Sitting on Emperor Penguins: The Discomfort of Protecting a Peaceful Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty System has been a success story for international multilateralism, science diplomacy, and environmental protection for decades. However, for some time the system seems incapable of living up to its own commitments, seen in the ongoing failure to grant the quintessential Antarctic icon, the emperor penguin, special protection as an endangered species. Patrick Flamm attended the Treaty’s most recent diplomatic gathering in Hiroshima as an advisor to the German delegation. In this article for PRIF Blog he argues that, because of the significant uncertainty and instability in the international system, it is now warranted to focus on protecting the institutional ecosystem for peaceful cooperation itself.

After Stephen Murray-Smith had been sent on an expedition with the Australian Antarctic Division as a governmental observer in 1985, his book Sitting on Penguins presented a passionate critique of what he witnessed. In Murray-Smith’s view, the Australian programme of the time lacked any deeper intellectual and scientific engagement with the Antarctic continent and was merely “sitting” on it, building polar infrastructure only to maintain an outsized claim to 42 percent of the Antarctic landmass. The book’s title was inspired by a historic polar manual which referred to penguins as a source for survival food, including the description that penguins are “most easily killed by squashing the air out of their lungs for a fairly long period by sitting on them.”

At the most recent Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Hiroshima in May 2026—and despite the best available science advising to do so—there was for the fifth time in a row no consensus on designating the endangered emperor penguin a specially protected species under Annex II of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. While only two countries did not support the proposal (for different reasons), it very much feels like the whole Antarctic Treaty System is sitting on the issue, and in effect on the emperor penguins’ chances to adapt to vanishing sea ice conditions resulting from global climate change. To be sure, the plight of emperor penguins is ultimately more determined by serious global climate action—the paradox of Antarctic environmental protection—than by actions in the Antarctic only.

The widespread frustration over this lack of institutional progress is understandable, however. Antarctic Treaty Parties have previously committed to the protection of Antarctic ecosystems and failing to do so will eventually erode the Antarctic Treaty System’s international legitimacy and exclusive political authority over the Southern polar region. If Treaty parties cannot agree on special protections for the most iconic of Antarctic species, what are they even doing? Just sitting on the continent, squashing the life out of it?

Governing Antarctica as a Nature Reserve, Devoted to Science and Peace

To be clear, the Antarctic Treaty System remains a very successful multilateral forum providing a precious public good. Its arrangements have kept the Antarctic a demilitarised, nuclear-free zone with a robust inspection regime, freedom of science, and international cooperation. These are not just talking points but remain a lived reality, while environmental protections and standards are high. At the same time, the human footprint on the continent is growing steadily, with regulatory challenges such as tourism and other non-governmental actors in need of effective responses.

Antarctic decision-making has, however, slowed down and been hollowed out as it increasingly relies on non-binding soft power instruments instead of legally binding measures. A 2018 Nature editorial even proposed to scrap the consensus-principle in the face of the unfolding decision-making stasis. Yet such a move would be even less geopolitically prudent today than it was when it was proposed, since it is this very consensus-norm that stabilises the whole governance arrangement. Without this veto right, great powers active in Antarctica may as well resort to otherwise unrestrained “might makes right” attitudes.

Far-reaching changes in the international system in the last decade—exemplified in the Trumpist turn of the United States, the aggressively revisionist Russian Federation, and the increasingly assertive People’s Republic of China—have led to violent wars and exacerbated humanitarian, health, environmental as well as economic and energy crises. Given this, it is warranted to re-focus on how Antarctica can remain a space for peaceful cooperation, not least for the sake of Antarctic environments. In this regard there are at least three key points to discuss further.

The end of Antarctic Exceptionalism?

First, great power rivalry and concerns about strategic competition today risk overshadowing Antarctic relations when a treaty partner’s behaviour in the Donbas, South China Sea, or Strait of Hormuz trickles into the area south of 60° South latitude and manifests there as distrust. Often observers simply assume that a state’s resource interests in the Arctic or the moon are automatically the same in the Antarctic. This should be an empirical question about the strength of Antarctic norms and the so called “Antarctic exceptionalism”, however, and not a foregone conclusion based on crude political theories.

In this context, the inspection regime continues to be an effective tool for ensuring peaceful use, transparency, and trustworthiness of Antarctic operations, as most recently illustrated by US inspections of Australian, Chinese, Indian and Russian research stations in January 2026. Still, with the introduction of new technologies such as subsea cables and uncrewed land, air and sea platforms, dual-use concerns will need to be managed carefully in a transparent way. This is already shaping up to be a real test for the peaceful nature of Antarctica.

It’s the Politics, Stupid?

Second, a breakdown of bilateral relations between states outside of Antarctica and unrelated to Antarctic matters can still lead to unsupportive behaviour where one state shows little interest in granting another one any political wins. This non-support has recently taken the form of stalling another state’s request for consultative status or blocking any diplomatic breakthroughs as retribution against the chairing host country.

Contrast this with the situation a decade ago: under President Obama, there were joint US-Russian inspections, an Antarctic-related bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2012, as well as Russian support for the Ross Sea Marine Protected Area in 2016, and US-China rapprochement was critical for getting the Paris Agreement over the line. Add today’s energy and resources crises, cuts to science funding, as well as rollback of environmental rules to great power politics, and it seems rather unlikely that an agreement like the Antarctic Treaty could be concluded under current conditions. This is not even accounting for the real possibility that US Antarctic policy might change abruptly and without any larger strategic rationale.

Raising the Stakes?

Third, this counterfactual reflection leads to a clear strategic difference between Russia and China. Beijing is a relative newcomer, shaping the Antarctic order according to its interests, whereas Moscow has a clear stake in the current system with its Cold War origins. At the same time, Chinese polar power capacities in science, technology, and various logistical platforms can be expected to further increase while Russian capabilities are stagnating at best. Accordingly, Russia needs the ATS for influence in Antarctic affairs, while China could potentially go without if it does not develop a large enough sense of ownership of the Antarctic Treaty System.

How then to deal with consensus-blockage against these geopolitical stakes? In consensus-systems with asymmetrically dependent parties, where one actor values institutional continuity less than the others, pressuring or shaming this actor into compliance is unlikely to work. Instead, strategies to engage with persistent consensus-blockers could include initiatives to raise their stake in the regime while acknowledging their constraints, which often stem from domestic politics.

One such initiative that may be of interest to China—the global leader in green tech development—could be the idea of a forever ban on Antarctic hydrocarbon resources. Antarctic diplomacy needs to be mandated and resourced well enough to creatively seek and try any workable options. Once a viable initiative for cooperation has been found, great power ownership of the issue—and thus higher-level ministerial involvement—is the next diplomatic step to be worked on. Such an ambitious approach clearly demands a higher political priority and a diplomatic step-up from business as usual for most middle and small powers with a stake in a protected and peaceful Antarctica. Again, this is not accounting for what the White House would think about any such initiative.

Weathering the Storm, and then?

Finally, these reflections may mean—at least in the near term—the discomforting acceptance of slower progress and imperfect compromises regarding environmental regulation in exchange for maintaining the institutional ecosystem that enables peaceful cooperation at all. Protecting Antarctica environmentally today means protecting the Antarctic Treaty System, despite its shortcomings, until great power relations allow for a different type of Antarctic decision-making again. This may take a while. In the long term, however, it is not enough to weather the storm if we ultimately find ourselves lost at sea without any sense of direction.

To move beyond mere damage control, we must also work toward more aspirational goals that can guide our long-term efforts. Some of these can already be found in existing principles from the Environmental Protocol, such as the idea of Antarctica’s “intrinsic value”. Other more far-reaching ideas have been developed by the Antarctic Rights-initiative. Yet the overall project of a peaceful and protected Antarctica will ultimately fail if it becomes a permanent exercise in postponing failure rather than creating success. The discomfort of “sitting on emperor penguins” is a stark reminder of what is ultimately at stake.

Author’s Note: I would like to express my gratitude to Alan D. Hemmings and Stefan Kroll for thoughtful comments on a draft version of this piece. The opinion expressed here is a personal one and cannot be attributed to the German ATCM delegation.