With elections taking place in less than a month, Germany finds itself faced with a critical challenge: foreign influence and disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic processes. As Anne Applebaum warns, authoritarian regimes are no longer passive observers but rather active participants in spreading narratives that target the core ideals of freedom and democracy. In Germany, the government’s fragmented approach to countering disinformation only underscores the urgent—and, given recent developments, long overdue—need for a more proactive strategy for better understanding and addressing disinformation–during elections and beyond them.
At the end of November 2024, as it became clear that Germany would be facing elections in early 2025 amid the current government’s collapse, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) issued a public warning regarding the potential for foreign influence and manipulation in the upcoming elections. The agency warned of foreign actors employing tactics such as disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, espionage, and sabotage, with particular emphasis on the threats posed by Russia. The issue of disinformation has been a concern not only in the context of external security threats but also within domestic politics. In mid-December 2024, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), and the Left Party (Die Linke) reached a consensus on a so-called Fairness Agreement (Fairness-Abkommen) during the election campaign. This agreement focused on opposing the use of disinformation, AI-generated content, and violence against individuals throughout the campaign. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and left-populist Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) are not part of the recent Fairness agreement. Nevertheless, it appears that there is a consensus among German political parties and governmental agencies that disinformation poses a significant threat to both German elections and society at large. This concern resonates with the German population–a Bertelsmann Foundation survey from 2024 showed that a large part of the public considers disinformation a serious issue that endangers “social cohesion and democracy”. Furthermore, every second person believes that disinformation originates from both domestic and foreign sources. However, assessing the severity of such concerns is complicated by ongoing scientific controversies and policy debates on the effects and efficacy of foreign disinformation campaigns. The research field on disinformation boomed in the aftermath of 2016 US presidential election and Brexit. A study which examined the impact of disinformation during the 2016 US elections found that, while many citizens were exposed to it, its actual effect on elections outcomes is difficult to determine. Others found concerning evidence that false news reaches more people than the truth on social media. However, empirical research on policy interventions in the field of disinformation remains inconclusive and some scholars caution against framing disinformation as an existential democratic crisis, as this risks fueling “moral panic” and legitimizing restrictive policies that may ultimately undermine core democratic values such as free speech.
That being said, given the role disinformation plays in the current election period, broad public concerns may be justified. As highlighted in Thomas Reinhold’s blog post on peace in cyberspace, there has been an obvious general increase in disinformation media campaigns that rely on troll and bot accounts. Reinhold also draws attention to the pro-Russian Doppelgänger campaign, which aims to undermine German support for Ukraine–though the extent of its impact remains unclear. A recent journalistic investigation by the NGO CORRECTIV reported on yet another disinformation campaign, Storm-1516, attributed to Russia, that uses AI and deepfake technology to produce fabricated videos that are published on fake websites and later amplified on social media networks. The targets of these false narratives are usually individual politicians. In addition, it is clear that social media does play an important role in its spread, especially among young people. A recent opinion poll shows that young TikTok users in Germany are surprisingly open to the narratives of Russian and Chinese disinformation.
Fragmented Institutional Efforts
Despite these growing concerns from both the public and authorities, the German institutional framework for addressing the issue of disinformation and foreign electoral interference remains chaotic and, at best, fragmented. The Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) for instance, collaborates with missions abroad and has a team of analysts who monitor social media content using publicly available information to uncover disinformation campaigns. In addition, the Federal Foreign Office developed tools that use artificial intelligence to detect manipulative behavior on social media. On January 21, Federal Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock announced a further initiative against hybrid threats, arguing for the exchange of information between the EU members states as well as with NATO. The Foreign Ministry also already has established cooperation with international partners, in particular, the EU and its East StratCom Task Force. Similarly to the Foreign Office, the Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt) uses social listening tools to track discussions on social media, focusing on accounts previously identified as linked to disinformation. In addition to the Federal Foreign and Press Offices, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) and the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) handle foreign state-led disinformation and influence operations as part of their legally defined responsibilities. However, as intelligence agencies, their work remains by default largely outside the realm of public discourse. In contrast, the Ministry of the Interior and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat) has taken a more active and visible role in addressing these challenges. The Ministry chairs the working group Hybrid, which coordinates the federal government’s strategy for managing hybrid threats, including disinformation, and brings together representatives from all ministries at the departmental leadership level.
Better Late Than Never: the Delayed Response and the Potential of the Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation (ZEAM)
While recognizing the problem is a crucial first step being taken by the many governmental institutions and structures outlined above, the German government has so far lacked a dedicated organization to coordinate the various efforts of different agencies and proactively engage with the harmful content. In Europe, France stands out for instance as a leading example, having launched Viginum in 2021–a specialized agency tasked with monitoring and countering foreign information manipulation. Discussions about the agency’s structure and mission began as early as 2018. Viginum regularly uncovers disinformation campaigns. In February of 2024, the agency published a report detailing its analysis of a network of at least 193 pro-Russian “digital news sites” operating across Europe and occupied Ukrainian territories. These sites amplify propaganda through automated content dissemination, search engine optimization, and the relay of ideologically driven, misleading narratives to polarize public debate in countries like France, Germany, and Poland. The overarching goal of the agency is to monitor and counter foreign information manipulation such as this one, increase awareness of such threats, and strengthen societal resilience against them. In support of its mission, Viginum as of 2021 was allocated an annual budget of 12 million euros. Similar to France’s Viginum, the US Global Engagement Center (GEC) also played a key role in countering influence operations–both in the US as well as amongst its allies and partners–though its mandate was not extended, and it was officially shut down at the end of 2024. A previous PRIF blog post on the role of disinformation during the US elections discussed the risks of GEC’s potential closure during the new Trump Administration. As GEC had an annual budget of just over 60 million dollars and was developed to counter disinformation domestically and abroad amongst the US partners and allies, its shuttering makes it more important than ever for European countries to strengthen their own efforts and take a more proactive approach in countering foreign influence operations.
Progress in this regard appears to be underway, as a new intergovernmental agency in Germany, the Central Office for the Detection of Foreign Information Manipulation (Zentrale Stelle zur Erkennung ausländischer Informationsmanipulation, ZEAM), was introduced in the summer of 2024. The agency is a joint initiative of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, the Foreign Federal Office, the Federal Ministry of Justice, and the Federal Press Office. Its primary objectives, as outlined on its so far relatively spare website, include the “protection of the liberal-democratic constitutional order” and the safeguarding of “political decision-making processes, such as elections, from manipulative and covert influence by foreign states.” The proposed budget for ZEAM is 7.8 million euros for the upcoming year, which would be used to develop a plan for the agency’s operations and outline the methods it would use for identifying and warning the public about disinformation. However, the budget for 2025 has not yet been approved, and Germany currently operates under a provisional budget that ensures the federal government can fulfill its necessary financial commitments but does not extend beyond that. As a result, it remains unclear whether and when funding for the agency will be allocated.
Concrete Steps and Potential Outcomes
With elections taking place in less than a month, it is clear that this agency’s efforts to address disinformation during the upcoming election cycle will be limited at best. In the short-term, the newly established agency, together with the German government, could take several concrete steps to mitigate the impact of disinformation during the upcoming elections. Firstly, Germany could set up a rapid-response team within ZEAM that would monitor and address disinformation in real-time, particularly now in the critical weeks before elections. Additionally, it would be important to raise public awareness and launch party-independent campaigns to help voters critically assess information–especially on social media. The government could also collaborate with more traditional media forms and public service broadcasting as well as newer NGOs such as CORRECTIV. Simply pointing out that there are indeed such disinformation campaigns taking place in Germany, such as Doppelgänger and Strom1516, would already be helpful for showcasing potential strategies for addressing disinformation. In the long-term, these campaigns could turn into bigger projects with the general aim of improving media literacy amongst the public. Because almost all parties mention the necessity to tackle disinformation in their programs for the upcoming elections, it should be one of the next government’s priorities to ensure that ZEAM is fully established and equipped with the necessary resources to take on this challenge effectively–not least because Germany can no longer rely on GEC from the US for support, due to its shutdown. However, it is equally important to ensure that counter-disinformation activities are empirically supported, compatible with democratic values and do not further jeopardize them. As ZEAM is still in the process of being developed, there is a window of opportunity to shift its focus toward a more proactive role in understanding and addressing disinformation, while ensuring it remains aligned with basic democratic principles. Another agency solely focused on monitoring content, like the Federal Press Office for instance, would not be enough–a more proactive stance is required to effectively tackle the potential challenges of foreign influence. In this regard, Germany could take inspiration from France’s Viginum or Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency, which has already implemented a more proactive approach to countering disinformation and foreign influence, setting a useful example for ZEAM to follow.
Mina Trpkovic
