Political rally for the pro-European presidential candidate Nicusor Dan, in Bucharest, Romania, May 11, 2025. | Photo: fusion-of-horizons via flickr

The Day After Tomorrow: The Emerging Political Disaster on the EU’s Eastern Borders

The European Union’s efforts to become a global power and to take the responsibility for its direct neighborhood may face a significant challenge. While news headlines remain fixed on Trump’s foreign policy, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the risks of global crisis, the region of Central and Eastern Europe is slipping into a spiral of political crisis. Between fragmented and polarized parliaments and fragile governmental coalitions, the EU’s borderlands are becoming political minefields. If their respective problems remain unchecked, the crises may impact the EU, paralyze governance, empower ‘sovereigntists’, and destabilize the EU from within. The cases of Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Poland, where systemic instability is the “new normal”, shed the light on the prospects that the whole EU may face in the very near future.

Bulgaria – the index for regional political turmoil

Bulgaria is a trend-setter for a political model that has the potential to spread further in the region. The country has faced 8 elections in the last three years. Each time, pro-Russian forces failed to win the majority to form the government, yet pro-European parties either lacked the political will or ideological cohesion to form governments, or failed to maintain governments thanks to weak solidarity within the governing coalitions. The current Bulgarian government is the result of a fragile compromise between the pro-Western but corruption-tarnished “GERB” party, the pro-Russian Bulgarian Socialist Party (S&D), and the populist “There is Such a People” party, led by former TV presenter Slavi Trifonov. The tiny majority is granted by the support of the compromised oligarch and leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, Delyan Peevski. The government may fail already in June this year after the release of the Convergence Report, which assesses the progress made by Bulgaria towards fulfilling the criteria necessary to adopt the euro. The collapse of the government will lead to a new round of snap elections followed by complicated and probably futile coalition talks.

Sovereigntists’ parade in Romania

The neighboring Romania faces similar challenges. The parliament is polarized while 1/3 of the parliamentary seats are occupied by anti-EU elements, the so-called sovereigntist parties of the AUR, POT and SOS. The mainstream National Liberals and Social Democrats are compromised despite having a parliamentary majority. The true challenge to the coalition were the presidential elections in May. While sovereigntists united in support of a single candidate George Simion, pro-European forces split their electorate between Crin Antonescu nominated by the ruling coalition of the mainstream parties, Nicusor Dan – an independent liberal candidate and a mayor of Bucharest and Elena Lasconi – a leader of the pro-European USR party.

In the first round of the recent elections on May 4, Simion got 40.96% compared to pro-European candidate Nicusor Dan with 20.99%. Only enormous mobilization of pro-European citizens and the largest voter turnout in the last 30 years – 64.72 percent, or over 11.6 million Romanians – ensured the victory of Dan in the second round, with 53.6% of the votes.

However, the divisions between the pro-European forces may result in failure to build a new coalition and Romania, like Bulgaria, may enter a spiral of snap elections, disabled governance, and political turmoil.

Revanchism in the Republic of Moldova

There is also a chance that the Republic of Moldova will enter the turbulence zone this autumn. Although in 2024 Maia Sandu – a pro-European reformist won the presidential elections for the second time in a row and Moldovans voted for the European integration at the national referendum – by the thinnest of margins, with 50.35% who voted in favor of the EU while 49.65% voted against it) – there is a high probability that at the upcoming parliamentary elections the pro-European PAS party will lose the majority in the parliament. This could lead to the victory of the pro-Russian and sovereigntist parties and to a contest between the pro-European President and revanchist government. This might in turn give rise to an inability to proceed with the reforms needed to join the EU. In such a case, the country’s pivot to Russia would be likely.

Poland at the edge

Poland is also holding presidential elections. The key fight is between the mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, who represents the ruling pro-European coalition and Karol Nawrocki, from opposition PiS. In the first round Trzaskowski won 31.36% of the vote while Nawrocki, supported by the populist right-wing party, took 29.54%. The second round is expected on June 1.

The alarming fact is the result of the representative of pro-Russian sovereigntists Sławomir Jerzy Mentzen, who holds third place with 14.8%. The failure of Trzaskowski to win the elections will result in another clinch between the President and the current government. Presidential veto on the governmental decisions will lead to a deadlock when the only solution will be parliamentary snap elections. It is not guaranteed that the pro-European forces would win the majority again. Another Central European country can be trapped in political turmoil and instability.

The EU’s response to the challenges

The EU makes sporadic efforts to fix the situation, ensure rewards for the reforms of EU member-states, and assist in negotiating compromises within the pro-European ruling governments. Both Bulgaria and Romania were granted accession to the Schengen zone last year and reached some process on their path to the eurozone. During his visit to Bulgaria in April, 2025, European Council President Antonio Costa highlighted the country’s progress with reforms and highlighted Bulgaria’s role in building European defence capabilities.

The EU also supports Maia Sandu’s reformist efforts in the Republic of Moldova. At a joint press-conference with the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu in April 2025, Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, noted that with the €1.9 billion reform Growth Facility now adopted, the EU is backing Moldovan reforms with real support. Additional €60m will be granted for defence support this year, including air defence, and joint efforts to protect autumn elections from ‘hybrid threats’.

Back in February 2024, the European Commission approved the release of up to €137 billion in funds for Poland that had been frozen over concerns about the integrity of the rule of law in Poland. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said to the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk she was impressed by the efforts of the Polish people to restore the rule of law as the backbone of its society. However, given wider trends in the region, this might not be enough.

Conclusion: what might we expect ‘the day after tomorrow’?

From Sofia to Chisinau and Bucharest to Warsaw, a pattern emerges in which societies and parliaments alike are polarized and divided, coalitions are too fragile to act, while anti-EU populists and so-called sovereigntists take advantage of political turbulence to strengthen their positions.

The EU seeks solutions and offers support in the form of funding, reform incentives, public endorsements. However, the lack of cohesive strategy to counteract growing democratic erosion and political polarization may result in further crisis on Europe’s eastern flank. The current “firefighting” approach can only be a temporary measure and must be replaced by strategic and structural engagement. Otherwise, the EU may find itself trapped within a region of turbulence and instability as soon as the day after tomorrow.

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

Sergiy GERASYMCHUK is Deputy Executive Director at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, Board Member at the Strategic and Security Studies Group, and teaches at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He is an author, co-author, and editor of a number of publications on NATO and EU enlargement, regional security in CEE, and Russian influence in the region. // Sergiy GERASYMCHUK ist stellvertretender Direktor des Foreign Policy Council „Ukrainian Prism“, Vorstandsmitglied der Strategic and Security Studies Group und lehrt an der Nationalen Universität Kiew-Mohyla Academy. Er ist Autor, Mitautor und Herausgeber einer Reihe von Publikationen über die NATO- und EU-Erweiterung, die regionale Sicherheit in Mittel- und Osteuropa und den russischen Einfluss in der Region.

Sergiy Gerasymchuk

Sergiy GERASYMCHUK is Deputy Executive Director at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, Board Member at the Strategic and Security Studies Group, and teaches at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. He is an author, co-author, and editor of a number of publications on NATO and EU enlargement, regional security in CEE, and Russian influence in the region. // Sergiy GERASYMCHUK ist stellvertretender Direktor des Foreign Policy Council „Ukrainian Prism“, Vorstandsmitglied der Strategic and Security Studies Group und lehrt an der Nationalen Universität Kiew-Mohyla Academy. Er ist Autor, Mitautor und Herausgeber einer Reihe von Publikationen über die NATO- und EU-Erweiterung, die regionale Sicherheit in Mittel- und Osteuropa und den russischen Einfluss in der Region.