How Germany Can Act Against the „Shadow Fleet“ and Shape International Order

The “shadow fleet” – a collection of substandard shipping vessels with opaque ownership used to evade international sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil exports – has recently adopted the tactic of sailing without a valid national flag. This affords a rare opportunity for European states to take decisive action against “shadow fleet” ships within the bounds of international law. Doing so will not just harry the “shadow fleet” and weaken Russian war funding but will actively shape the re-emerging global order in favor of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law at sea. For Germany and other European states, however, domestic legal reforms will be necessary to give effective teeth to sanctions and make the most of this opportunity.

Since 2022, a so-called “shadow fleet” has kept Russian hydrocarbons flowing to international buyers. By sailing under the flags of other countries, this collection of tankers has been able to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil and gas exports. The basic international legal principle of flag state control – which grants a state jurisdiction over any ships registered under its flag – has frustrated policymakers, limiting Europe to sanctions rather than seizures, while high-risk tankers fueling the Russian war economy continue to sail through congested European waters. Thus, European states committed to legal order in domestic and foreign affairs have faced a quandary: how to curb the „shadow fleet” phenomenon without embracing lawlessness?

Vessels without Nationality in the “Shadow Fleet”: Opportunity and Legal Gap

However, over the past year, the “shadow fleet” has adopted the unusual behavior of sailing under false national flags, the effect of which is to place ships in a legal gray zone. Issuing a flag is a state prerogative, but many small states have outsourced the functioning of their registry of ships to a private vendor. For several years, private, fraudulent registries have issued paperwork on behalf of states that have not authorized them to do so. After losing access to traditional havens like Panama, „shadow fleet“ ships turned to these vendors in 2025 to keep the „shadow fleet“ afloat. Many now  falsely claim the flag of nations like Guyana, Cameroon, or Curacao, which have raised the alarm about these unauthorized claims of nationality.

Vessels without nationality (sometimes referred to as stateless vessels) sit in a legal gray area – some scholars argue that any state may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel without nationality as if it were flying that state’s flag. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law, the flag state normally has exclusive jurisdiction over a ship. Generally, states treating a foreign ship as its own are violating the flag state’s right to the freedom of navigation. However, in cases where a ship is sailing without a flag, there is no flag state to harm. The argument that these vessels could be lawless voids if left unchecked creates a compelling argument for states committed to international order at sea to assert jurisdiction over vessels without nationality. Under UNCLOS Article 110, states may approach and inspect vessels suspected of being stateless, but it is silent on what states can do next. This creates a legal opening, but states must want to enforce its law over stateless vessels and have the domestic legal tools to do so.

Since the “shadow fleet” adopted the tactic of sailing under false flags, maritime security and law experts have asked why more European Sea states lack the will to seize both the opportunity and the stateless shadow tankers. The latest German example came January 28, when MdB Robin Wagener (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) asked Foreign Minster Johann Wadephul (CDU) why Germany was not taking stronger action against the shadow fleet, given its shift to using false flags. Wadephul responded that a valid legal process was vital to German interests, and that “We have a law of the sea…which is not fully suited to this current situation.” This  captures the fundamental problem: most domestic legal systems remain ill-equipped to deal with commercial vessels without nationality. This gap throws legal finish – i.e. the ability to translate boarding and seizure into a successful prosecution – into question.

Domestic Hurdles to Seizing Vessels without Nationality

The domestic legal problems boil down to jurisdiction and enforcement. Many national laws relevant to sanctions enforcement do not clearly apply to ships without nationality. This may create fatal weakness in any domestic court. Germany appears to fall into this group. However, some states have begun legislating with such vessels in mind.

A 2025 Indian law allows the government to seize any vessel without nationality found in India’s exclusive economic zone, which may have been used in February 2026 to seize tankers associated with Iranian oil smuggling. The UK’s Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2018) covers ships “not registered under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom” – i.e. vessels without nationality – but owned by persons with UK links. The US has numerous statutes and decades of practice asserting jurisdiction over stateless vessels, and likely relied on this tradition when seizing tankers off Venezuela.

Germany, on the other hand, does not appear to have any relevant laws that explicitly cover vessels without nationality. The Strafgesetzbuch limits jurisdiction to German ships, and exceptions in sections 5 and 6 are unlikely to apply to sanctions violations. Likewise, SanktDG is limited to German nationals. At least two environmental protection laws apply to all vessels in Germany’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including vessels without nationality, but involve only fines of 10,000 or 50,000 euro for specific infractions, which seem unlikely to be an effective deterrent. Similarly, France, which has seized two sanctioned tankers to much fanfare, quickly released each. In the most recent case, the ship was simply fined for failing to provide evidence of its nationality.

However, Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 3m prohibits the “purchase, import, or transfer” [emphasis added] of Russian petroleum products. Explicitly extending this to vessels without nationality in EU Regulations and German law could offer a basis for seizing sanctioned vessels without nationality and their cargoes. Simultaneous legal reform by multiple EU members concerned by the „shadow fleet“ would create more enforcement options and signal a European interpretation of jurisdiction over vessels without nationality to both Russia and international courts. This is particularly true if these actions are framed as part of a campaign of legal statecraft to use law as a core tool of state power to shape international affairs during this moment of evolving global order.

Enforcement powers are another important hurdle, but one where current German law may be sufficient, if insufficiently explicit. The SeeAufgG articulates the Bund’s responsibility for Schifffahrtspolizei activity “seawards of German coastal waters as permitted or required by international law.” This flexible wording could cover stateless vessels, but explicit clarity that it does so would announce or reinforce this as Germany’s interpretation.

Consider two clearer European examples. The UK’s Policing and Crime act explicitly extends English law to vessels without nationality in international waters and authorizes British law enforcement to exercise their powers in enforcing these laws. Similarly, French law authorizing Marine Nationale police activity explicitly includes vessels without nationality in French waters (including the EEZ) and the high seas.

Russia’s Response

Russia will surely push back, but whether it does so with rhetoric, posturing, or legal cases, German and European action will be worthwhile. In a February 17 interview, senior Russian official Nikolai Patrushev decried Western actions and stated that the “first step” in their response would use diplomatic and legal mechanisms. Russia plans to hit back first in international courts, but that is also an acceptable risk. A case at ITLOS would reinforce international law as Praxis, while clarifying the international law on jurisdiction over vessels without nationality. Petrushev also uggested that if legal challenges failed, Russia would use its navy to escort Russian ships. However, open-ended, long-distance escort patrols could quickly stretch Russia’s reduced naval fleet to a breaking point, particularly if European states make seizures in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, rather than the Baltic Sea.

More likely, however, is that Russian-aligned ships will simply start sailing under the Russian flag, trading risk and shadows for transparency and security. This would put European jurisdiction back into a by-exception and by-case situation. But it wouldn’t make domestic legal reform a waste. Far from it. Laws and the willingness to enforce them could deter other ships from replicating the „shadow fleet’s“ false flag tactics. And if passed quickly, an expanded German legal toolkit could net a few ships before the entire „shadow fleet“ could fully shift its behavior.

A “wehrhafte Ordnung” requires states to be equipped to uphold international law. By making domestic legal changes, Germany – either alone or in coordination with European allies – will be armed to strike a partial blow at the „shadow fleet“ and the Russian war economy if the political will to act can be found. The “shadow fleet’s” behavior will surely adjust, so a focus on vessels without nationality will not be a perfect solution – but it is a start. And perhaps more importantly, this action, if taken as part of a broader strategy of legal statecraft, can allow Germany to shape the emerging global order to advance its interests in a stable, accountable, rules-based international society.