Mikhail Polianskii ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Programmbereich Internationale Institutionen des PRIF und im Projekt PATTERN. Er forscht zur Außenpolitik Russlands sowie den Russland-EU/NATO Beziehungen im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheit. // Mikhail Polianskii is Researcher in PRIF’s Research Department International Institutions and the PATTERN project. His research interests are Russia’s foreign policy and the relations between Russia, EU and NATO. | Twitter: @PolianskiiM
Putin will den Konflikt mit der Ukraine nicht ernsthaft lösen. Aber er hält die Friedensverhandlungen am Laufen, weil sie ihm drei wichtige Vorteile bringen, meint Mikhail Polianskii.
As the new U.S. administration pivots toward negotiating a ceasefire in the Ukraine war, the growing nuclear threat from Russia demands urgent attention. Drawing on Cold War history and negotiation research, this analysis highlights how arms control – formal or informal – can help curb nuclear risks even in the most volatile crises. German and transatlantic policy makers should therefore integrate practical arms control and risk reduction measures into ceasefire discussions to safeguard European security and prevent nuclear escalation.
Der am 1. August 2024 in Istanbul durchgeführte Austausch von insgesamt 26 Personen zwischen Russland und mehreren westlichen Ländern ist einer der größten und ungewöhnlichsten Austausche von Gefangenen seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges. Die Entscheidung, zehn russische Agenten im Gegenzug für die Freilassung von 16 in Russland und Belarus inhaftierten russischen und westlichen Politikern und Journalisten aus der Haft zu entlassen, stößt jedoch vor allem in Deutschland auf heftige Kritik.
The March 2023 state visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Russia has attracted significant attention, and has been described as symbolic of growing cooperation between authoritarian states opposed to the current world order. However, as we argue in a recently-published article based on a review of Russian and Chinese expert statements, this partnership should best be understood as a limited, strategically motivated cooperation against shared threat perceptions. Meanwhile, there is much less agreement on normative questions, let alone a shared vision of an alternative world order.
Are dissociation from shared international institutions and the escalation of inter-state conflicts between involved states causally interrelated? Processes of dissociation – defined as the intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of international institutions – occur rather often and might even become a dominant feature of world politics as de-globalisation proceeds. In particular, it remains unclear whether the management of such developments can eventually lead to partial reconciliation or if tensions between the involved states are destined to increase. To answer this question, the following blog entry, summarising the results of one of the case studies of Drifting apart project, analyses the process of Ruxit i.e., the development of relations between Russia and the West after the end of the Cold War.
Just as leaders from across the world gathered in New York to address challenges to global peace and stability, the Russian president Putin declared mobilisation in Russia for the third time in its history. This step, which had formerly was ruled out by Russian officials, indicates that the Kremlin does not have any viable options but to escalate. Even though Putin still prefers to call the war a “special military operation”, he has virtually introduced martial laws across the entire spectrum of Russian economy and society, doubling down on the only gamble that he thinks can still pay off.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine Western countries have imposed devastating sanctions on Russia. This blog argues that the current sanctions-regime help boost Kremlin-propaganda, ultimately diminishing the possibility that sanctions will procure a popular uprising or help stop the war. Western states and private organisations must avoid cultural and academic sanctions against Russians and explore ways of helping and influencing Russian civil society while comprehensive sanctions against Kremlin-linked entities are in place.
As the military standoff over Ukraine continues, both sides have attempted to mobilize international support for their respective positions. While Kiev has received increasingly robust NATO backing, Russia has turned to its “strategic partner” China. A recently published joint Sino-Russian statement has fueled speculation that Beijing could weigh in on Moscow’s side and perhaps even lead to the resurgence of competition between ideological blocs in world politics. However, diverging interests on Ukraine limit such cooperation in the short term. A long-term alignment between both sides is a more serious possibility, but can still be influenced by Western policy choices.
The recent build-up of Russian troops on the border to Ukraine is making waves in the political debate. Predominant views in the West share the assumption that Russia has offensive intentions and aims at revising the established status quo. This blog post argues that Moscow’s motives are not as straightforward as usually assumed in the West. In fact, Russia’s military behavior and its crisis diplomacy suggests that Moscow is more interested in sending a signal than in preparing for war.
