The Rise of the Radical Right Across Latin America

Across Latin America, a number of left-wing governments have recently lost elections to staunchly right-wing candidates. These candidates aim to roll back hard-won social gains. However, their approaches vary from country to country and they do not share a single recipe for success. In the following article, based on a German-language contribution to the journal Welt-sichten, PRIF’s Jonas Wolff reviews key characteristics and dynamics associated with the rise of the radical right across Latin America. 

Latin America is currently experiencing a shift to the political right, a trend that became undeniable in June 2026 with the narrow election victories of both Abelardo de la Espriella in Colombia and Keiko Fujimori in Peru. Since 2023, right-wing candidates have won 13 of the 17 presidential elections on the subcontinent. The only center-left candidates to prevail were Bernardo Arévalo in Guatemala (2023), Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico (2024), and Yamandú Orsi in Uruguay (2024). Added to this is the special case of Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro was able to avoid defeat in 2024 only through blatant election fraud. The fate of President Lula’s government in Brazil will be decided in the runoff election on October 25, and most signs point to another shift toward the radical right, represented in this case by candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of the convicted former President, Jair Bolsonaro. 

Some two decades after a shift to the left in Latin America — also known as the “pink tide” — the region’s political landscape is now largely occupied by conservative and far-right forces. Memories of charismatic left-wing leaders like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia are fading. Instead, public attention is now focused on figures like Javier Milei, Argentina’s chainsaw-wielding, right-wing libertarian president; Nayib Bukele, El Salvador’s president and self-proclaimed “coolest dictator”; the Bolsonaros in Brazil; or Chile’s new head of state, José Antonio Kast.  

Last but certainly not least: U.S. President Donald Trump, who, by unscrupulously advocating for right-wing candidates serving his agenda, has become the central figure, ally, and reference point for the new Latin American right. It is no coincidence that during the Colombian election campaign, Abelardo de la Espriella presented himself as a mix of Milei, Bukele, and Trump, promising a radical downsizing of the state à la Argentina, a tough, military-style crackdown on organized crime à la El Salvador, and, following the U.S. president’s model, an unconditional fight against anything even remotely “leftist” or “woke.” 

The Shift to the Right: More Than Just a Pendulum Swing 

At first sight, the current shift to the right in the region looks like yet another pendulum swing, a phenomenon well known not only in Latin America. Especially in times of high dissatisfaction, people tend to vote out incumbent governments—and if those governments were previously on the left, they simply opt for the right-wing alternative. The impression of a normal pendulum swing is reinforced by the fact that, to date, hardly any right-wing government has managed to remain in power for more than one legislative term. In cases where right-wing heads of government replaced left-wing predecessors early on—such as Mauricio Macri in Argentina (2015–2019), Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2019–2023), and Sebastián Piñera in Chile (2018–2022)—the population subsequently opted for left-wing alternatives. El Salvador’s Bukele, who has been in office since 2019, is the exception that so far still proves the rule.  

However, this by no means implies that the current shift to the right will remain a mere episode. For this is not a conventional movement from the left to the right. Rather, we are witnessing the rise of a new and far more radical right, one that aims to fundamentally reshape the societies of the region. Despite its diversity, the current political right in the region is fundamentally aimed at rolling back social progress in the legal recognition and inclusion of marginalized social groups. Scholars Leigh Payne, Julia Zulver, and Simón Escoffier have characterized this movement as a “right against rights”. 

Additionally, we also see Latin American security policies becoming fixated on violent repression. Following the model of Bukele and Trump, right-wing forces propagate military action against both alleged and actual criminal groups without any regard for human rights. The culture war that the new right-wing forces are deliberately driving forward also undermines central elements of the already precarious basic consensus of Latin American democracies, which had replaced the military dictatorships of the Cold War era. In Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the brutal military coups and regimes of earlier decades are once again being officially defended, and much of the societal process of coming to terms with those dark years is in danger of being undone.  

Socially, the Latin American right today relies, on the one hand, on its traditional pillars — such as established right-wing parties, economic elites, the military, and the Catholic Church — and, on the other hand, on a broad spectrum of actors from think tanks, evangelical churches, and the digital sphere. Added to this are transnational networks that connect right-wing forces in the region with like-minded groups in the U.S. and Europe. 

Causes of the Right-Wing Trend 

So, if this is more than just a societal mood swing, what are the causes of the shift to the right? Public dissatisfaction suggests that the less-than-convincing track record of left-wing governments in previous years and decades has played a role in the rise of the right. Admittedly, the current situation can also be attributed to external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and global upheavals resulting from international wars. But the left-wing governments of the 2000s and 2010s failed to fundamentally transform the region’s extractivist development model, which continues to be one-sidedly focused on the export-oriented exploitation of natural resources, nor could they reduce severe social inequalities in a sustainable way. Added to this, quite a few leftist governments governed in increasingly authoritarian ways and had to confront major corruption scandals. 

Paradoxically, the political right is also benefiting from the successes of left-wing governments and, more broadly, from the social changes spearheaded by Indigenous, peasant, and feminist movements, human rights organizations, and labor unions. For decades social movements across the region have fought to advance the legal recognition, political participation, and socioeconomic inclusion of marginalized social groups. Right-wing forces are now mobilizing against these social changes, adopting the international right-wing strategy of combatting “gender ideology” in defense of religion and the traditional family model. Prominent figures on the right frequently use language that is openly racist against Indigenous and Afro-Latin American populations as well as migrants. This discourse is part of a more general and international right-wing backlash against political reform and social change, with reactionary movements from Europe to Latin America promising the restoration of an imaginary “grand old order.”  

Another driver of the shift to the right is the crisis of internal security, which is real on the one hand (albeit varying greatly from place to place), yet is being dramatized in the media and in politics on the other. In the election victories of Bukele in El Salvador (2024), Daniel Noboa in Ecuador and Kast in Chile (2025), as well as de la Espriella and Fujimori in Colombia and Peru (2026), crime, criminal violence, and the promise of a “hard-line” (Mano dura) security policy were central issues. The same applies to Flávio Bolsonaro’s current presidential campaign in Brazil. In Argentina and Bolivia, by contrast, the right wing is mobilizing primarily on the promise of reining in a supposedly bloated and corrupt state through neoliberal economic reforms. 

No Universal Recipe for Political Success 

In this respect, there is neither a unified Latin American right, nor do its representatives have a universal recipe for political success. Rather, Latin American right-wing forces combine social conservatism, “mano dura” security policies, and economic neoliberalism in ways specific to each country. While internal security is the central focus in El Salvador and Ecuador, Milei’s discourse and policies in Argentina revolve around economic reforms. In contrast to Kast in Chile, who combines social conservatism with a neoliberal economic orientation, both Ecuador’s Noboa and Bolivia’s newly elected Rodrigo Paz presented themselves as socially progressive centrists and promised economic reforms without overly harsh cuts. 

Ultimately, right-wing forces — especially their more radical representatives — also benefit from the ongoing structural transformation of the public sphere and, in particular, from the rise of digital communication. Right-wing parties and their bases know how to use these tools particularly effectively for their own purposes and frequently orchestrate disinformation campaigns and hate speech.  

The trajectory of the shift to the right also varies from country to country. In Colombia, for example, de la Espriella’s extremely narrow election victory, and the remarkably strong showing of his left-wing opponent Iván Cepeda, are less signs of a broad societal trend rightward than of extreme political polarization. Here, the shift to the right is taking place primarily within the political right-wing camp, namely from the conventional — though already quite radical — right centered on former President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) to the openly far-right outsider de la Espriella.  

In Bolivia, by contrast, the moderate candidate Rodrigo Paz prevailed over a significantly more right-wing opponent in October 2025 and only became an avowed right-winger after the election. Noboa in Ecuador also originally presented himself as a center-left candidate and only shifted to a clear right-wing course once he was in the presidential palace.  

Coup Strategies Are by No Means Out of the Question 

The consequences of the political success of the right for democracy are ambivalent. On the one hand, the integration of right-wing forces into parliaments and governments channels their demands and mobilization dynamics into institutional frameworks. This reduces the risk of democracy being destabilized from outside its institutions, as was the case with Latin American military coups of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, Jair Bolsonaro’s well-documented attempt to use any means available to prevent the transfer of power to President Lula da Silva in 2023 shows that coup strategies are far from being ruled out when radical right-wing forces are confronted with a loss of power. 

So far, however, the ruling right-wing parties have not openly challenged democracy and have avoided a break with the constitutional order. Instead, there is a gradual undermining of democracy and of social peace, with many far-reaching consequences. For example, during the roughly seven years of the Bukele administration, El Salvador has undergone a clear process of autocratization. Democratic institutions have been undermined beyond recognition, accompanied by serious human rights violations. Ecuador has followed a similar path since President Noboa declared war on the country’s criminal groups in early 2024 — a trend that has intensified since early 2026 through joint military operations with the U.S. Nevertheless, the political situation in this South American Andean nation remains significantly more uncertain and volatile than in El Salvador.  

Polarization Is Deliberately Exacerbated 

Both countries clearly demonstrate that a one-sided tough-on-crime approach, which simultaneously serves as a justification for restricting civil society and democratic oversight bodies, jeopardizes democracy and human rights. In Argentina, too, the Milei administration is attempting to undermine the potential for social resistance through legal restrictions and political repression. 

Furthermore, current right-wing governments are working to dismantle group-specific rights. The goal is to secure or restore traditional privileges and hierarchies at the expense of historically marginalized groups. This runs counter to the participation of Indigenous and Afro-Latin American groups, women, and minorities with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities — areas in which the region had made significant progress in recent decades. In a shift that is new for Latin America, but fully in line with Donald Trump’s agenda, the new right-wing governments in Chile and Colombia have also explicitly mobilized against migrant communities. Added to this is a general tendency to erode the boundaries of public discourse and the construction of enemy stereotypes. Polarization is thus deliberately intensified while fundamental norms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts are undermined.  

All of these policies are met with resistance — in some cases strong resistance— across the region. Should the current shift to the right take hold, the signs hardly point to stability. This is especially true given that right-wing governments have so far shown no indication that they have plausible strategies for fulfilling the promise of a new dynamic of economic development — nor do they make any mention of a socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable development path. 

Jonas Wolff

Editors note: This text was first published in German language in Welt-Sichten: Vormarsch der radikalen Rechten | Welt-Sichten