Lithium Before Democracy: The Hidden Costs of Europe’s Green Transition

Europe requires vast amounts of critical raw materials to fuel their green transition. The European Union has invested in several strategic projects to boost their domestic CRM supply while reducing dependencies on importing from China. One of these projects, the Serbian Jadar Valley mine, shows the EU’s continued willingness to partner with Serbian President Aleksander Vučić despite his violent repression of protests and democratic backsliding. The EU has yet to overtly condemn Vučić, a strategic stance that has been intensely criticized by Serbians and European nations alike. How far will the EU truly go in their support of Vučić to prioritize their economic strategy?

The Green Transition

In December 2019, the European Commission published their formal response to the climate crisis: the “European Green Deal” (EGD). With the EGD, Europe plans to become the world’s first climate neutral continent by transitioning to a greener economy. Vital to their “green transition” are critical raw materials (CRMs), used in a variety of green technologies such as batteries and solar panels.

Lithium, a key component in the lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles (EVs), has gained attention from countries globally. Demand for lithium is expected to triple over the next decade. Due to a domestic supply shortage, the EU currently imports 81% of its extracted lithium and 100% of its refined lithium. China produces 70 percent of the world’s lithium-ion batteries, sparking renewed interest in developing domestic European CRM supply chains to avoid prolonged dependence on China.

Seeking a solution, the EU established the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in 2022, which is intended to secure resilient, domestic supply chains for numerous CRMs. The CRMA lies at the center of Europe’s green transition, setting ambitious benchmarks for reducing import dependencies through 47 strategic projects within the EU and 13 outside of the EU.

A Short-Lived Victory for Protesters

One of these projects, the Jadar Valley lithium mine in Serbia, has been touted as a strategic opportunity for both the EU and Serbia. In exchange for its CRMs, Serbia would benefit from increased economic integration with the EU and a potentially smoother EU accession process. However, concerns about the environmental consequences of the project ignited nationwide protests, making the Jadar Valley a focal point for social and political unrest.

In 2004, Rio Tinto, a London-Australia based mining company, discovered a lithium and boron-rich mineral in western Serbia, naming it “jadarite” after the Jadar Valley. Serbia’s supply of lithium would cover 90% of Europe’s lithium demand.

Citing the ecological and social damage caused by similar mining projects (such as the Vareš silver mine in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which received numerous environmental complaints for documented pollution), local communities and environmental groups called for the cancellation of Rio Tinto’s mining permits. The “We Won’t Give Up Jadar” protests garnered mass support, uniting grassroots organizations, opposition politicians, and environmentalists across Serbia. Under pressure from a 38,000 person petition, President Vučić revoked Rio Tinto’s mining permit in January 2022, marking a significant victory for the protests. Despite their permits being annulled, Rio Tinto maintained a presence in the Jadar Valley.

Overriding the Environmentalists

In September 2023, Vučić reversed his concession by signing a Letter of Intent (LoI) to mine CRMs for the EU’s green transition. Despite more protests, the project moved forward: days after the Serbian Constitutional Court unfroze Rio Tinto’s permits, Vučić signed a MoU with the European Commission on July 19th, 2024, formalizing their strategic partnership. While Serbia’s Constitutional Court is formally independent, Vučić has appointed a third of its judges, raising questions of its impartiality in reinstating Rio Tinto’s permits.

During a press conference following the signing of their MoU, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, President Vučić, and former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized the project’s strict environmental guidelines. Vučić affirmed that environmental protection was his top priority and that the EU’s top environmental experts would monitor the Jadar Valley mine. However, Rio Tinto’s preliminary research drilling in 2021 already polluted the surrounding area, and environmental damage is projected to intensify as the mine becomes operational. Any attempts at remediation have been limited and lack transparency. For these reasons, one poll shows that over 88 percent of Serbians do not believe that the mine will adhere to the highest environmental standards and over 60 percent of Serbians oppose the project altogether. In spite of the project’s pollution and unpopularity, the EU has invested 5.5 billion euros across their 13 non-EU strategic projects, with Rio Tinto contributing 2.24 billion euros to the Jadar Valley mine.

The strategic partnership between the EU and Serbia overrode the victory of Serbia’s environmental protests by restarting mining operations in the Jadar Valley. The EU contributed to the reversal of this policy, signaling an alliance between the EU and Vučić against the demands of protestors. Working with Vučić against protestors may further undermine the Serbian peoples’ support of EU accession, a constituency that is already in decline.

In November 2024, a new wave of protests began following the collapse of the Novi Sad railway, a Chinese-led construction project connected to the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. Because Vučić views these protests as an existential threat to his regime, he has increasingly relied on violent measures to suppress the protests and remain in power. Protestors have been hospitalized, arrested, and intimidated. Vučić’s escalation of violence has been undeterred by Serbia’s democratic institutions, which were strategically weakened by Vučić’s administration from 2012 to 2018.

Given Vučić’s violent crackdown on Serbia’s current nationwide protests, questions remain on how the EU’s strategic partnership with Serbia impacts their public response to his authoritarian abuses.

The EU’s Response to Vučić

In recent years, the EU has issued coordinated responses to the violent repression of protests in Belarus, Georgia, Iran, and Hong Kong. These responses included direct condemnation, third-party investigations, and joint sanctions. The same is not true for Serbia. The EU’s response to Vučić thus far has been disconnected, disorganized, and ineffective.

At the highest levels, the EU has maintained a strategic silence towards Vučić. High-level officials consistently emphasize Serbia’s economic progress while avoiding substantive discussion of Vučić’s violent repression of protests and democratic backsliding. Over the past year, EU Commission President von der Leyen, EU Council President Costa, EU Enlargement Commissioner Kos, NATO Secretary General Rutte, former German Chancellor Scholz, and Trade Commissioner Šefčovič have all met with Vučić, praising Serbia’s economic progress and affirming its path to joining the EU while turning a blind eye to Vučić’s authoritarianism.

The majority of the EU’s criticism of Vučić has come from the institution’s lower levels. Political groups and individuals such as the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), Greens/EFA, Renew Europe, JEF Europe (Young European Federalists), the EU Parliament’s rapporteur for Serbia, the EU delegation to Serbia, and the EU Commissioner for Human Rights have all issued public statements supporting Serbian student protesters and condemning the violent repression of peaceful protests. However, uncoordinated and disorganized criticisms through decentralized EU institutions evidently do not impact the regime’s behavior.

Before von der Leyen’s meeting with Vučić on March 25th, 2025, 31 MEPs sent her a letter stating that the meeting would send “a highly troubling and harmful signal given the depth and gravity of political crisis in Serbia,” potentially reinforcing the perception that the EU ignores Vučić’s authoritarianism. In response to the letter and growing discontent with the EU’s silence, von der Leyen wrote that Serbia “needs to deliver on EU reforms, in particular to take decisive steps towards media freedom, the fight against corruption and the electoral reform” in a post on X after her meeting with Vučić. The post did not mention the violent repression of protests. On that same day, the EU even officially approved the 60 strategic projects for CRMs across Europe, including the Jadar Valley mine.

Conclusion

The EU’s strategic silence has been shaped and constrained by a multitude of factors, such as the EU’s need for domestic CRMs, political ties and party affiliations between Vučić and EU officials (such as von der Leyen), a strategic interest in maintaining stability in the Western Balkans, and Vučić’s ideological and economic partnerships with Russia and China.

For these reasons, Vučić knows that the EU will not want to take significant action against his regime. Any potential action, such as freezing Serbia’s EU accession disbursements, designating Serbia as a “backsliding democracy,” demanding third-party monitoring of mining, financially supporting independent Serbian media, or even issuing united statements denouncing Vučić’s authoritarianism may jeopardize their mutually beneficial strategic partnership. In return, Vučić is afforded additional leniency with regard to his violent repression of protests and democratic backsliding.

Serbia’s Jadar Valley mine highlights the length that the EU is willing to go to prioritize its green transition over democracy and human rights in Serbia. In doing so, the EU further erodes its credibility as a defender of democracy and allows Vučić greater latitude to entrench his political control. As Serbia’s protests grow in size and intensity every week, one question remains: at what point will Vučić’s continued repression and violence make the EU’s silence impossible to maintain?