When Western voices described the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as an attack on the “rules-based” or “liberal” international order, it was always implied that it was Western states, and the USA in particular, that safeguarded international law after the Second World War. However, it was primarily Afro-Asian states that defended the rules-based order during the Cold War when aggressions challenged the inviolability of international borders. A closer look at this history can help to develop concepts for the validity of international norms – especially for a Europe that is in danger of becoming an object of great power politics in the future.
The norms of equality under international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of aggression are considered to be the core of the rules-based international order. Today, Russia’s war of aggression and Donald Trump’s second presidency – his rapprochement with Russia and his territorial claims to Canada and Greenland – appear to threaten the continued existence of this order, if it has not already been destroyed beyond repair.
However, as recent historical research has shown, the “rules-based” international order was by no means a “Western” achievement. Rather, it was primarily the states of the “Third World” that promoted the development and codification of these norms in the United Nations, advocating multilateral approaches to solving global problems, and generally supporting international cooperation across ideological boundaries. At the same time, they were the most decisive defenders of the norms that enshrined the equality, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states and the prohibition of aggression.
Beginning from this observation, this blog post considers the chances of defending the core of the rules-based order and thus maintaining a basis for multilateral cooperation.
Territorial conflicts and the rules-based international order during the Cold War
Certainly, the presence of the USA in Europe was crucial for the containment of Soviet expansion and enabled democracies in the west of the continent to work together in peace and freedom. Nuclear deterrence prevented the Cold War from becoming a hot war in Europe, and the integration of a divided Europe into two opposing military alliances helped to contain conflicts within the respective camps.
It was the Afro-Asian states that had to worry about the inviolability of their borders. Most of them had only recently gained independence from European colonial rule. The decolonisation waves of the 1960s and 1970s repeatedly brought about territorial conflicts. It was an open question whether the norm of territorial integrity would be respected in a rapidly changing world after the end of the colonial era, not least because violators of the norm could usually rely on the support of one of the two superpowers or European states. In the mid-1970s, for example, the USA sympathised with the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara and the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. In 1971, the Soviet Union supported the Indian military intervention that led to the secession of East Pakistan/Bangladesh. Regarding both sides, it can be said that the superpowers’ policies on territorial conflicts in Africa and Asia were driven by geostrategic interests rather than a desire to maintain a rules-based international order.
Contrary to this self-interested approach, states that have historically suffered from imperial oppression have frequently invoked the fundamental norms of international law to combat global inequalities and defend their sovereignty. In the age of decolonisation, states formerly under European rule began to forge relationships with each other, while a growing number of voices called for a united Afro-Asian presence on the international stage. A prominent expression of this self-image was the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, whose Final Communiqué repeatedly endorsed the principles of the UN Charter.
Accordingly, an overwhelming majority of Afro-Asian states insisted that the norm of territorial integrity enshrined in the UN Charter must be the basis for all approaches to resolving territorial conflicts. A defining moment was the Congo crisis. In July 1960, the resource-rich province of Katanga declared its independence, an attempt at secession that was only possible with the military support of the former colonial ruler Belgium. While the political leadership of Katanga enjoyed sympathy in many Western capitals, the Afro-Asian countries condemned the secession as a product of neocolonial Belgian aggression. Upholding the territorial integrity norm went hand in hand with a self-description of the Afro-Asian states as a group of small countries whose task it was to defend the values of the UN Charter in the face of the great powers. At a UN Security Council meeting on the Congo crisis, for example, the representative of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) described the “small Powers” [sic] as the “conscience” of the United Nations, calling on Western states to stop supporting the secessionist regime in Katanga.
Such rhetoric could very well influence the policies of the superpowers. The geopolitical rivalries of the Cold War were not least a competition for influence and prestige in the “Third World”. Hence, endeavours to maintain their own reputation provided both Washington and Moscow with incentives to present themselves as guardians of international norms in world politics. Thus, the USA ultimately pursued a course of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo, even though the secessionist rulers in Katanga were ostentatiously anti-communist.
In the arena of the United Nations, the ideological conflict between the superpowers was often less one between capitalism (or democracy) and communism, but rather a rhetorical battle between two sides that both claimed to be defending the UN Charter and accused the other side of pursuing an aggressive foreign policy. This did not rule out actions contrary to international law and morally questionable manoeuvres by the superpowers – as already mentioned, violators of the norm could often count on the support of Washington or Moscow if it suited their geostrategic interests. At the same time, however, both superpowers had a certain interest in not appearing too contemptuous of core international norms in the eyes of the world. On the other hand, supporting states whose sovereignty and territorial integrity was under threat could enhance their prestige. Consequently, there were no annexations by a permanent member of the Security Council during the Cold War and, on the whole, only very few border changes resulting from the use of force.
This was mainly an achievement of those countries that defined themselves as “small states” and defended the United Nations as an institution that stood up for the rights of small states. Not taking sides unconditionally in the East-West conflict not only served the purpose of playing off one superpower against the other for their own benefit, but also the goal of collectively standing up for the rights of small countries in international politics. However, the international order propagated by Afro-Asian states certainly had its downsides. The unqualified endorsement of the territorial integrity norm allowed post-colonial states to brutally quell secessionist movements with military force, as the Nigerian government did in the Biafra War (1967-70). Nevertheless, their defence of the norm contributed to the establishment of a world of sovereign nation states with inviolable borders. The international order of the Cold War was thus shaped not only by the US-Soviet antagonism, but also by the activities of the Afro-Asian states.
Europe as an alliance of small states in a world of great powers
The power dynamics of the Cold War differ substantially from the world order that many see as emerging from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Donald Trump’s second term in office: a world in which the great powers pursue their interests without any consideration for international law. Herfried Münkler, for example, speaks of “a new world order in which there is only one currency: power”. In such a world, the small states will at best be able to play the great powers off against each other; at worst, the great powers will agree on spheres of influence which the affected states will have no choice but to accept.
There is now a growing number of voices calling for closer European cooperation on foreign and security policy and more investment in defence. Without question, everything indicates that in the future Europe will no longer be able to rely on the United States to protect its own security. However, the question of which political goals a rearmament should be linked to remains open. Is it about Europe becoming another member of the club of great powers alongside the USA, Russia, and China? Or is it about the defence of the repeatedly invoked rules-based international order?
In the latter case, it is not enough to merely build up an independent European military power. To maintain international norms, Europe must mobilise support beyond its borders. Here it can learn from the strategies of the Afro-Asian states during the Cold War. The commitment to sovereign equality, combined with their self-description as small states, enabled them to stand together in support of the UN Charter and the territorial integrity norm. In this way, the Cold War superpowers could not ignore their demands. Likewise, Europe could now define itself as an alliance of medium-sized and small states working to preserve the rules-based international order for the sake of protecting the rights of all medium-sized and small states around the world.
Certainly, the current world situation differs from the Cold War era and there are developments that make such a strategy appear less promising today than during the East-West conflict. On the one hand, the “Global South” has asserted itself in a completely different form in recent years than the “Third World” once did. Groupings such as BRICS are primarily associations of emerging great and regional powers that are challenging the hegemony of the West in the context of shifting geopolitical power relations. Standing up for international norms is less important to them than emphasising their own claim to power. On the other hand, it was precisely the rivalries of the Cold War that allowed the Afro-Asian states to participate in the negotiations on the rules of international politics. Close cooperation between the great powers, such as that which is emerging between the USA and Russia, naturally restricts the ability of smaller states to exert influence.
It is unlikely, however, that the recent contacts between the USA and Russia will lead to lasting cooperation between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. In particular, the USA and China – the two crucial superpowers of the coming decades – have conflicting interests that are difficult to reconcile. Hence, global rivalries and the competition for prestige in international forums will likely continue to play an important role in the future. On 24 February 2025, for example, the US tried in vain to prevent the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution submitted by Ukraine condemning the Russian aggression and calling for compliance with international norms. Even if the rising, often Russia-friendly regional powers of the Global South are currently in the spotlight, that the resolution was passed with 93 votes in favour despite opposition from Washington and Moscow shows that there are still a significant number of states that have an interest in upholding the rules-based international order.
A Europe that defines itself as an alliance of medium-sized and small states would therefore not be alone in the world. Opportunities for cooperation with non-European states would be afforded by cooperation with regional international organisations such as ASEAN, forums such as the Munich Security Conference and, last but not least, the United Nations, which remains the most important platform for negotiating the rules of international politics. To avoid appearing as a great power that is only concerned with its own strategic sovereignty, Europe as a group of medium-sized and small states must meet potential partners on an equal footing and, beyond its borders, defend the rights of states whose sovereignty and territorial integrity are under threat. Particularly when a great power openly questions the fundamental rights of small states, as Trump recently did regarding Panama, Europe should not selfishly ingratiate itself with the stronger side. In international forums, Europe should take a clear stance in favour of upholding the rules-based international order. In Europe itself, the desired rearmament must not be limited to protecting the borders of the European Union or the European NATO members. Economic and military support for Ukraine must not only be continued but intensified, regardless of the further course of the war and any upcoming negotiations. Abandoning Ukraine now would expose all European invocations of a rules-based international order as pure hypocrisy.
In view of all the obstacles and opposing developments, protecting the rules-based international order is no easy task. It is, however, more promising than the two alternatives. Continuing as before would only reinforce the dwindling of Europe’s relevance – a development that threatens not only Europe’s global position, but also the peace, security, and prosperity of the continent. On the other hand, the idea of Europe becoming itself a unified great power seems illusory. For the foreseeable future, Europe will find it difficult to compete as a peer with the USA and China (and militarily with Russia). Even with the greatest possible efforts, Europe would hardly be able to create a competitive military power in the next few years nor act with the same unified intent as the other great powers. On a global level, and in view of the long list of colonial crimes committed when European states still dominated world affairs, a Europe that acted as a great power would likely enjoy even less sympathy than its competitors.
As an alliance of medium-sized and small states, however, Europe could act confidently and credibly, not least because in the foreseeable future it will de facto be no more than a group of medium-sized and small states trying to be as united as possible in difficult times. The international order propagated by such an alliance has a good chance of being supported by all those who fear being left behind in a world of great power rivalries. The transatlantic rift following Donald Trump’s second inauguration might even offers some opportunities, as it is now far more difficult to accuse the Europeans of hiding Western hegemonic ambitions behind the concept of a rules-based international order. Such a vision may also mobilise more support among the people of Europe than the goal of creating a European great power. It could appeal both to supporters of deepening European cooperation and to those who are sceptical about the project of a European superstate. At the same time, cooperation with the superpowers China and the USA is not ruled out, provided they pursue a policy that is in line with the rules-based international order and do not seek to trap Europe in lasting dependency.
A plea in favour of a Europe that is confidently involved in shaping the future international order may seem overambitious in times of current European weakness. But when politicians call on the peoples of Europe to make sacrifices for the creation of a European military power, this should be linked to a positive, broadly agreeable vision of the future. This vision should also be attractive to all states beyond Europe that are equally concerned about the threat to fundamental international norms. In the best-case scenario, it would also encourage the two superpowers, the USA and China, to behave in accordance with the rules-based international order. Not because the governments in Washington and Beijing need to be convinced of the norms of this order, but because in times of competition for power, prestige, and influence it can be beneficial for superpowers to appear as guardians of the rules-based order.
Disclaimer: This article was first published in German.
Christian Methfessel
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