When Western voices described the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as an attack on the “rules-based” or “liberal” international order, it was always implied that it was Western states, and the USA in particular, that safeguarded international law after the Second World War. However, it was primarily Afro-Asian states that defended the rules-based order during the Cold War when aggressions challenged the inviolability of international borders. A closer look at this history can help to develop concepts for the validity of international norms – especially for a Europe that is in danger of becoming an object of great power politics in the future.
Schlagwort: China
Festhalten an der regelbasierten internationalen Ordnung: Wie Europa als Allianz kleiner Staaten gegenüber den Supermächten bestehen kann
Wenn westliche Stimmen den russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine im Februar 2022 als Angriff auf die „regelbasierte“ oder „liberale“ internationale Ordnung beschrieben haben, schwang dabei stets mit, dass es westliche Staaten und insbesondere die USA waren, die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg das Völkerrecht sicherten. Es waren jedoch vor allem afro-asiatische Staaten, die während des Kalten Kriegs die regelbasierte Ordnung verteidigten, wenn Aggressionen die Unverletzlichkeit internationaler Grenzen infrage stellten. Eine nähere Betrachtung dieser Geschichte kann helfen, zukunftsfähige Konzepte für die Geltungskraft internationaler Normen zu entwickeln – gerade für ein Europa, das Gefahr läuft, zukünftig zur Verhandlungsmasse der Großmächte zu werden.
Confronting Antarctic Security. Let’s stop chasing spectres at the South Pole!
Antarctica is often celebrated as a continent of peace and science. All ‘measures of a military nature’ – other than logistic and technical support for scientific endeavours – are prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty, which remains widely observed some 66 years after it was negotiated in 1959. However, conversations about ‘Antarctic security’ appear to be increasing in frequency and salience. Rather than chasing military and national security spectres at the South Pole, we should invest more in diplomatic and political efforts to ensure the ongoing effective and peaceful management of the Antarctic.
Germany’s Fragmented Approach to Disinformation in 2025 Elections
With elections taking place in less than a month, Germany finds itself faced with a critical challenge: foreign influence and disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic processes. As Anne Applebaum warns, authoritarian regimes are no longer passive observers but rather active participants in spreading narratives that target the core ideals of freedom and democracy. In Germany, the government’s fragmented approach to countering disinformation only underscores the urgent—and, given recent developments, long overdue—need for a more proactive strategy for better understanding and addressing disinformation–during elections and beyond them.
Going over the Guardrails? China Policy in the 2024 US Election
No matter who wins the US presidential elections in November, the United States will likely continue a more confrontative China policy launched under Trump in 2017. A second Trump administration, however, would likely mean an end to the Biden-era “guardrails” against escalation. It would also make it much harder for Europe to assert its own interests and conduct an independent China policy.
With or Without you: Climate Policy After the US Elections
The potential re-election of Donald Trump would be a setback for the US climate policy of recent years. Although emissions reductions remain insufficient, climate policy has been a priority under President Joe Biden. The attempts to find a cooperative format with China despite geopolitical tensions deserve special attention, as I argue in this blog post. This approach could also set an example for European and German foreign policy if Trump is re-elected. In any case, Germany and Europe must assume even greater responsibility and leadership in this policy area. This means meeting their own commitments and helping others to do the same.
Segmentierung des Cyberspace? Chinas und Russlands Decoupling-Bestrebungen und ihre Konsequenzen
Seit einigen Jahren zeichnet sich ein besorgniserregender Trend ab: Autoritär geprägte Staaten entkoppeln sich zunehmend von den globalen Internet-Infrastrukturen durch den Aufbau eigener IT-Systeme und -Infrastrukturen. Mittelfristig könnte diese Entwicklung zu einer Aufteilung des Cyberspace in unabhängig voneinander funktionierende Teile führen. Eine solche Segmentierung kann Bestandteil strategisch-außenpolitischer Interessensdurchsetzung sein. Damit wird die ohnehin brüchige Stabilität des Cyberraums nachhaltig untergraben und das Risiko schwerwiegender Cyberattacken erhöht.
Do regime differences shape developmental engagement? How China and Japan compete in post-coup Myanmar
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has left the country significantly isolated on the world stage. Politically, foreign governments have avoided recognizing the junta rulers, although quasi-official engagement is still underway. Economically, foreign investments into Myanmar have dropped by 42% from 2021 to 2022, off levels that had already massively decreased since the 2017 Rohingya expulsion. However, despite the international outcry over the new regime’s open warfare against civilians and the escalating violence in Myanmar’s multi-front civil war, both China and Japan have remained engaged in development cooperation, pursuing ambitious projects for economic corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) that were contracted under the deposed civilian government; in the case of China, even some new projects have been launched.
Germany’s New China Strategy: A Defensive Shift
After a lengthy process of internal deliberation, the German government released its China strategy on July 13. The document signals a policy shift away from the business-focused approach taken by previous governments, and towards a “de-risking” of ties with China. It also reframes the relationship by stressing elements of competition and even rivalry, based on the perception that Chinese authoritarianism is becoming a threat to Germany and its role in the world. Instead of seeking to transform autocracies through engagement, the new approach is much more about shoring up Germany’s own system.
The Power of Not Using Power: China and the Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement
The intensifying systemic rivalry between great powers also involves contesting the most effective approaches to conflict resolution and mediation. The most recent Beijing-mediated détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran has ignited heated debates regarding its longevity and China’s rising profile in the region. While the Middle East may still be a region largely inhospitable to outsider mediation, there are three good reasons why Beijing’s latest foray into Middle East peace diplomacy may be effective. The article argues that China’s hitherto successful mediation between Saudi and Iran lies in its power of not using power—the ability to leverage its growing geoeconomic influence while refraining from the use of coercive power in regional affairs. This approach aims at providing an alternative approach to external powers’ engagement in Middle East peace affairs.
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