Sudan’s Blue Nile state is becoming a strategic node where the country’s civil war intersects with wider regional power competition. Allegations that neighboring Ethiopia has facilitated Rapid Support Forces (RSF) activity by opening its borders for the RSF to train its fighters and is permitting the United Arab Emirates to use Ethiopia’s airports for logistical transfer are exemplary of the geopolitical problems facing Sudan.

On 11 January 2026, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) airstrikes hit a convoy in Yabus in Blue Nile State, Sudan, killing an unspecified number of people. These airstrikes were the first acts of violence following the SAF’s accusations that Ethiopia has been supporting the paramilitary group, Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Ethiopia is accused of opening its border to the RSF for training camps and allowing the United Arab Emirates to use its airports to ship mercenaries, drones, and jamming devices to the RSF in Sudan’s Blue Nile state. Ethiopia denies this claim. The SAF said the attacked convoy was carrying foreign mercenaries trained in Ethiopia to reinforce the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N/Hilu). The SPLM-N Hilu, however, claimed the strikes killed 93 civilians returning from markets and workplaces.

Since mid-December 2025, the SAF, RSF, and allied forces have mobilized forces in Blue Nile, after news of Ethiopia’s support was reported by the SAF. The airstrikes continued on 22 January in Yabus and Bellila in al-Kurmuk locality. Yabusa is SPLM-N/Hilu stronghold in Blue Nile, while its main stronghold in Sudan is in Kauda town in Nuba Mountains in neighboring South Kordofan state.

The first on-the-ground confrontation between the two groups occurred on 25 January when, after crossing from South Sudan, the RSF and al-Hilu’s faction clashed with the SAF troops in the al-Slik, Malkan, and Ahmir areas of Blue Nile state’s Bau locality. The RSF and SPLM-N/Hilu controlled al-Slik for only a day before the SAF regained control of the area on 26 January. Bau county borders South Sudan and lies between the Blue Nile’s capital, al-Damazin, and the al-Kurmuk locality, which hosts al-Hilu’s stronghold, Yabusa. The fighting continued on 3 February, with the RSF and SPLM-N/Hilu controlling several locations in al-Kurmuk. Sudanese officials indicated that this fighting was assisted by drones and claimed that the drones were launched from bases overseen by the UAE in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) shows that the number of air and drone strikes in Blue Nile increased in February, where 19 strikes with 68 reported fatalities with 30 reported fatalities were recorded — in January, only three air and drone strikes were recorded. The majority of these strikes were conducted by the SAF, while the remaining were conducted by the RSF and SPLM-N/Hilu, jointly known as the Sudan Founding Alliance, or Tasis.

Previously peripheral to the war, the Blue Nile state is fast becoming a focal point where Sudan’s internal conflict intersects with regional rivalries.

Blue Nile as a Gateway to Central Sudan

Because it borders Sennar state, which the SAF has held since early 2025, control of Blue Nile state is strategically significant as it can determine who controls central Sudan. Before the start of the current Sudan war, Blue Nile state’s territorial control was shaped by a mix of government forces and long-held footholds of the al-Hilu faction. The government held most urban and administrative centers, while the RSF, which was part of the government’s security sector, had bases in the capital and other parts of the state. Al-Hilu’s faction held rural areas, especially areas close to the border with South Sudan and Ethiopia. At the start of the war, the SAF seized control of the RSF’s bases in Blue Nile’s capital, al-Damazin. Most fighting in 2023, therefore, involved clashes with al-Hilu’s faction rather than the RSF. The SPLM-N/Hilu focused on defending its territories and maintained a largely neutral stance, despite occasional confrontations with both the SAF and the RSF and intermittent tactical cooperation with the SAF in South Kordofan.

The SAF and RSF confrontation in Blue Nile didn’t intensify until the last quarter of 2024 amid escalating competition for control of Sennar. In November 2024, fighters from the SPLM-N faction led by Malik Agar (SPLM-N/Agar) integrated into the SAF. This move aimed to strengthen the SAF’s manpower and counter growing RSF activity in the state, led by Obeid Abu Shotal, a traditional chief of the Hamaj sub-group of the Funj people and former member of the Agar’s faction. SPLM-N split into two factions in 2017 due to ideological and political differences between Hilu and Agar.

In 2025, the SPLM-N/Hilu shifted from neutrality after joining the RSF-aligned Tasis Alliance, which was formed in February to establish a rival authority to the SAF-led government. The first major joint operation occurred on 25 February 2025, when SPLM-N/Hilu forces, supported by the RSF, overran SPLM-N/Agar positions in Malkan. The battles between the parties have focused on gaining control of strategic locations, such as in and around the capital, al-Damazin, and the al-Tadamon locality, which borders Sennar state. Since late 2024, al-Tadamun’s administrative center, Bout, has been a focal point of fighting in the area, with control shifting between the SAF and RSF. It is currently under the control of the SAF.

In general, since the start of the conflict in April 2023, territorial control in Blue Nile state has not changed much. The SAF still controls most of the urban and administrative centers, and al-Hilu’s faction and the RSF control rural areas.

Through the Tasis Alliance, the RSF has gained access to experienced local fighters and leverages the dynamics of local ethnic groups, which involve disputes over land and authority. Al-Hilu’s SPLM-N has historical links with South Sudan’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and al-Hilu’s deputy ethnic group also resides in neighboring Ethiopia, which enables Hilu’s faction to mobilize fighters from both South Sudan and Ethiopia. Experts consider al-Hilu’s faction in Blue Nile to be the SPLM-N’s militarily dominant faction, making its alignment with the RSF a significant force multiplier. Control of Blue Nile could open routes toward Sennar and simultaneously pressure the SAF in Kordofan, where it is currently fighting the RSF and al-Hilu’s faction for control of the region.

Geopolitical Interests Intersect at the Blue Nile Frontier

As the conflict in the Blue Nile heats up on the ground, sharper focus is being drawn on its wider geopolitical importance for the region. Reports that the RSF and its ally are now receiving the UAE’s military support in Blue Nile through Ethiopia and operating from Ethiopian territory, may draw in Egyptian and Ethiopian forces. Alternatively, they might trigger a proxy confrontation due to the close proximity of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), as well as heightened recent competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

There is a long-standing dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the GERD, in which Sudan has aligned with Cairo. The main dispute, which has stalled negotiations since 2011, is Egypt’s and Sudan’s continued demand for a legally binding agreement to govern the dam’s operation, particularly during multi-year drought periods. Shared concerns over the GERD’s potential to undermine water security have driven deeper military and diplomatic cooperation between Cairo and Khartoum. At the same time, Egypt has expanded defense alliances with Somalia and Eritrea, aimed at countering Ethiopia’s regional influence. Previously, officials from Addis Ababa have also accused Cairo of supporting rebel groups based in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, which hosts the GERD and borders Blue Nile state, to disrupt the completion of the dam. In 2025, Sudanese forces and the Eritrean military provided logistical support to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front-controlled Tigray Defense Forces along the Ethiopian-Sudan border, suggesting opportunities for proxy warfare. Some analysts argue that Cairo may be using the Sudan war to reposition its elements closer to Ethiopia’s western frontier, namely the Benishangul-Gumuz region.

Ethiopia’s interest in counterbalancing Egyptian pressure and its close relations with the UAE led it to facilitate Emirati support of the RSF and to tolerate the RSF’s camps. Ethiopia also views the Blue Nile as a buffer zone that shields the GERD, just like it has established a buffer zone at the border areas with Somalia to shield its territory from Islamist groups operating in Somalia. The dam’s inauguration in September 2025 will limit the likelihood of incurring direct attack from Egypt, because damaging the dam would lead to flooding in Sudan. But were the SAF to gain full control of the Blue Nile, it  would help Egypt to encircle Ethiopia from Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia, increasing pressure on GERD negotiations, something US President Donald Trump recently expressed interest in renegotiating.

Another geopolitical interest is also at play in the Blue Nile, linked to the Gulf rivalry. The RSF’s offensive capabilities depend on an international supply network facilitated by the UAE. Though Abu Dhabi has denied supporting the RSF, reports claim that the UAE has used regional airspace and maritime corridors to sustain the RSF’s operation in Sudan. However, in January 2026, the geopolitical map of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa was altered when the Somali government terminated all agreements with the UAE, prompting the UAE’s withdrawal from Somalia. This collapse of relations was triggered by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the UAE’s extraction of Yemeni separatist Aydarus al-Zubaydi via Somalia territory, without the knowledge of the Somali government. The withdrawal of UAE forces closes the Bosaso smuggling route for the RSF. This shift has created an opening to the UAE’s Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to deepen their influence in the Horn. Saudi Arabia has closed its airspace to UAE aircraft bound for the Kufrah airbase in Libya, which is used to deliver weapons to the RSF in western Sudan. Similarly, Egypt has also closed its airspace to the UAE. Additionally, on 13 January, Egyptian military airstrikes targeted an RSF convoy in the border triangle between Sudan, Libya, and Egypt, one of the RSF’s primary weapon smuggling routes, which it took over on 11 June 2025. These closed airspaces and airstrikes affect the RSF’s main weapon smuggling routes and force the RSF and its supporters to find alternative routes. One of these alternative routes could be via the Blue Nile state through Ethiopia.

What does this Mean for Competition in Blue Nile State?

The 11 January airstrike is the beginning of a new round of violence among the warring parties, after weeks of mobilization in the region. The fight for Blue Nile will focus on strategic locations such as al-Damazin city and al-Kurmuk, and the al-Tadamun localities. Though the closure of Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s airspace to the UAE’s aircraft affects the RSF’s main weapon-smuggling routes, Ethiopia’s close relations with the UAE and its interest in balancing Egypt’s influence in the region might open a new supply route to the RSF in Blue Nile.

Additionally, Trump’s renewed interest in restarting negotiations over the GERD dispute could further accelerate competition in Blue Nile, as Egypt seeks leverage over Ethiopia. The 2019-2020 Trump administration-led talks ended in a stalemate and strained relations with Ethiopia, which accused Washington of abandoning neutrality. In 2020, Trump indicated that Egypt might resort to bombing the dam if no agreement was reached. With the dam now completed and any direct strike likely to affect Sudan as well, Egypt’s options are limited to indirect pressure, including encirclement and the use of proxy arenas around Ethiopia.