates livelihoods, health systems, food security, and access to clean water – resources that are also essential for coping with and adapting to climate hazards. Long‑term infrastructure planning and public‑service investments needed for climate adaptation become extremely difficult amid active conflict.

Military Emissions

Beyond the direct effects of climate change – such as droughts, floods, and other ecological shifts – organized violence also adds to the problem. Fighting uses a lot of energy and releases many greenhouse gases. In recent years, researchers and activists have tried to measure how much carbon is emitted when wars damage the environment. For example, they have counted the emissions from destroying forests in Vietnam and large parts of Gaza. One detailed study looked at the war in Ukraine and found that, in the first 18 months, the fighting released about 77 million tons of CO₂‑equivalent into the atmosphere.

Even after the fighting stops, rebuilding war‑torn areas typically produces far more emissions than the combat itself. Constructing new buildings, moving materials and creating infrastructure all demand large amounts of energy and release additional greenhouse gases. For example, by the late 2010’s, rebuilding buildings destroyed in Aleppo and Homs during the Syrian civil war would, amount to between a quarter and a half of Syria’s annual emissions.

A less obvious point is that most military‑related emissions do not come from the actual fighting itself, but from keeping armed forces ready for future conflicts. The 77 million tons of CO₂‑equivalent attributed to the first 18 months of the war in Ukraine may sound like a lot, yet they represent only about 0.1% of all global emissions. To put this in context, the Center for Conflict and the Environment estimates that the entire defense sector – including all militaries worldwide – accounts for roughly 5.5 % of global emissions.

Climate Change Mitigation Politics

Beyond direct emissions from military activities, war and its preparation also shape the politics of climate‑change mitigation in pivotal ways. A striking example is the EU’s policy shift after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The loss of Russian gas turned renewable energy from a purely environmental objective into a security‑driven necessity. The RePower EU initiative – adopted specifically to offset the loss of Russian gas – sets markedly higher renewable‑energy goals, highlighting how security concerns are reshaping and reinforcing climate‑mitigation priorities.

A similar dynamic unfolded in the United States with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The legislation contains extensive subsidies for renewable‑energy generation, storage, transmission, and electric vehicles. Senator Joe Manchin – whose decisive vote secured the bill – later cited the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the catalyst for his support. The IRA was also propelled by concerns that China could outpace the U.S. in clean‑technology development, framing the legislation as a strategic response to a looming geopolitical challenge.

Both initiatives signal a broader shift in climate‑mitigation policy from neoliberal, price‑based mechanisms toward securitized green industrial policy. Earlier efforts – EU, South Korean, and New Zealand emissions‑trading schemes, Australia’s brief carbon tax, and U.S. cap proposals – relied on market pricing to make carbon‑intensive options costlier and encourage low‑carbon alternatives. By contrast, the EU’s RePower EU plan and the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act direct public and private capital straight into renewable‑energy generation, storage, transmission, and electric‑vehicle infrastructure. In each case, security concerns are propelling a move away from pricing schemes toward an industrial‑policy approach that builds the necessary technological capacity.

Climate Cooperation

In the short term, the heightened risks of warfare risks can push nations to bolster domestic energy security, often spurring greater investment in renewables – as seen in China during the 2010s and Europe in the 2020s. Yet those same security pressures complicate climate cooperation. The Arctic Council, which addresses Arctic challenges including climate change, now fulfills only its minimal mandate. In 2022, China suspended climate talks with the United States after a U.S. legislator visited Taiwan; talks resumed later that year only after extensive diplomatic de‑escalation. Achieving ambitious shared climate goals – such as phasing out fossil fuels and transforming agriculture – will require robust international collaboration. A world where the EU, U.S., China, Russia, and Japan are locked in conflict or preparing for it is, for now, ill‑suited to that cooperation.

Effects of Climate Change Mitigation

In an optimistic scenario where rapid decarbonization succeeds, it will also reshape peace and security dynamics. Accelerating the shift to solar, wind, and battery technologies demands vast quantities of minerals that must be mined, refined, and processed. As NGOs, scholars, and citizens have warned, this surge in mineral extraction carries the same risks of violence in mining communities and broader social harms associated with traditional resource extraction.

Many nations still depend on fossil‑fuel revenues to sustain their governments. The United Nations Environment Program identifies 40 “fossil‑fuel‑dependent” countries, where on average ≈ 38 % of public revenue and ≈ 61 % of exports derive from fossil fuel rents. Some – such as Saudi Arabia – have already launched long‑term diversification strategies, though success is uncertain. Others lack the resources or political consensus to pursue similar reforms. Consequently, a rapid transition driven by falling fossil‑fuel prices could trigger profound structural adjustments and elevate the risk of conflict.

Conclusion

Reviewing the interplay between organized violence and climate change yields three key lessons for citizens and policymakers. First, while climate change contributes modestly to conflict, violent conflict dramatically heightens vulnerability to climate impacts. Thus, the priority for the ‘climate-security’ agenda should be finding ways to reduce vulnerability for conflict‑affected populations. Second, climate mitigation efforts are unfolding in an increasingly violent world, and we cannot ignore this reality when strategizing to address climate change. Instead, we should leverage the energy‑security advantages of wind and solar, challenge wealthy nations that divert climate‑fund commitments to defense spending, and promote green‑technology transfers that reduce securitization. Third, even if short‑term energy‑security concerns do spur clean‑energy production, this alone will not achieve net‑zero emissions. The most challenging aspects, such as phasing out fossil fuels, still demand robust international cooperation.