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A Seat at the Table: Germany’s Role in the War Between the US, Israel and Iran

19. March 2026

Since the US and Israel launched their military campaign against Iran, many in Israel have framed the conflict as the “last war”. Yet military action alone cannot secure long-term stability. Germany occupies a unique position in the context of European diplomacy, maintaining strong ties with both Washington and Jerusalem. Germany should be using its rapport with both administrations to persuade Israel to commit to a comprehensive process of confidence-building measures with both the Palestinians and its neighbors in the region—measures that will ultimately lead to Palestinian statehood. Without such efforts, the region will drift from one escalation to the next. This makes Germany’s proactive diplomacy not only worthwhile, but necessary.

Since the US and Israel launched a broad military campaign against Iran, much of the conversation in Israel has focused on the potential for the current war to be the “last war”, toppling the regime that has long called for Israel’s annihilation. Indeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran has long been characterized as Israel’s existential threat. Iran invested billions in a nuclear program, which, according to the IAEA, has repeatedly been found in non-compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Tehran has also aligned itself with the Anti-Western forces, namely China, Russia, and North Korea (known collectively as CRINK). Iran has built up expansive missile and drone arrays and provided these to Russia for its war against Ukraine. Iran has also funded, armed, and trained militias, armed groups and terror cells across the Middle East and beyond.

Inside Iran, executions of Iranians accused of spying for Israel have significantly increased since last year, following a direct confrontation between the two regional enemies in June 2025. The regime’s Revolutionary Guards Corps have also long oppressed the Iranian people. The latest round of protest repression took place in January, with the regime killing at least 3,000 according to Iranian authorities, and up to 30,000 according to international Human rights organizations. Now, after more than two weeks of military exchanges the conflict has spread to the entire region, while economic shocks are being felt globally.  Yet, while it has been weakened the Iranian regime remains intact, leaving those who hoped for Iranian liberation torn between feelings of hope and growing fear.

A Time for Reckoning

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has framed this war as the way to peace in the Middle East. But this is yet another false promise by Netanyahu. Since the October 7th attacks and Israel’s war in Gaza the Israeli PM has pledged a “total victory”. But any signs of victory have yet to appear. Yes, decimating Iran’s military capabilities could significantly decrease the threat it poses to the region and to Israel in the short term. NYT columnist Thomas L. Friedman recently conjectured the emergence of an “Islamic Republic 2.0”—less repressive to its people and less threatening to its neighbors. However, this is just one scenario and an optimistic one at that. Meanwhile, Israel has intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon and has sent ground forces to establish an “additional security layer” in the southern part of the country.

Yet Military action alone will not achieve long-term stability and peace, neither for Israel nor for the Middle East. With growing uncertainty about Iran’s future, it has become apparent that military intervention has once again been proven insufficient for regime change in the Middle East and potentially destabilizing for the entire region.

The time has come for Israel to reckon with its habit of “living by the sword”. As the transition from the 1973 Yom Kippur War to the peace accords between Israel and Egypt in 1979 showed, sometimes the most unlikely transformations can emerge between once bitter enemies.  In reckoning with its past Israel must recognize that dialogue and diplomacy between neighboring countries must include solutions to root causes of instability in the region. If this truly is the “last war”, then Israel must be willing to commit to actions that it has historically found challenging: a genuine and comprehensive diplomatic process that includes a pathway to regional reconciliation and a two-state solution with the Palestinians. Only through such efforts is there any prospect of long-term stability in the Middle East. Without it, regional inter-state conflicts and intrastate tensions will endure. Yet Israel and the US cannot go it alone, they will need allies from Europe and from the Arab and Muslim world to make it tangible.

Many Israeli politicians and their supporters will dismiss such diplomacy as being representative of what has been dubbed defeatist “October 6th discourse”. But this is simply not true. What is true is that the longer Israel delays confidence-building measures with its neighbors and hampers a path for Palestinian statehood the sooner the next round of war and terror.

Germany’s Strategic Positioning

The war between the US, Israel and Iran has left Berlin in the midst of a European diplomatic quagmire. Policies and stances on Iran vary greatly across countries—Germany has so far placed itself squarely on the side of the US and Israel, with Chancellor Merz saying, “This is not the moment to lecture our partners and allies.” Because international law and the rule-based order are based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, this is undoubtedly a problematic statement. The Chancellor has since expressed concern for the apparent lack of exit strategies for the war in Iran, but in a Europe divided over how to approach the war, Germany seems to currently be better positioned to take up diplomatic dialogue with Israel and the US than either France or the UK. For Israel’s government, British and French recognition of the State of Palestine in September 2025 put a dent in their diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, Trump has consistently swiped at both President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer. While the attitudes toward Paris and London should be called into question, the practical reality is that Germany currently enjoys direct and open diplomatic channels of communication with both the US and Israel.

Chancellor Merz was the first to visit the White House after the war began, was praised by President Trump and, in what seems to be a token of appreciation, was informed of the initial strikes shortly before the first bombs dropped in Iran. This is reflective of a broader perception of Germany’s strategic positioning as unique compared to its E3 partners and others in Europe, especially in Israel. Meanwhile, Germany enjoys exceptional legitimacy in Israeli public opinion, ranking just behind the US and ahead of nearly all other countries in its significance for Israel’s foreign policy. To this effect, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has in recent months led a concentrated effort to strengthen relations with Germany. In this context, German opposition to US and Israeli attacks based only on legal principles would represent a futile gesture that could cost Berlin influence at precisely the moment when it could be used more effectively to shape better outcomes behind closed doors. This, however, should not be construed as letting Germany easily off the hook.

Chancellor Merz may want to strategically maneuver around President Trump’s Interventionist tendencies and disregard for international law to leave open communication channels with both Washington and Jerusalem. But if the Chancellor does not leverage his position to achieve a better outcome for collective security, then it will have all been for nothing. Germany should be translating its rapport with both administrations to persuade them to commit to a comprehensive process of confidence-building measures with the Palestinians and Israel’s neighbors in the region. This can be done with the involvement of both the UN and other allies and partners. Realistically, the goal of such a process is not achievable in the short term, but such an effort would set down the necessary foundations for a safer Middle East, even in the unlikeliest of circumstances.

Germany need not attempt this by itself. Regional partners such as the UAE  and Saudi Arabia are instrumental, bringing regional stability and a tangible contribution to Palestinian statehood while they balance the normalization of relations with Israel. India should also play a central role, given its labor and energy interests in the Sunni Gulf States and Iran’s Chabahar port, not to mention its growing clout in Israeli foreign policy. France and the UK should also be part of any solution, as they were during the talks held by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which led to the development of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. If Germany and these actors band together, they could shape a coalition that moves the region from battlefield logic to diplomatic compromises and political solutions.

None of this guarantees success, and the political conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough remain far from ideal, but the elephant in the room must still be named even as war engulfs the entire region: any lasting resolution to the region’s cycle of escalation ultimately runs through Palestinian statehood. Germany, together with its partners, must be willing to push both Israel and the US toward that path. The current Israeli government presents a particular obstacle. Netanyahu has spent much of his political career resisting Palestinian statehood, and meaningful progress is difficult to envision while his government remains in power. Equally, the Palestinian Authority’s diminished legitimacy among its own population cannot be ignored. Yet these are arguments for looking toward the horizon. The nearing Israeli elections in 2026 may yet produce a leadership more open to compromise, and the same applies to Palestinian political renewal.

Author(s)

Ilai Yaron Levy

Ilai Yaron Levy

Ilai Yaron Levy studiert im Masterstudiengang Vergleichende Demokratie an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt und arbeitet als studentischer Mitarbeiter in der LOEWE-Forschungsgruppe Weltordnungen im Konflikt und am Programmbereich Internationale Institutionen am PRIF. Zuvor war Ilai in der strategischen Beratung zu den Themen Großmachtkonkurrenz und US-israelische Partnerschaft tätig. // Ilai Yaron Levy is studying for a Master’s degree in Comparative Democracy at Goethe University in Frankfurt, and works as a research assistant in the LOEWE Research Group World Orders in Conflict and in the Research Department International Institutions at PRIF. Ilai previously worked in strategic consulting on Great Power Competition and the US-Israel Partnership.