The upcoming U.S. elections signal a potential shift in U.S.-Korean relations. While Kamala Harris would likely continue President Biden’s focus on sanctions and deterrence, Donald Trump might just as easily revive diplomatic talks as cause another flare-up of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea is concerned about U.S. security commitments and currently debating whether to pursue its own nuclear deterrent. The Washington Declaration reaffirms U.S.-South Korean cooperation, but the conservative security proposal, Project 2025, hints at potential reductions in U.S. military presence. These developments raise questions about South Korea’s security and the broader stability of East Asia.
The Democratic Party’s choice to drop denuclearization from its 2024 election platform underlines a change in U.S. policy toward North Korea. For many decades, denuclearization was the key goal of U.S. diplomacy with Pyongyang. However, the new direction suggests that Washington may no longer prioritize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The shift has been seen as a logical response, given that North Korea shows no intention of relinquishing its nuclear weapons. Experts argue that denuclearization has become an unrealistic goal, with North Korea continuing to expand its nuclear capabilities. Instead, the focus is shifting to managing nuclear risks and maintaining deterrence. Nevertheless, the upcoming 2024 U.S. elections create uncertainty about the future of the U.S.-North Korea relations.
South Korea has raised concerns about the U.S. Democratic Party’s decision to change its official stance on denuclearization, especially as the country faces an increasingly precarious security environment. Many South Koreans view the U.S. nuclear umbrella as essential to their defense strategy. While moving away from denuclearization does not equal a deprioritization of security cooperation with South Korea, a potential shift in Washington’s viewpoint about denuclearization may undermine South Korea’s vision for security by implicitly recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status. The rhetorical change has also fueled already ongoing debates in South Korea about whether it should develop its own nuclear deterrent as concerns grow over the erosion of international norms and the effectiveness of existing security guarantees. At the same time, North Korea continues to escalate tensions by advancing its nuclear program and conducting missile tests that threaten regional stability.
The Biden-Harris administration has reaffirmed its commitment to extended deterrence and regional security, while also emphasizing the importance of alliances with South Korea and Japan. They have worked to reassure South Korea that U.S. military commitments remain solid. Still, the evolving U.S. political landscape raises questions about the future of the Korean Peninsula and regional security. How the next U.S. administration addresses North Korea’s nuclear threat is thus likely to impact the stability of East Asia and the global non-proliferation regime.
Historical Background: U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Since the 1990s
Over the past few decades, the U.S. policy toward North Korea has alternated between diplomacy and pressure, with each administration striving to limit Pyongyang’s nuclear development. The Agreed Framework developed under the Clinton administration was signed in 1994 between the United States and North Korea. It aimed to freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy assistance, including the delivery of heavy oil. The United States also agreed to help build two light-water nuclear reactors, which are less likely to be used for weapons production. The deal aimed to improve relations between the two countries. However, it collapsed under the Bush administration not least because he labeled North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil”. When President Obama took office, the United States shifted to a strategy called “strategic patience”. This approach relied on maintaining sanctions and diplomatic isolation, hoping that North Korea would eventually return to the negotiating table. Despite these efforts, North Korea continued to develop its nuclear capabilities and conducted several nuclear tests.
During President Trump’s tenure, the strategy shifted again. At first, Trump escalated tensions with North Korea, famously declaring his nuclear button was “bigger and more powerful” than Kim Jong-un’s. This raised fears of war. Reports indicated that Secretary of Defense James Mattis was so concerned about a potential attack that he slept in his clothes, ready to respond immediately. However, Trump later pursued a more diplomatic path, holding summits with Kim in 2018 and 2019. These meetings, famously accompanied by what Trump called “love letters” from Kim, temporarily eased tensions but failed to produce concrete steps toward denuclearization. North Korea soon resumed its missile tests, revealing the limits of Trump’s top-down diplomacy.
Today, the U.S.’s strategy appears to be evolving from complete denuclearization toward managing nuclear risks, with a stronger emphasis on deterrence and regional alliances. A key example of this shift is the Washington Declaration, signed in 2023 under the Biden administration. This security agreement between the United States. and South Korea enhances extended deterrence in response to North Korea’s advancing nuclear program. It strengthens military cooperation through joint planning and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea – including nuclear-capable bombers and submarines. At a time when direct negotiations with Pyongyang have stalled and questions appear regarding the future of U.S. engagement with North Korea, the U.S. has tried to reassure South Korea of their strong commitment to defend the country against threats from the north. Nonetheless, the challenge for U.S. policymakers remains balancing deterrence with the long-term goal of reducing nuclear risks on the Korean Peninsula.
Possible Futures of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards North Korea
The upcoming U.S. election has increased uncertainty about the future of Washington’s policy toward North Korea. Because the Democratic Party no longer appears to officially prioritize denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, the question arises of how a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump administration would manage relations with Pyongyang.
If Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election, her administration would likely maintain Biden’s strategy, focusing on sanctions and deterrence. It would likely involve strengthening alliances with South Korea and Japan through the framework of the Washington Declaration and enhanced trilateral defense cooperation. Harris’s main goal would likely be to contain North Korean aggression and preserve regional stability. While Harris’s strategy may address immediate threats, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation efforts are likely to persist. Some have argued that economic incentives, such as easing sanctions or offering aid, could be necessary to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. However, it is doubtful whether such an approach would prove successful, nor would it be politically popular in either the United States or South Korea. The Harris administration might therefore face a continuing diplomatic stalemate with North Korea, which could further strain South Korea’s trust in U.S. defense commitments. The uncertainty may also strengthen calls within South Korea for the development of its own nuclear deterrent as concerns over regional security grow.
Conversely, if Donald Trump returns to office, there could be a revival of his “top-down” diplomatic approach, focusing on high-level negotiations between leaders. Given Trump’s erratic behavior and insensitivity to the domestic and international political climate, this strategy might even include offering concessions, such as relaxing sanctions and reducing the U.S. military presence in the region, just for the sake of making a “deal” with North Korea.
In the past, Trump has called for troop withdrawals from South Korea unless its government would be willing to pay more for the large U.S. presence on the peninsula. The Project 2025 agenda, a comprehensive policy guide designed for a future Republican administration, also emphasizes the increase of American military strength and the reduction of diplomatic engagements. While not an official document of the Republican Party nor endorsed by Trump, a key aspect of the plan entails a re-evaluation of U.S. military commitments globally. This may also mean, for example, reducing American troops in South Korea.
However, Trump’s previous high-level summits yielded minimal progress, with North Korea resuming missile tests soon after. His approach failed to produce lasting results, leaving Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities largely unrestrained. The method could thus temporarily ease tensions in the short term, but it poses significant risks to long-term regional security. A reduction in the U.S. military presence could further undermine South Korea’s security, weaken U.S. influence in the region, and raise doubts about North Korea’s intentions. These factors may drive South Korea to consider developing its own nuclear capabilities.
Perhaps even more importantly, Trump might as well cause new tensions on the Korean peninsula by once again rattling the nuclear saber and directing inflamatory rhetoric towards Kim-Jong Un. These concerns are also reinforced by Project 2025, which calls for an expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, thereby risking an increase in tensions in the region, while also raising concerns in South Korea about the reliability of U.S. defense commitments.
To sum up, both Harris and Trump present distinct approaches to North Korea, but neither guarantees a clear resolution to the nuclear issue. Harris’s reliance on deterrence could maintain stability while prolonging the nuclear stalemate, whereas Trump’s top-down diplomacy may bring symbolic gains at the potential cost of regional security. It is also possible that there will be another flare up of tensions in a second Trump presidency due to Trump’s aggressive nuclear rhetoric and increased U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence. For South Korea, the uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy raises pressing questions about reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and their next steps could shape East Asian security dynamics.
Outlook
Prospectively, the U.S. policy toward North Korea could shift depending on who wins the U.S. presidential election. Although a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops seems unlikely, a decline of U.S. presence under Trump may push South Korea to reconsider its dependence on U.S. security guarantees. In this scenario, South Korea might accelerate its pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent, a feasible option given the country’s advanced nuclear infrastructure. With its existing technology and nuclear latency, South Korea could develop nuclear weapons in a couple of years if necessary. However, this decision would be fraught with diplomatic challenges, particularly regarding its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Washington Declaration of 2023 complicates a potential reduction of U.S. commitments. The declaration strengthens defense cooperation and emphasizes the U.S.’s extended nuclear deterrence in the region. Although Project 2025’s call for reshaping U.S. military and nuclear strategies could affect the broader security landscape, the existing commitment may temper the likelihood of significant reductions in U.S. military presence. Yet, the changing tone of U.S. policy could still leave South Korea uncertain about the future of its security, increasing internal debates over the necessity of developing its own nuclear capabilities. Under President Moon Jae-in and in accordance with then-U.S. policy under Trump, South Korea initially sought to improve inter-Korean relations. Because these initiatives stalled and North Korea persisted in its provocations, public opinion in South Korea began to change. An increasing number of South Koreans favor developing their own nuclear deterrent, since they doubt the credibility of U.S. protection.
South Korea’s security will be shaped by several key factors. Amongst others, this includes North Korea’s continuing nuclear development, the consistency of American defense commitments, and broader geopolitical changes in East Asia. For example, China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea and the increased tensions between China and the United States add to regional instability. At the same time, security cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, such as joint military exercises and missile defense systems, will also play a crucial role in countering North Korea’s threats. Ultimately, South Korea will need to carefully balance diplomacy, military cooperation, and responses to North Korean provocations to maintain stability.
Kim Lorenz
Latest posts by Kim Lorenz (see all)
- U.S. Elections and Their Potential Impact on U.S.-Korean Relations - 4. November 2024
