3. Februar 2026
Alongside Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, non-military operations across Europe have also been on the rise, blending methods of espionage, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and sabotage with other unconventional means of attack. These events have given new impetus to analyses on how to address the issue of ‘hybrid warfare’. The ongoing negotiations on a ceasefire and an end to the war have also raised the question of how Moscow’s employment of hybrid warfare can be curbed, or whether we must prepare for it to continue even after the fighting ends. In this context, it is important to understand the evolution of Russia’s unconventional methods of international interference and the conceptual reasoning behind them.
The Conceptual Rediscovery of Unconventional Warfare
During the Cold War the Soviet Union used “active measures” to pursue its political objectives: covert operations involving everything from disinformation and propaganda to agents of influence, subversion and sabotage, even kidnapping and assassinations. These actions, which coincided with an uptick in internal conflict across the globe, compelled Western strategists to grapple with the blurring of lines between military and civilian entities. Eventually, strategic theorist and defense analyst Frank Hoffman coined the term ‘hybrid warfare’, arguing that nations, not just rebel or terrorist groups, can combine irregular tactics and covert operations to achieve their goals both on and off the battlefield. While not the first to do so, Hoffman conceptually linked unconventional means with conventional practices of warfare in a way that came to dominate Western security conversations. This was especially the case during the War on Terror, when Hoffman’s model seemed to address the fluidity and interweaving of warfighting techniques that characterized political conflict the modern era. Consequently, this framework has been used to contextualize and interrogate Russia’s behavior towards the West with little consideration for Moscow’s own understanding of what can be achieved through covert measures below the threshold of war.
As the Rapprochement Ended, Covert Actions Resumed
Following several years of cordial relations, Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 signaled an end to the fragile friendship between Russia and the West. He expressed disappointment in the unfulfilled hopes of rapprochement, criticizing the US-dominated unipolar world order, NATO’s eastward expansion, the neglect of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Washington’s excessive use of military force. This dynamic further deteriorated when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. Having fallen far behind technologically and militarily, Russia lashed out, relying increasingly on unorthodox means of warfare. In addition to deploying troops and occupying South Ossetia, the Kremlin cooperated with separatists and continued to recognize the autonomy of Abkhazia to further destabilize Georgia. This tried-and-tested practice was revived in 2014, when unmarked Russian forces partnered with local militias to seize the Crimean Peninsula and subsequently annex the territory from Ukraine. Around this time, Russia also began using extensive cyber operations to meddle in the infrastructure and affairs other European nations. One of the most prominent examples was a a series of cyber-attacks on Estonian authorities and organizations in 2007, which included the parliament, banks, ministries, and media. When a cyber-attack struck the German Parliament in 2015, the European Union attributed it to Russian state-sponsored actors. In 2017, concentrated information campaigns attempted to discredit the Armenian elections.
Intensification in the Context of the War against Ukraine
With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these unconventional means of warfare have become increasingly coordinated by the Russian state, which has historically relied heavily on decentralized covert operations and deniable proxy actors to undermine the political stability of other nations. From espionage and offensive cyber operations to disinformation and sabotage of transport and energy infrastructure, campaigns are now coordinated between the GRU military intelligence service, the SVR civilian foreign intelligence service, and the FSB domestic security service. Particularly sensitive attacks are authorized by the National Security Council of the Russian Federation. This coordination has come to highlight the centrality of these methods to Russian foreign policy objectives.
However, despite the intensification, the feared paralysis of Ukraine’s digital, energy, and transport infrastructure by means of cyber operations did not materialize, while disinformation campaigns and acts of sabotage in Europe have had no significant impact on the course of the war or European foreign policy. These results have led Russia to employ even more unorthodox methods. After hundreds of Russian intelligence agents with diplomatic passports were expelled from European countries, Moscow increasingly resorted to cheap and untrained “disposable agents”, many of whom were quickly exposed and convicted. Drones presumed to be controlled by Russia circled over European air bases and industrial zones. Submarine cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea were repeatedly damaged by Chinese cargo ships with Russian crews. Yet even as Russia’s traditional avenues for subversion were counteracted they continued to harass their Western adversaries, probing for weaknesses and points of friction. However, what Western strategists have often categorized as a nuisance is a foundational element of Russian strategic thinking.
Russian Understanding of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’
From the Russian perspective, the essence of war in the modern era is being redefined. General Makhmut Gareev, the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has made it clear that Russia does not see modern conflict in the way put forth by Hoffman. Even outside of the conventional battlefield, Gareev sees the utilization of subversive actions and the creation of controlled chaos—as was done in Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine before—as the central method of violating states’ internal stability and the essential modus operandi of war today. This interpretation of war carries over into the Russian understanding of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’, which differs significantly from Western ‘hybrid warfare’ in both meaning and execution.
In the eyes of Western strategists, ‘hybrid warfare’ reflects the complexity of integrated warfare in the 21st century, where conventional and unconventional methods are combined and centrally coordinated to achieve the objectives of war. ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’, by contrast, focuses on ways political actors can undermine their adversaries by eroding domestic and international political legitimacy and stability without resorting to conventional means of fighting. This term is closer to the notion of subversion rather than ‘hybrid warfare’ as defined by the West.
Russian strategists emphasize two elements of modern conflict. First, the goal of breaking a nation by eroding its culture, values, and self-esteem. Second, the employment of covert political, information, and economic instruments, rather than overt military force. While interpretations within Russia vary, proponents of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ take care to separate the term from its Western counterpart. Some argue that, unlike hybrid warfare, ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ aims to avoid the battlefield entirely and destroy the adversary via a hybrid of ideological, informational, financial, political, and economic methods that dismantle the socio-cultural fabric. Others see information warfare as the core of the term, noting that intensive informational subversion is a central and long-standing instrument of Russian state power.
Differences and Convergence with Western Thinking
This understanding was particularly shaped by Moscow’s perception of Western non-military influence, which was often labeled as ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ by Russian elites. In response to the sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov publicly alleged that Russia faces continuous, large-scale information warfare and that Western sanctions would aim to destroy the economy, raise popular protests, and ultimately result in regime change. Putin employed similar rhetoric in 2021,when stating that unlawful street protests and open propaganda—such as hostility in social networks—were all part of Western efforts to strike a blow at Russia’s constitutional base.
So-called “color revolutions”, inspired by the Arab Spring, were framed as being provoked by the West, while similar claims were made regarding mass protests during the 2012 Russian presidential election. Public criticism from Western governments against the repressive measures of Russian authorities encouraged Putin to voice his belief that foreign involvement prompted the unrest. This suspicion was seemingly confirmed by linking Russian opposition leaders to the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Similar assumptions suggested that Ukrainian NGOs organized EU- and US-funded seminars with Russian youth groups, with the goal of destabilizing Russia. Ukraine’s pivotal Euromaidan protests and the fall of former President Yanukovych increased the regime’s fear of Western ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’. In 2014, Lavrov accused the United States of trying to defeat Russia through these unconventional actions and to provoke regime change to suit Washington’s interests. These accusations were repeated throughout the course of the full-scale war against Ukraine, especially in relation to Western economic sanctions against Moscow and military support for Kyiv. In turn, this framing served to reframe Russia’s imperialist invasion as a strategic conflict with the West.
Observing the development of the concept and practice of ‘hybrid warfare’ versus ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ since the 2000s, striking differences and convergences become apparent. While the American conceptual understanding always merged conventional and unconventional activities, the Russian concept seemed to keep the two separate in order to identify and condemn Western non-military influence. Consequently, the Kremlin increasingly adopted a mirroring strategy in practice and engaged in a range of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ activities without translating them directly into open military confrontation. This changed for the first time, but only temporarily, with Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008, and again when invading Crimea in 2014. Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, we have seen a complete convergence of Russian practice in terms of coordinated ‘hybrid warfare’ in the Western sense. Of course, there are differences on the battlefield, yet Russia’s military aggression and non-military interventions are carried out in an integrated manner in Ukraine. Further, Russia has expanded its non-military measures against Europe and is currently testing the limits of this approach.
Limited Effectiveness, but Likely Continued Use
Despite these adjustments of theory and practice, however, their impact on Russia’s war objectives in Ukraine remains modest. Ukrainian cultural identity as an independent nation is stronger than ever, both at home and internationally. In most other European states, too, Russia’s covert operations have failed to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Neither has it succeeded in mobilizing effective favorable political movements, nor in orchestrating significant unrest or even achieving political control in public discourse through digital disinformation campaigns. Nevertheless, Moscow’s means of interference continue to generate significant political uncertainty in Western societies.
The Kremlin has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in its conceptual and practical approach to warfare. This in turn means that even in the event of achieving a ceasefire or indeed a peace agreement, one cannot necessarily expect an end to interventions or interference through covert means. A return by Russia to the tried and tested practices of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ is equally likely. The extent to which Russia will be able to revert to this practice depends on the sensitivity and resilience of Europe and North America on the one hand, but also on the future design of relations between Russia and the West on the other.
After all, it was a reflection of weak relations with the West that Russia expanded its practice of ‘active measures’, deployed ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ as a counterstrategy to Western foreign policy, and ultimately adopted and aggressively implemented our own concept of ‘hybrid warfare’.
