Between Window Dressing and Political Perspective: Regime Change in the Controversy over the US Intervention in Venezuela

The argument that the US military strike could lead to a democratic transition in Venezuela does little to lend legitimacy to the US intervention, which violates international law. Nevertheless, many Venezuelans hope for a democratic opening as an indirect consequence of the intervention. This deserves international support, including from Europe.

In the international debate on the legitimacy and consequences of the recent US intervention in Venezuela, the question of a possible regime change plays a prominent role. As Thilo Marauhn has explained on the PRIF blog, for the legal classification of the military strike as a clear violation of the international prohibition on the use of force, it is irrelevant whether the Trump administration intends to enforce a return to democracy in Venezuela. However, as a look at international reactions – particularly those of European governments and the Venezuelan diaspora – shows, the question of the intervention’s goals and its possible political consequences in Venezuela shapes the political assessment of the US action. For the justification of the intervention and its legitimacy in the eyes of the international public, the issue of regime change is therefore significant.

As we argue in this contribution, attempts by European governments to lend at least partial legitimacy to the US intervention by referring to possible democratic reforms are built on shaky ground. For the US administration, a possible regime change in Venezuela has so far played a marginal role at best. Accordingly, no concrete political perspectives for a democratic transition are currently apparent. At the same time, we suggest that the voices of Venezuelans – who are currently forced to speak primarily from the diaspora – should be taken seriously, and that a democratic opening as a political perspective should not be lost from view internationally.

Regime Change as a Precarious Justification for the US Intervention

A number of European governments, including Germany, emphasized in their statements the lack of democratic legitimacy of Maduro, his dictatorial rule, and the goal of a democratic transition, for example in the statement by Chancellor Friedrich Merz of January 3 and the declaration by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas of January 5. These rhetorical maneuvers to lend a taste of legitimacy to an intervention that clearly violates international law are questionable for two reasons: one rooted in realpolitik, the other more paradigmatic.

First, the United States itself did not associate the intervention with a claim to democratic change. At the press conference on January 3, 2026, US President Trump emphasized that Maduro, an “outlaw dictator” or “illegitimate dictator,” had been removed from power, but he did not mention the word “democracy” and only indirectly hinted at the goal of regime change. And this is only logical: in his first year in office, Trump has made no secret of his lack of respect for democratic processes and his willingness to cooperate with autocratic regimes. Instead, the focus of the statement was on accusations of “narco-terrorism” allegedly attributable to Maduro and on securing US control over Venezuela’s oil reserves. Democracy was also not mentioned in the statement by the US ambassador to the UN Security Council, in which he downplayed the military intervention as a mere “law enforcement operation” against an “indicted narcotrafficker.”

The facts on the ground also argue against a serious US policy orientation toward regime change. The intervention ultimately focused on the abduction and de facto removal of Maduro. As a result, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was able to assume the presidency in accordance with the constitution and with the consent of the Trump administration, thus ensuring continuity of the Chavista regime for the time being. Although the three-phase plan announced by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio includes a “transition” as its final step, this phase has neither been specified nor scheduled. For now, the Trump administration’s primary concern is clearly the stabilization of Venezuela under US access to its oil reserves and the reduction of the influence of rival extra-regional powers such as China and Russia. All of this reveals the US intervention as an expression of unvarnished imperialism, no longer even claiming to serve shared goals or universal values.

Second, however, it would also be too simplistic to lament that the US government failed to seize the “opportunity” to use the military intervention for a full-scale invasion to enforce a genuine regime change, as in Iraq (2003) or Panama (1989/1990). As imperfect as such comparisons may be, research on external democracy promotion clearly shows that militarily enforced regime change succeeds only rarely and under very specific conditions. Externally imposed democratization exacerbates the inherent dilemmas of democracy promotion, particularly the core problem that external intervention undermines the very principle of democratic self-determination it seeks to promote. The risk of violence inherent in democratization processes is also increased in cases of externally enforced regime change. For Venezuela, the International Crisis Group has warned of a real risk of violent escalation in a post-Maduro scenario, for example if military units oppose regime change and/or if the various non-state armed groups (urban militias, Colombian non-state armed actors such as the ELN) exploit a power vacuum.

Democratic Change as a Possible Indirect Consequence of the Intervention

In this sense, it is good news that the option of a regime change enforced by military invasion in Venezuela appears off the table for the time being. Nevertheless, the question if and how the US intervention might indirectly lead to democratic change in Venezuela remains important – particularly for Venezuelans at home and abroad. Many Venezuelans in the diaspora understandably reacted with relief or even open joy to Maduro’s removal from power. Even when sharply criticizing the US intervention, they simultaneously expressed hope for a democratic transition, including in Spain and Germany (see here and here). It can be assumed that this sentiment is broadly shared within Venezuela, although repression makes it difficult to articulate, and uncertainty about what lies ahead weighs more heavily. It is clear that the repressive Maduro regime had drastically limited opportunities for advocating democratic change from within Venezuela. At the latest with the 2024 elections, in which opposition candidate Edmundo González appears to have won a majority of votes, the path to a transition initiated from within seemed largely closed. At the same time, Trump’s plan to control Venezuela for the foreseeable future is unlikely to find support within the country, and hopeful voices from the diaspora were quickly accompanied by concerns about subordination under US control.

Implications for Europe

For European states, the US military intervention in Venezuela entails not “only” the responsibility to clearly oppose violations of international law and to forge alliances against the continued erosion of the international order. It also requires making use of existing room for maneuver to maximize the remaining opportunities for democratic change in Venezuela opened by Maduro’s de facto removal.

European engagement in support of a democratic transition could rest on three pillars:

1. Cooperation with the US: Regardless of how the Trump administration’s Venezuela strategy ultimately develops, the US will remain a key player in terms of power politics for the foreseeable future when it comes to further developments in the South American country. European cooperation with the US is therefore unavoidable. The Spanish government has shown that condemning the US intervention as a violation of international law and engaging in dialogue on Venezuela’s political prospects are not mutually exclusive. Together with Latin American countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, Spain issued a clear statement against the US military strike and at the same time entered into talks with the US administration on the question of a democratic transition. Rubio’s three-phase plan offers a “foot in the door” for such engagement, precisely because the Trump administration itself is probably not yet clear on what the transition phase might look like. A unified European approach will be crucial in this regard.
2. Incentives and offers of cooperation for the Venezuelan side: A democratic opening in Venezuela will only be possible in the foreseeable future if the transitional government can be persuaded to agree to a negotiated transition. This depends, on the one hand, on the Trump administration and the Chavista transitional government under Rodríguez not consolidating an agreement in which the Chavista regime restabilizes itself internally while at the same time positioning itself externally as a reliable junior partner of the US. In response, European engagement should aim not “only” at ensuring that the goal of some form of opening is not lost sight of and that the necessary framework conditions are created. European actors should also urge the US and Venezuelan governments to make such a process as inclusive as possible. In addition to the central figures and currents of the fragmented Venezuelan opposition, a broader spectrum of political and civil society actors should be involved, including (former) Chavista forces. Europe should on the other hand work to ensure that any transition is not too narrowly focused on elections, but rather approach democratization as a complex process of social change by addressing a broad spectrum of political, economic, and social challenges. In addition to restoring an independent judiciary, guarantees for political participation, civil society engagement, and media freedom, this also includes difficult issues such as coming to terms with the past and social reconciliation, security sector reform, and measures to combat poverty and social inequality, while gradually moving away from the extractivist economic model. As a clear counter-model to Trump’s claim to imperial control, Europe’s guiding principle here should be that the design of such a transformation process is a matter for Venezuelans, and that the role of external actors should focus on supporting procedures and framework conditions for self-determined change in Venezuela.
3. Involve regional cooperation partners: Colombia and Brazil in particular can play an important role in a gradual, negotiated transition process. Given the fragile security situation and the presence of Colombian armed groups such as the ELN in Venezuela, Colombia is particularly affected by developments in its neighboring country. A European strategy for Venezuela should be developed and implemented in close consultation and cooperation with Latin American partners – not least as a counterweight to the influence and openly undemocratic stance of the US government.

The US military strike against Venezuela and the de facto removal of President Maduro have ushered in a new phase of political development for Venezuela, which entails numerous risks but also opens up opportunities. A democratic transition in Venezuela is not currently on the horizon, no matter how eagerly many opposition forces at home and abroad may hope for it. The Venezuelan transitional government is clearly aiming to consolidate power, and the Trump administration for the time being also has other priorities. European and Latin American actors have only limited influence in this context, but they should use their options for action to promote development towards a democratic, inclusive and self-determined change in Venezuela. In any case, it would not be in keeping with Germany’s and Europe’s claim to a rules- and values-based foreign policy to simply accept the currently emerging scenario of continuity of the authoritarian regime under the paternalism of the Trump administration, after the overly cautious reactions to the US intervention, which violated international law.

Editor’s note: This text is the English version of the article „Zwischen Feigenblatt und politischer Perspektive: Regime Change in der Kontroverse um die US-Intervention in Venezuela“ posted on PRIF Blog on January 19, 2026. The translation was provided with the help of AI and Charlotte Meier.