In a time of escalating global crises, German foreign policy faces immense pressures. Yet, German policymakers and experts rarely discuss the institution tasked with executing German diplomacy: the Federal Foreign Office. While the German Bundestag is currently debating drastic cuts to the ministry’s budget, parliamentarians are not debating overdue reforms in the Foreign Office. This is a problem, because any significant changes to the ministry will require attention and pressure from parliament.
With an escalating war in the Middle East, discussions on peace conferences addressing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, preparations for the fallout of the US elections, and the largest humanitarian crisis in decades in Sudan, German foreign policy and diplomacy are under immense pressure.
Given the state of the world, there is hardly a day without politicians or experts in Germany calling for a more active and strategic foreign policy. On the other side of the political spectrum, demands for “more diplomacy” have become a campaign slogan. Across the political spectrum, however, hardly anyone pays attention to the question of whether the very ministry responsible for crafting diplomatic strategies and executing diplomacy – the German Federal Foreign Office – is fit for purpose.
German foreign policy needs an effective Foreign Office
When the Bundestag debated drastic cuts to the Foreign Office budget during the opening debate on the 2025 budget in early September, however, the only reform topic that a few members of parliament raised was the digitalization of visa procedures. This is problematic for three reasons:
First, German foreign policy needs an effective Foreign Office. Yes, many key foreign policy decisions are made at the Chancellery and other ministries engage with an increasing number of international issues. Yet Germany still needs a ministry capable of collecting and synthesizing information from 225 embassies and consulates, other ministries, partner countries, and civil society, and use this information to develop coherent strategies.
Second, with more than 13,000 employees worldwide, the Foreign Office’ comparative advantage does not lie in its project funding but in its diplomats’ networks, contacts and knowledge – especially now, when project budgets for crisis prevention, stabilization, and humanitarian aid face severe cuts. Yet there is hardly any debate on how to best use this resource efficiently.
Here are just a few of the questions parliamentarians could have discussed in September:
- If the Foreign Office’s strength lies in its diplomats, how should training, language skills, and pre-deployment preparation be improved? How could lifelong learning and subject expertise be strengthened? How must working conditions change so that the ministry can not only recruit, but also retain the best talent?
- What IT investments are needed – not just in the short term but looking ahead 10 or 20 years? How does the Foreign Office make use of artificial intelligence? If a significant portion of thousands of staff hours is dedicated to drafting talking points, briefings, responses to parliamentary inquiries, and negotiation documents – often recycling previously used phrases, then why hasn’t the use of AI tools become standard for every diplomat?
- How can the ministry’s knowledge management be improved? Most diplomats rotate to new roles and countries every few years. How is it possible, that whether and to what extent knowledge and contacts are preserved for a diplomat’s successor still depends largely on individual initiatives?
- How do the ministry’s structure and culture need to evolve to enable more time to developing strategies, launching new initiatives, and strategic planning? How can incentive structures be changed to reward new ideas, teamwork, and knowledge sharing?
None of these questions came up in the Bundestag debate in early September.
Overdue reforms will only happen with outside pressure
A third and final reason why this neglect is so problematic is that it has been clear for at least two decades that the Foreign Office is in dire need of reform, yet without parliamentary pressure this will not happen. There has been progress on some fronts, with the ministry taking some significant steps on gender equality. The introduction of a specialist career track is a real step forward, too. However, deeper reforms aimed at bolstering strategic capabilities have consistently failed, whether in the so-called “Pleuger” reforms under Joschka Fischer in the early 2000s, or in the “Review” launched by then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2014.
This inertia is partly due to the lack of political will and incentives for the ministry’s leadership – including both the ministers and the state secretaries – to advocate for comprehensive changes. This is where external pressure is essential.
In other countries, such pressure exists. The Canadian Senate recently published a report with 29 recommendations for reforming Canada’s Foreign Ministry after a commission conducted extensive interviews at home and abroad. In the U.S., a 16-member congressional commission composed of senators, members of Congress, and experts is currently working on reform proposals for the State Department.
In Germany, meanwhile, parliamentarians aren’t even discussing the need for reform when they are about to drastically cut the ministry’s budget, expecting the Foreign Office to accomplish more with fewer resources. As budget negotiations continue and with the second parliamentary debate on the 2025 budget yet to come, there is still time for these debates. But beyond this year’s budget debates and with a view to the upcoming federal election, all political parties need to seriously consider how the Foreign Office can be made fit for 21st century challenges and what political and financial resources will be needed to do so.
A shorter German version of this piece was first published by Frankfurter Rundschau on 28 October 2024 with the title “Reformiert das Auswärtige Amt.”