No matter who wins the US presidential elections in November, the United States will likely continue a more confrontative China policy launched under Trump in 2017. A second Trump administration, however, would likely mean an end to the Biden-era “guardrails” against escalation. It would also make it much harder for Europe to assert its own interests and conduct an independent China policy.
Schlagwort: China
With or Without you: Climate Policy After the US Elections
The potential re-election of Donald Trump would be a setback for the US climate policy of recent years. Although emissions reductions remain insufficient, climate policy has been a priority under President Joe Biden. The attempts to find a cooperative format with China despite geopolitical tensions deserve special attention, as I argue in this blog post. This approach could also set an example for European and German foreign policy if Trump is re-elected. In any case, Germany and Europe must assume even greater responsibility and leadership in this policy area. This means meeting their own commitments and helping others to do the same.
Segmentierung des Cyberspace? Chinas und Russlands Decoupling-Bestrebungen und ihre Konsequenzen
Seit einigen Jahren zeichnet sich ein besorgniserregender Trend ab: Autoritär geprägte Staaten entkoppeln sich zunehmend von den globalen Internet-Infrastrukturen durch den Aufbau eigener IT-Systeme und -Infrastrukturen. Mittelfristig könnte diese Entwicklung zu einer Aufteilung des Cyberspace in unabhängig voneinander funktionierende Teile führen. Eine solche Segmentierung kann Bestandteil strategisch-außenpolitischer Interessensdurchsetzung sein. Damit wird die ohnehin brüchige Stabilität des Cyberraums nachhaltig untergraben und das Risiko schwerwiegender Cyberattacken erhöht.
Do regime differences shape developmental engagement? How China and Japan compete in post-coup Myanmar
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has left the country significantly isolated on the world stage. Politically, foreign governments have avoided recognizing the junta rulers, although quasi-official engagement is still underway. Economically, foreign investments into Myanmar have dropped by 42% from 2021 to 2022, off levels that had already massively decreased since the 2017 Rohingya expulsion. However, despite the international outcry over the new regime’s open warfare against civilians and the escalating violence in Myanmar’s multi-front civil war, both China and Japan have remained engaged in development cooperation, pursuing ambitious projects for economic corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) that were contracted under the deposed civilian government; in the case of China, even some new projects have been launched.
Germany’s New China Strategy: A Defensive Shift
After a lengthy process of internal deliberation, the German government released its China strategy on July 13. The document signals a policy shift away from the business-focused approach taken by previous governments, and towards a “de-risking” of ties with China. It also reframes the relationship by stressing elements of competition and even rivalry, based on the perception that Chinese authoritarianism is becoming a threat to Germany and its role in the world. Instead of seeking to transform autocracies through engagement, the new approach is much more about shoring up Germany’s own system.
The Power of Not Using Power: China and the Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement
The intensifying systemic rivalry between great powers also involves contesting the most effective approaches to conflict resolution and mediation. The most recent Beijing-mediated détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran has ignited heated debates regarding its longevity and China’s rising profile in the region. While the Middle East may still be a region largely inhospitable to outsider mediation, there are three good reasons why Beijing’s latest foray into Middle East peace diplomacy may be effective. The article argues that China’s hitherto successful mediation between Saudi and Iran lies in its power of not using power—the ability to leverage its growing geoeconomic influence while refraining from the use of coercive power in regional affairs. This approach aims at providing an alternative approach to external powers’ engagement in Middle East peace affairs.
Decoupling and the “New Cold War”: Cautionary Lessons from the Past
An emerging “new Cold War” appears to pit democracies, led by the US, against autocracies, led by Russia and China. But the analogy between today’s regime competition and that of the “old” Cold War is deceptive. China and Russia today are much more closely intertwined with Western democracies than the Soviet Union ever was. These linkages will complicate the conflict considerably. There is already growing pressure to engage in “decoupling”, that is, to break these interdependencies. Research on past instances of decoupling shows that such processes often exacerbate conflict. This research offers four lessons about the general dynamics of decoupling – and little cause for optimism about today’s disengagement processes.
Xi and Putin’s Strategic Tango: Unpacking the Complexities of Russia-China Relations After the 2023 Moscow Summit
The March 2023 state visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Russia has attracted significant attention, and has been described as symbolic of growing cooperation between authoritarian states opposed to the current world order. However, as we argue in a recently-published article based on a review of Russian and Chinese expert statements, this partnership should best be understood as a limited, strategically motivated cooperation against shared threat perceptions. Meanwhile, there is much less agreement on normative questions, let alone a shared vision of an alternative world order.
Regime Competition in a Fragmented World: Consequences for Peace and Conflict
More than thirty years after the proclaimed “end of history” and the third wave of democratization, the world is once again marked by increased diversity in political regimes. The (re-)emergence of powerful authoritarian states like China and Russia and the trend of backsliding in seemingly consolidated democracies have created a more pluralistic and multipolar world, in which states with different political regime types increasingly view each other as competitors, seeking to prove the superiority of their own political and economic systems and to win the allegiance of third countries.
China’s new Global Security Initiative: a rising power spreads its wings
On 21st February 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released its concept for a “Global Security Initiative”, a white paper outlining the country’s proposed solution to challenges across traditional and non-traditional security issues. While the content mostly amounts to a restatement of long-standing principles and pooling of existing activities under a new label, its packaging as a “global initiative” should be seen as a statement of intent, claiming a much greater role in international politics. The sketched Chinese security agenda differs significantly from that of Western powers in both its principles and practices, making this field a new arena of competition between both sides.
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