In December 2024, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, attacked Pakistani security forces. The Taliban, who have taken refuge in Afghanistan, have been targeting Pakistan from their base in Afghanistan. This incident is part of a series of attacks that have been taking place since 2021, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Initially, it was expected that the return of the Afghan Taliban would benefit Pakistan’s strategic interests. However, the opposite has happened. This article examines why and how the TTP is catalysing a gradual deterioration of the relationship between the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af-Pak).
Recent Skirmishes
Amidst a series of escalating events spanning between October 2024 and January 2025, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan reached new heights. In October 2024, a senior TTP leader, Ustad Qureshi, was killed by Pakistan. This action was met with a retaliatory attack by TTP militants on a Pakistani military outpost in the vicinity of Dera Ismail Khan, resulting in the death of 10 Pakistani security personnel. On December 21, the TTP attacked security forces posted near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, resulting in the deaths of 16 Pakistani security personnel. The assailants destroyed the outpost and seized military equipment. In retaliation, on December 24, Pakistani military aircraft bombarded Afghanistan’s eastern province of Paktika, killing 46 Afghans. Pakistan claimed that the strikes aimed to destroy the hideouts and training facilities of the TTP. However, Afghanistan asserted that the casualties included refugees from Waziristan who had fled Pakistan, predominantly women and children. These attacks occurred while Pakistan’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Mohammad Sadiq, was visiting Afghanistan to discuss various bilateral issues aimed at enhancing relations between the two countries. It remains unclear whether he was aware of the military operation in advance or if there was a communication gap between Pakistan’s military and civilian authorities.
Afghanistan treats TTP as ‘guests’ and has vowed to retaliate. Afghan defence minister on X social media platform said, “The Islamic Emirate will not leave this cowardly act unanswered but rather considers the defence of its territory and sovereignty to be its inalienable right.” In response to the aerial attacks, the Afghan Defence Ministry stated that they had targeted ‘several points’ beyond the ‘hypothetical line,’ as Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line drawn by the colonial British between the two nations. On December 28th, however, Pakistan claimed to have thwarted an infiltration attempt by the Afghan Taliban, who attacked military outposts near the border, allegedly killing 15 militants. Pakistan launched mortar attacks on three bordering villages in Afghanistan’s Khost Province on 2nd January 2025.
In light of these recent events, the resurgence of the Pakistani Taliban has significant implications for the geopolitical dynamics of the Af-Pak region. This article will explore the potential consequences of this development on Af-Pak relations.
Pakistan-Taliban Relationship: Pre-2021
Pakistan, along with the United States, had longstanding ties with the mujahideen, Afghanistan’s Islamic insurgency that fought against the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, toppling its government in 1992. Pakistan was one of the few countries to recognise the Taliban, a Sunni Islamist nationalist pro-Pashtun movement, and the most powerful faction within the mujahideen when it came to power in Afghanistan in 1996 after years of infightings. Over the years, the Taliban’s Haqqani network, responsible for many deadly attacks, was based in Pakistan, and was used strategically by the Pakistan government to covertly pursue its interests. This led Hillary Clinton, who was the US Secretary of State at the time, to remark, “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours.” Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan to destroy the al-Qaida terrorist network that was responsible, and which had been operating in the country. Pakistan became a major ally and strategic partner in the US’s so-called War on Terror, largely due to its strong influence in the region and considerable sway over the extremists. However, this destroyed Pakistan’s alliances with many extremist groups that it had deployed covertly for state-sponsored terrorism. With the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden by US forces in Abbottabad in 2011, Pakistan lost credibility with both its US partner and with extremists. In August 2021, after two decades of fighting, the US and its allies left Afghanistan, handing power to the Afghan Taliban. Imran Khan, the former cricketer turned politician who was then the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan, lauded the Afghan Taliban’s return to power, saying “Afghan Taliban has broken the shackles of slavery”. In this context, Pakistan hoped to revive its partnership with the Taliban.
The Rise of the TTP
Pakistan’s offensive against al-Qaida in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a semi-autonomous tribal region of Pakistan, has led to an upsurge in the TTP. FATA was governed by the federal government since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. In 2018 the region was merged with the neighbouring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. For long it has been the hideout of numerous militant groups. One of Pakistan’s main grievances is the US drone policy, which has killed many ordinary civilians and targeted prominent militants. Baitullah Mehsud founded the TTP in 2007, and it is recognised “as an umbrella organisation of various hardline Sunni Islamist groups operating individually in Pakistan.” The aim of the TTP is to dethrone the Pakistani government and “establish an emirate based on its interpretation of Islamic law”, a Taliban-style regime similar to the one in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s military and foreign investment interests are the group’s primary targets. US-led drone strikes killed Baitullah in 2009 and his successor Hakimullah Mehsudin in 2013. Noor Wali Mehsud currently leads the group after being led by Mullah Fazlullah (killed in a drone strike in 2018), who is not from the Mehsud tribe. During this time, the group has witnessed the splintering of multiple factions. The group was behind the assassination of former Pakistan PM Benazir Bhutto and attack on Noble Peace Prize Educationist Malala Yousafzai. The TTP shares ideological similarities with the Afghan Taliban, including a commitment to establishing an Islamic state governed by their strict interpretation of Sharia law, as well as their opposition to foreign influence, particularly Western influence. As a result, the TTP provided the Afghan Taliban with recruits and shelter during the latter’s fight against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Because of the TTP’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of sponsoring and harbouring terrorism and not doing enough to curb the threat. Afghanistan, on the other hand, is reluctant to put too much pressure on the TTP. Domestically, it fears the TTP’s alliance with the regional Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), which is conducting operations against Taliban security forces and represents a significant threat to Taliban rule.
Post US Withdrawal in 2021
In November 2022, the TTP unilaterally ended the ceasefire with the Pakistani government after months of talks hosted by Afghanistan failed to resolve the cross-border crisis. Following the collapse of the ceasefire, the TTP ordered its fighters to resume attacks across Pakistan, intensifying violence in various regions. Inside Afghanistan, Pakistan began targeting TTP leaders. An attack in Pakistan in March 2023 killed five Chinese nationals. The Pakistani government blamed the TTP for the attack. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has huge investments in Pakistan. China has urged Pakistan to minimise security risks and has been vocal about the security situation, in which its nationals are increasingly targeted. In June 2024, Pakistan launched its new counter-insurgency operations entitled ‘Azm-e-Istkeham’, which in Urdu means ‚resolve for stability‘. It will focus on both internal security threats and cross-border armed insurgency from across Afghanistan. The TTP is the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan and is supported by the Taliban government to carry out cross-border attacks in Pakistan, according to a 2024 UN report. The report also states that the total number of TTP fighters in Afghanistan is between 6,000 and 6,500. The groups has been using NATO weapons left behind during the withdrawal. Pakistan has also claimed that in exchange for assurances that the TTP would not target Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban demanded 10 billion Pakistani rupees ($35 million) for the relocation of TTP members. The Taliban deny the claim. The TTP has warned that it will continue to target the Pakistani military run businesses.
What Does the Future Hold?
The situation is still evolving. The above mentioned UN report states, “TTP could transform into an umbrella organization for other terrorist groups. In the medium term, a potential merger of TTP and AQIS [Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent] could escalate the threat against Pakistan, and eventually India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.” It is therefore likely that the region will soon be roiled once again by the growing links between various extremist groups that can use Afghanistan as a safe haven. Eventually, the negative impact would not be limited to the bilateral exacerbation in the Af-Pak region. World powers must therefore rethink their policies towards the region, before it is too late.
Suparna Banerjee
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