Influenced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the evolving security landscape, Germany’s decade-long debate over armed drones concluded in 2022 with the decision to arm the Heron TP. This article examines the potential use of armed Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAVs in countering Russian grey zone tactics in the Baltic region. It argues that, despite vulnerabilities in high-intensity warfare, UAVs like the Heron TP are well-suited for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and rapid response in irregular conflict scenarios. Forward deployment to the Baltics could enhance responsiveness and deterrence, supporting NATO missions and demonstrating Germany’s commitment to collective defense in an increasingly unstable European security environment.
For over 10 years, the question of whether Germany should acquire armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was one of the primary debates in German defense and security policy. The so-called “Drohnendebatte” (drone debate) encompassed multiple stages and aspects, from the leasing, procurement, and arming of drones to the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement (ROE). The debate concluded only in 2022, when a decision was made to arm the German Heron TP, procurement of which began in 2016. This shift followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Bundeswehr’s withdrawal from Afghanistan – events that prompted a reassessment of German security policy and the potential conflict scenarios for which the Bundeswehr needed to be prepared and equipped.
In the later stages of the drone debate, the possibility of employing armed medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAVs like the Heron TP in the Baltic to prevent possible infiltration by Russian Forces came up in the German parliament. This was a stark contrast from the prevailing narratives around the military utility of armed MALE UAVs in counterinsurgency operations such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Mali. These systems are consistently framed as especially well-suited to operating in uncontested air space supporting ground forces on overseas deployments. At the same time, they are considered ill-suited to high intensity warfare between states because of their vulnerability to air defense systems, resulting from their medium operating altitude, relatively slow speed and inability to perform evasive maneuvers.
Against this backdrop, this article explores whether armed MALE UAVs could be employed in irregular conflict scenarios, enhancing security in disputed border regions and countering Russian grey zone activities by providing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). It concludes that, while limited in high-intensity conflict scenarios, armed drones may provide operational value in irregular conflict scenarios through their ISR and precision strike capabilities. Forward deployment to the Baltics might help to deter potential covert infiltrations by Russian special forces and would also symbolize NATO solidarity, even if the drones would remain unarmed.
Fundamental Assumptions and Capabilities of Armed Drones
This investigation rests on three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, both Germany in particular and NATO in general are committed to defending the Baltic States from any aggression, with military means if necessary. This was expressed by former German chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2024, when he reiterated Germany’s determination to defend every last square centimeter of NATO territory. The new government also remains committed to Germany’s responsibility in NATO and to a strong European security and defense policy.
Secondly, current generation MALE UAVs are highly capable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike platforms if operating in an uncontested airspace. This is due to their ability to remain active for long periods of time in the area of operation – over 24 hours in case of the Heron TP –, their wide range of sensors, and their considerable payload. Explicit data for the Heron TP is not publicly available. However, it is very comparable in size to the MQ-9 Reaper. Because these drones can stay in the air for a long period of time, they can closely monitor potential threats and help confirm who or what is being observed (positive identification). Once a target is identified, the drone’s weapons allow it to respond quickly if needed. This can be critical in moments when overwhelming pressures are put on coalition forces.
Lastly, MALE UAVs are extremely vulnerable to capable integrated air defense systems (IADS). Russia possesses such IADS that can reach deep within NATO airspace. Based on these assumptions, it must be concluded that any use of MALE UAVs for countering a possible infiltration by Russian forces will have to take place in a scenario in which the Russian military is either unable or unwilling to engage NATO aircraft in international or NATO airspace – similar to the first weeks in Russia’s war against Ukraine, where the Ukrainian military managed to exploit gaps in Russian air defenses and struck Russian ground forces using its Bayraktar TB-2 drones.
Russian Strategy
To assess whether a scenario where Russian forces refrain from openly engaging NATO aircraft is plausible, it is necessary to understand how Russia conceptualizes and conducts military operations below the threshold of large-scale military conflict and open warfare. What is often described in Western discourse as “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone tactics” is referred to within Russian military doctrine as “noncontact warfare.” This concept emphasizes achieving strategic goals through indirect means – such as disinformation, cyberattacks, covert troop movements, and psychological operations – rather than through open, large-scale battles. It reflects a shift in how military power is used, aiming to influence events without triggering a clear military response, and is partly shaped by how NATO has conducted its own operations in the past.
The U.S.-led campaigns against Iraq in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1999, during the formative years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, were fought by extensive use of standoff weapons and precision-guided munitions, heavily coordinated air campaigns and intelligence operations to shape a battlefield in which the combat attrition of friendly ground forces could be kept to a minimum. Initially, these weapons and doctrines were developed to counter the conventional advantage of Soviet military forces in Europe.
Soviet and Russian planners adapted their own battle doctrine according to NATO’s way of warfare. Russian forces are now heavily dispersed (as can be seen in Ukraine) to avoid detection and targeting. The battlefield is intentionally fragmented to enable the destruction of an adversary’s fighting capability through ‘defeat in detail’. During the initial phase of military operations in a foreign nation, this relies partly but critically on cross-border infiltration by specialized Russian ground forces to achieve a fait accompli in changing the geopolitical landscape to Russia’s advantage. These ground forces are drawn from the FSB, Russia’s security intelligence agency, responsible both for the homeland and for the “near-abroad” (former Soviet nations) as well as the Russian military. The FSB has its own paramilitary forces, specialized light infantry formations recruited from the airborne and naval infantry forces (Spetsnaz) and the tier one special operations forces of the Russian military, the KSO. The deployment of these units in foreign nations would happen in close coordination with shaping operations – i.e. measures intended to create a favorable battlespace, such as reconnaissance, psychological operations, strikes on key personnel or infrastructure, etc. – to be conducted by Russia’s intelligence agencies.
These shaping operations are not only meant to gather information but employ “active measures” to sway public opinion and coerce key persons into accepting a new status quo. All of this is meant to further enable freedom of movement for ground forces to occupy strategic locations. Prime examples of this approach were seen in Crimea and the Donbas region in 2014. During these operations, Russian ground forces consisted largely of light infantry that entered their area of operations clandestinely and could not be tracked or attributed. Russia therefore enjoyed a critical advantage that allowed the Kremlin to accomplish its goals while leaving the Ukrainian and Western governments and militaries confused and unable to respond decisively. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 can be seen as an attempt at applying this strategy on a grand scale, although heavily supported by armored formations and long range weapon strikes.
While this approach was only partially successful in the Donbas in 2014 and failed in 2022 – due to the Russian military’s failure to establish an airbridge at Hostomel airport – it is still very likely that Russian military leadership would employ elements of this strategy in the future. This holds true in particular for the infiltration of specialized forces, because the Baltic states possess far less strategic depth than Ukraine, defined as the distance between a country’s key strategic locations and their border with a potentially hostile nation. Therefore, less ground has to be covered by irregular military forces operating covertly to significantly change the geostrategic landscape in Russia’s favor. To counter such a threat, persistent surveillance enabled by the extended loitering time of MALE UAVs, along with the ability to promptly engage identified targets, could prove highly effective.
So Why the Heron?
UAVs like the Heron could play an important role in responding to infiltration threats, especially in the complex environment of grey zone conflict. Their ability to stay airborne for long periods of time, monitor wide areas, and respond quickly to emerging threats has already proven useful in counter-insurgency operations. These same strengths make them well-suited to counter the more subtle and indirect tactics often used in grey zone or hybrid activities – specialized infantry forces can be tracked and engaged from the air in much the same way as insurgents.
The potential battlefield resulting from the changes in Russian warfare would to some degree resemble the fragmented battlespaces found in counter-insurgency operations. Moreover, even if the threat that emerges in the Baltic states would be of a different nature than anticipated in this article, the significant ISR capabilities of the Heron TP could address the significant shortfall of these capabilities by European armed forces in a timely fashion and would enhance Baltic security, even without taking the Heron TP’s armament into consideration.
What is more, the airspace above the Baltics would likely only be partly contested. The main Russian advantage in the air, its ground-based air defenses (GBAD) relying on long-range surface-to-air missiles, would likely not be at play. This is because firing missiles into NATO airspace would be a significant step of escalation towards high-intensity combat operations. Moreover, even activating their target acquisition radars would be viewed as a significant act of aggression by NATO leadership. A possible counterargument regarding the projected inactivity of Russian GBAD in such a scenario could be that MH17 was shot down by Russian air defenses during Russian-supported separatist operations in Eastern Ukraine. But while the exact reasons for this shootdown are unknown, the attack heavily implicated Russian involvement, something that Russia would actively seek to avoid in its grey war operations. Of course, electronic warfare measures that could complicate the use of MALE UAVs remain an issue, but that is already the case now. In addition, Ukraine has managed to keep its drones flying despite Russian electronic warfare efforts.
Along these lines, it can be concluded that the deployment of German Heron TPs to the Baltic States in support of enhanced forward presence, Baltic Air Policing or NATO’s Baltic Sentry mission represents a possible effective use case of this weapon system. Because of these already existing missions and deployments in the Baltic, operating German drones in the region is not a step that would provoke significant risk of escalation, as there are already far more conventionally capable forces operating in the area. Moreover, German Heron TPs already patrol the Baltic Sea to deter sabotage and protect critical undersea-infrastructure. If there are concerns that deploying armed drones could be perceived by Russia as escalatory, a more measured approach would be to operate the Heron TP unarmed by default, with the flexibility to arm it should intelligence indicate an increased risk of Russian aggression on NATO’s Eastern Flank.
The Question of Forward Deployment: Keep them at Schleswig Air Base or Deploy to the Baltic States?
If the German drones are to be committed to operations in the Baltic states, forward deployment (basing them in the Baltic states themselves) would make this task far more effective. The distance from Schleswig Airbase, where the drones are currently stationed, to the Russian border in Lithuania is approximately 1,000 kilometers, resulting in a one-way flight time of over two hours at their reported cruising speed of 400 km/h. Even at an assumed airtime of 24 hours or more, this cuts heavily in to the time these drones can be used to cover the border. If tensions with Russia should increase, this travel time would make drone operations far more inflexible and predictable for the enemy. Forward deployment of drone operators also follows established German SOPs for drone operations, according to which drone crews are stationed near the area of operations – in close proximity to the ground forces which they are supporting. With German Heron TPs very recently deployed to patrol the Baltic sea to protect critical maritime infrastructure, there is an opportunity to expand UAV operations in the region.
The Bundestag could mandate a mission for UAV operations in the wider Baltic Region with the sea patrolling component remaining stationed at Schleswig Airbase, supported by a staff element of the German Navy. Under the same legislative framework, a land component could be established to support the coming German Army brigade in Lithuania. This land component would be forward deployed and work closely with the brigade staff. The Luftwaffe possess the capability for this through the German Air Force Force Protection Regiment.
The main limiting factor is likely how quickly the ordered UAVs become operational. This will also influence whether forward deployment to the Baltic States or continued basing in Schleswig is preferable. A larger available fleet of Herons would reduce the significance of travel time, potentially making forward deployment less necessary.
Conclusion
Despite their limitations in high-intensity conflict, MALE UAVs appear well-suited for countering Russian grey zone activities, as their operational advantages align closely with the demands of irregular warfare. Even if the drones would remain unarmed, they could address the European shortfall in ISR capabilities and contribute to security in the Baltics.
Beyond their technical and operational utility in irregular conflict, there are also compelling strategic reasons to deploy Germany’s new armed drones to the Baltic states. German and European forces are stationed in close proximity to Russia and Belarus, operating within a highly volatile geopolitical environment. With Germany planning to permanently deploy a bridge to Lithuania by the end of 2027, the Heron TP could provide critical support in fulfilling their operational objectives. Moreover, in an era of uncertainty surrounding continued U.S. commitment to NATO, any deployment of advanced military assets in support of European allies sends an important signal of solidarity and resolve.
