After the long-awaited fall of the brutal dictator Bashar Al-Assad on December 8, 2024, through a swift offensive by Islamist rebels, many Syrians initially found hope. However, for the Kurds, this brought a different reality. Turkey and its Islamist allies have been putting immense pressure on the Autonomous Administration. Around 100,000 Kurds have already fled, and a Turkish invasion seems increasingly likely. The dream of democratic self-governance now faces an existential threat.
Turkey and its pro-Turkish Islamist militias, particularly the Syrian National Army (SNA), are leveraging the power shift in Damascus to target the Kurdish-controlled self-administration areas in northern and eastern Syria. Ankara justifies these actions by claiming that groups operating in the region, especially the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which lead the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Turkey considers a terrorist organization and an existential security threat. The recent escalation of attacks is unsurprising, as Ankara had likely been waiting for a strategic opportunity. The Islamists have advanced into Kurdish-controlled territories, engaging in fierce clashes with the SDF, and have taken control of several areas under SNA command.
This article analyzes the situation in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria, the role of the Kurds in the civil war, and provides an overview of the development of their autonomy. It explores the military conflicts, the actors involved, and their goals, as well as the threats faced by the Kurds. Additionally, the article discusses whether the Kurds can defend their autonomy under current pressures. Finally, it examines the possible consequences of the drastic escalation in Syria.
The Kurds in the Syrian Civil War: The Path to Autonomous Self-Governance in Rojava
The Syrian Kurds, comprising about 10 to 15 percent of the population, faced systematic discrimination and oppression under decades of Ba’ath Party rule, being denied basic rights and citizenship for many. With the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, they defended themselves against the Al-Assad regime and Islamist groups. Under the leadership of the secular-Marxist Democratic Union Party (PYD), an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), they established a self-administration in January 2014 under the name “Rojava” (Kurdish for Western Kurdistan), encompassing the cantons of Kobanê, Cizîrê, and Afrin. During the course of the conflict, Rojava expanded and was renamed the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria in March 2016, although it has not yet been internationally recognized. The ethnically diverse region of Rojava, predominantly Kurdish, borders Turkey and Iraq. This autonomous administration stands in stark contrast to the authoritarian and partially-democratic regimes of neighboring countries, which are often characterized by centralized power, limited political participation, and minority discrimination. Rojava operates under a framework that emphasizes direct democracy, gender equality, and ethnic inclusivity, with policies that mandate equal representation of men and women in administrative positions. Its political structures are designed to include representation from diverse communities, including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, and Turkmens.
YPG, the military wing of the PYD, defend the autonomous region and achieved a decisive victory against the terrorist organization of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Kobanê in January 2015. In 2015, they formed the SDF with other groups, a U.S.-backed military alliance comprising Kurds, Arabs, and Christians that played a key role in dismantling the IS. Their successes thus became a symbol of resistance against jihadism and brought the Kurds international recognition.
Kurds in the Crosshairs of Turkey and Islamist Rebels: Motives and Objectives
For years, the Turkish army and allied mercenaries have been targeting Kurdish regions in northeastern Syria, affecting both military posts and civilian infrastructure, as Turkey perceives Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, and armed Kurdish forces near its border, as a threat to its national security. Until recently, Kurdish forces controlled roughly one-third of Syrian territory but have steadily been losing ground since the fall of the Al-Assad regime, brought about by an Islamist alliance led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), an Al-Qaeda offshoot. Turkey, a long-time player in the conflict, has supported Sunni opposition groups while targeting both the Assad regime and Kurdish forces. The regime’s fall gave new momentum to Erdoğan and his allies, enabling pro-Turkish militias to advance into Kurdish-controlled territories and seize key cities like Tal Rifaat and Manbij. Since November’s rebel offensive, over 100,000 Kurds have fled, fearing extremist militias.
Turkey’s recent actions are part of its ongoing military escalation. Supported by Islamist militias, Turkey has targeted Kurdish territories in Syria for years, with notable incidents including the capture of Afrin in 2018 during the so-called “Operation Olive Branch” and the occupation of Tall Abyad and Ras Al-Ain in 2019 as part of “Operation Peace Spring”. Turkey’s presence in northern Syria since 2016 has been subject to criticism, with some international bodies considering it a violation of international law. Numerous reports highlight ethnic cleansing, property confiscation, and severe human rights abuses against the Kurdish population in Afrin, carried out by Turkish forces and their allied SNA militias. Turkey has stated its soldiers will remain stationed along the border until Kurdish groups lay down their arms.
But what drives Turkey and its Islamist allies to take such aggressive action against the Kurds, and what are their objectives? Turkey seems intent on dismantling Kurdish autonomous structures in Syria. Ankara views the YPG, which lead the SDF, as an extension of the PKK – a group in armed conflict with Turkey for decades and listed as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington, and the European Union. As such, Turkey classifies the YPG as a terrorist group, in contrast to the U.S., which supports the YPG in the fight against the IS. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has emphasized that there is no place for “PKK and YPG terrorists” in Syria’s future, calling for the YPG’s dissolution. In contrast, the Syrian Kurdish leadership has repeatedly distanced itself from the PKK, and asserting that their aim is not independence, but the preservation of autonomy within a unified Syria. Recently, the SDF commander Mazloum Abdi also expressed readiness to integrate into a new Syrian army under a negotiated agreement on a “suitable framework”. Abdi has also proposed steps to address Ankara’s security concerns, including a demilitarized zone in Kobanê under U.S. supervision – a proposal Turkey rejected.
Many analysts and observers believe that Turkey’s efforts to establish a 40-kilometer-deep “safe zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border in northeastern Syria are part of a broader strategy to undermine Kurdish autonomy in the region. While not yet fully realized, parts of this zone have already been established, resulting in the displacement of Kurdish populations in affected areas. Such a zone would enable Turkey to expand its territorial control and significantly bolster its influence in northeastern Syria. The current dynamic developments suggest that the realization of this plan now seems more attainable for Turkey than ever before.
Erdoğan is also pursuing domestic political objectives with this offensive, aiming to bolster his standing among voters and solidify his power base under the pretext of combating terrorism. Additionally, he seeks to resettle the more than three million Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey back to Syria, particularly in Kurdish areas, not merely to reduce domestic pressure, but also because they would simultaneously be more favorable to his interests than the Kurds. Such demographic changes would be catastrophic for the Kurds. In already occupied regions like Afrin, a similar strategy was implemented, with Arab populations being resettled, and many Kurds displaced – objectives that resonate particularly well with Turkish nationalist circles.
Another key player in the military developments is the SNA, an alliance of groups including Islamist, jihadist factions and warlords, and one of the major opposition forces alongside HTS and the SDF. Established in 2017 with Turkish support, the SNA receives financial and military assistance from Ankara, and maintains ties with HTS. The SNA played a significant role in the November blitz offensive and operates in areas occupied by Turkey, where it serves de facto as a tool against Kurdish autonomy efforts, and is often referred to as a “puppet of Turkey”. The SNA views the Kurds as enemies and seeks to weaken their influence in Syria while simultaneously expanding and consolidating its own power.
Can the Kurds Withstand the Pressure from Turkey and Islamist Groups to Maintain their Autonomy?
The question of whether the Kurdish forces in Syria can withstand the massive pressure from Turkey and Islamist rebel groups is crucial for the future of their autonomous regions. Organized under the PYD and supported by battle-hardened militias such as the YPG, which form the backbone of the SDF, the Kurds have shown their ability to resist formidable opponents during the Syrian Civil War, including the IS, the Assad regime, and Turkey. However, volatile developments and complex power dynamics in the post-Assad era present a new threat dimension. Turkey not only wields its power as a leading regional force and NATO’s second-largest army, but also relies on Islamist and jihadist militias of the SNA. Another complicating factor is HTS, led by Ahmed Al-Shara‘ also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani, who has become Syria’s de facto leader and has formed a transitional government. While Al-Shara‘ has stated that the Kurds are part of Syria, he demands the disarmament and dissolution of all militias, including Kurdish forces, into the Syrian army. It must not be overlooked that Turkey exerts significant influence over HTS, which it has supported thus far. This influence could help Turkey more easily implement its agenda in northeastern Syria, significantly complicating the challenge for Kurdish militias both militarily and politically.
A key factor in the preservation of Kurdish autonomy remains military support from external allies, primarily the United States. Washington could exert influence to prevent an escalation by Turkey but faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the Kurds are reliable partners in the fight against the IS; on the other hand, Turkey, as a NATO member, is indispensable. Under the leadership of the designated President Donald Trump, who shows little interest in the region and could push for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, the conditions for the Kurds are likely to worsen. Whether they can secure their autonomy in the long term remains uncertain.
Outlook and Potential Consequences
The current developments surrounding the fall of the Ba’ath regime and the resulting new power structures create significant uncertainties for the future of the Kurds in Syria. In the face of the threat, particularly from Turkey, the Kurds find themselves in an increasingly defensive position, fighting to defend their autonomy and the achievements they have made. A large-scale offensive by Turkey and its Islamist allies could have serious consequences. Such an attack would most likely lead to intense resistance and mark the beginning of a new phase in the Syrian Kurds‘ struggle for self-determination. At the same time, the autonomous structures that have been built up could be weakened or severely destroyed by occupation. A humanitarian crisis is also looming, with further displacements and a demographic reshaping to the detriment of the Kurds, as was already the case in Afrin, for example.
An escalation would also hinder Syria’s reconstruction, destroy hopes for peace, and prevent the return of refugees. Additionally, the weakening of Kurdish forces could enlarge the power vacuum, facilitating the resurgence of IS, which strategically exploits such situations and power vacuums. Thousands of imprisoned IS fighters could escape from Kurdish prisons, as was attempted in 2022. Another major concern is the Al-Haul camp complex in the Kurdish-controlled Al-Hasaka Governorate, where tens of thousands of IS supporters and their families are held, considered “ticking time bombs”. The collapse of these structures would have destabilizing consequences not only for Syria but for the entire region.
Masood Al Hakari
Latest posts by Masood Al Hakari (see all)
- Rojava Under Pressure After the Fall of Dictator Al-Assad: Turkey and Islamist Allies Threaten the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Syria - 3. Januar 2025
- Syrien: Blitzoffensive der islamistischen Rebellenallianz stürzt Assad - 10. Dezember 2024
- Zehn Jahre nach dem Genozid: Die fortdauernde Krise der Jesiden - 2. August 2024
