The Western withdrawal from Afghanistan and the following collapse of the local government to the Taliban has left many international observers to ponder who might fill the resulting vacuum. Many eyes have turned to China, which had already engaged the Taliban in political dialogue, is open to formal recognition of the new regime, and is also one of its more plausible aid donors. Beijing has also increasingly touted an alternative to the Western program of liberal peace- and statebuilding that failed in Afghanistan, focused on developmental objectives and tying into Chinese strengths and interests especially under its global “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI).
Schlagwort: China

Deutsche China-Politik zwischen Partnerschaft und Rivalität
Chinas scheinbar unaufhaltsamer wirtschaftlicher Aufstieg hat inzwischen auch die deutsche Parteipolitik erreicht, und die Frage nach dem zukünftigen Umgang mit der neuen Supermacht als bedeutendes Wahlkampfthema etabliert. Die deutschen Parteien begegnen dieser Herausforderung, indem sie 2021 erstmalig ausgewiesene China-Politiken skizzieren. Das ist neu: noch 2017 fanden sich nur vereinzelte Erwähnungen von „China“ in den damaligen Programmen, und ausschließlich in unspezifischen Kontexten wie dem Umgang mit autoritär verfassten Staaten. Wie ein Vergleich der aktuellen Programme zeigt, ist China inzwischen nicht nur eines von vielen außenpolitischen Themen, sondern sogar wichtiges Element ihrer allgemeinen weltanschaulichen Positionierung.

Die UN als globaler „Streitraum“. Zur Aktualität von Dag Hammarskjölds Erbe
Dag Hammarskjöld? War das nicht der mit dem mysteriösen Flugzeugabsturz im Kongo? Außerhalb des kleinen Kreises derer, die sich intensiv mit der Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen beschäftigen, verblasst die Erinnerung an den zweiten UN-Generalsekretär zunehmend. Wir wollen den 60. Todestag von Dag Hammarskjöld zum Anlass nehmen, um nochmals einen Blick auf dieses „Wunderkind aus Schweden“ […]
Three futures for NATO: New FES/PRIF backgrounder for the 2021 NATO summit
Today, NATO‘s Heads of State and Government are meeting in Brussels for a summit that is expected to set the course for the rejuvenation of the Atlantic alliance. Leaders will discuss the report of the NATO Expert Group, kick off the process for developing a New Strategic Concept, and signal a closing of transatlantic ranks. Against this background, the new FES/PRIF Report “Three visions for NATO” offers a glimpse behind the headlines. It maps expert debates about the future of the alliance across and within NATO member states and identifies three alternative “futures” for the evolution of the alliance.

China in transitionary Myanmar. Challenging paths to democratization and peace
The recent military coup in Myanmar reversed a decade-long experiment towards incremental political liberalization. At the same time, it also brought China’s engagement there back into the spotlight, and initial Chinese reactions led to suspicions that Beijing had welcomed or even aided the return to military rule. However, the reality of China’s role in Myanmar’s democratic transition and simultaneous peace process is far more complicated, and instructive for its overall engagement in conflict societies.
Bloß Neustart oder Renaissance nuklearer Abrüstung? New START um fünf Jahre verlängert
Die Verlängerung von New START ist gesichert. Damit ist die seit zwei Jahrzehnten fortschreitende Auflösung zahlreicher Rüstungskontrollabkommen vorerst gestoppt. Es ist noch lange keine Renaissance der nuklearen Abrüstung. Hierzu müssen die Risiken nuklearer Eskalation minimiert und sub-strategische Nuklearwaffen in den Blick genommen werden. Es braucht außerdem die Einbindung Chinas und ein Upgrade der bilateralen Rüstungskontrolle auf die multilaterale Ebene. Wie kann das gelingen?
A renaissance of nuclear disarmament, or merely a new start? New START extended for five years
New START will be extended for five more years. This means that the unraveling of numerous arms control agreements, which has been progressing for two decades, has been halted for the time being. We are still far from a renaissance of nuclear disarmament. For this to happen, the risks of nuclear escalation must be minimized and sub-strategic nuclear weapons must be addressed. It also requires engaging China and upgrading bilateral arms control to the multilateral level. How can this succeed?

The EU-China Investment Agreement: a sign of political naïveté or strategic autonomy?
The recently-concluded EU-China Investment Agreement has attracted severe criticism, with many commenters focusing specifically on the supposed naïveté of concluding a separate agreement with China instead of pursuing a joint approach together with the incoming Biden administration. However, this approach is in line with the EU’s stated desire to achieve a greater strategic autonomy, and in fact a sensible reaction to the uncertainty that has marked international politics since the Trump era.
From China Threat to Red Scare: a Post-Trump Republican Perspective on US-China Relations
In its last months in office, the Trump administration published a new, comprehensive framework on China policy. Despite the upcoming change in government, this report is notable for introducing a very ideology-centered perspective and rhetoric reminiscent of the Cold War. It could therefore provide a glimpse on how Republicans will approach China policy in opposition and exert pressure on the new government to stick with the confrontative course taken by Trump.

China Policy in the 2020 Election: Same Same, but Different?
With US-China relations caught in a seemingly inescapable downward spiral and mounting speculation about a new „Cold War“, could a Biden victory in the upcoming US election lead to a reduction in tensions? Based on what is known about Biden’s approach to China, we should not expect a fundamental shift, and the US-China confrontation is likely to shape the international system for years to come. However, a Biden strategy would seek to re-engage allies in Europe, and may offer them a bigger chance to influence this process.