Be It under a Foreign or a National Umbrella: The Strategic Cost of Nuclear Deterrence for Germany is Too High

Russia’s Saber-Rattling and the Resurgence of Nuclear Deterrence in NATO

Russia’s nuclear threats at the outset of its war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 were aimed at deterring the United States and European nations from intervening. However, President Vladimir Putin has not succeeded in preventing indirect financial and military support, which has grown steadily over the first three years of the war. Moscow’s nuclear posture and signaling, however, appears to have contributed to preventing Western forces from participating in the war directly. What is certain, though, is that Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling has triggered a renaissance of nuclear deterrence within the Western alliance.

During the very first days of the war in March 2022, the German government ordered American F-35 fighter jets to replace the aging Tornado aircraft serving as delivery systems for the American B61 nuclear bombs deployed in Büchel. Under great pressure to act, the German government lacked better, readily available options to reinforce its nuclear deterrence. Germany’s nuclear sharing within NATO required a rapid update to respond to potential Russian aggression. Over the course of the war, Russia has expanded its capabilities, through the development and testing of new hypersonic delivery systems and cruise missiles, as well as the deployment of Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. In response to this heightened threat, the German government forged even closer ties with the US to ensure an adequate deterrent.

At the 2024 NATO summit in Washington, US President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz agreed to deploy long-range US missile systems in Germany starting in 2026, in particular, Tomahawk cruise missiles. Although these are not nuclear weapons, they would be capable of penetrating deep into Russian territory and destroying strategic—including nuclear—capabilities. The delicate point here is that command authority—unlike the nuclear-capable fighter jets controlled by Bundeswehr soldiers under the framework of nuclear sharing—is to remain exclusively in the hands of the US military, meaning that the German government would have no direct control over their deployment. Decision-making regarding their use for Germany’s defense or an escalation from German soil was supposed to rest solely with the US president.

A Fatal Strategic Dependency

With President Donald Trump taking office in January 2025, Germany’s previously increased nuclear and strategic dependency on the US has become a serious security risk. Since the war in Ukraine started, Berlin has relied primarily on American weapons systems and the strengthening of NATO for its conventional rearmament efforts and nuclear deterrence, rather than prioritizing the pursuit of European sovereignty in security policy. The short-sighted focus on swiftly closing capability gaps with Washington’s help is turning out to be a trap for Germany.

The new US president has repeatedly called into question security guarantees and even future alliance membership. Trump also imposed arbitrary tariffs on allies and even publicly considered military action to annex Greenland—the territory of alliance partner Denmark. His tendency to jeopardize the security interests of close allies without consultation is epitomized by the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran, which quickly escalated into a conflagration across the region. Most recently, Donald Trump not only announced a reduction in US military forces in Germany but also withdrew the commitment to deploy extensive US missile systems shortly before their planned deployment—in response to the German chancellor’s criticism of the US war in Iran and just days after a lengthy phone call with the Russian president to discuss the details of a ceasefire and an end to the war in Ukraine. There is no prospect of compensation for the sudden loss of this deterrent mechanism, which had been eagerly desired by German security policy circles.

Due to this unprecedented loss of trust, American security guarantees are increasingly being cast into doubt. Concerned about being left defenseless and abandoned in the face of Russian nuclear might, ever more voices are calling for German nuclear weapons or at least a new form of cooperation with other European states.

Yet the demand to compensate for the loss of the US nuclear umbrella—especially through nuclear weapons under national control—is just as strategically ill-conceived as the previous hasty intensification of nuclear dependence on the US. Germany would face significant hurdles to developing a nuclear arsenal of its own, particularly from a technical and financial standpoint.

Technical and Financial Obstacles to Nuclear Self-Arming

The days when the Federal Republic possessed so-called “nuclear latency” and would have been able to produce plutonium weapons within a short time are in the past, at the very latest since the plutonium facility in Hanau was dismantled and the last civilian nuclear energy plants shut down. Nuclear weapons based on highly enriched uranium are also out of reach for the country. Most German research reactors operate with uranium enriched up to 20%, which is insufficient to produce nuclear weapons.

Technically, higher enrichment would be feasible for Germany. However, the largest uranium enrichment facility suitable for this purpose, located in Gronau, belongs to the international company URENCO, in which the Netherlands and Great Britain hold majority stakes. Furthermore, the company is committed to the exclusively civilian use of nuclear technology and is subject to strict monitoring by the IAEA. To use this infrastructure for military purposes and to be able to produce the quantities such use would require, it would have to be nationalized and significantly expanded.

Even in an ideal scenario, these steps would take several years. It would also be necessary to conduct tests to ensure the weapon’s reliability. But neither Germany nor Europe has suitable test sites for above-ground or underground nuclear weapons testing. And nuclear allies would certainly not compensate for this shortcoming by sharing their own simulation systems or databases.

Furthermore, the development and production of modern warheads is complex and would require secure production facilities and the pooling of extensive expertise. Effective delivery systems would also have to be developed and produced—in a country with little experience in long-range ballistic missile systems. An arsenal based on Tornado jets, in turn, would be a useless security risk given the adversary’s offensive and defensive capabilities.

Since land-based systems can be neutralized quickly, Germany, much like the United Kingdom and France, would have to rely primarily on nuclear-capable strategic submarines, whose development would also require an enormous amount of time and incur high costs. The construction of deep underground command posts, production facilities, and storage sites would consume additional time and resources.

To detect enemy missile launches and secure its own chain of command, Germany would further require an extensive and shielded C4I network (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence)—precisely the capability the country lacks most (and is most dependent on the US for).

Limitations Under International Law and Political Constraints

All these efforts and activities, some of which are illegal, would either have to be carried out unnoticed or tolerated by the international community, particularly the recognized nuclear weapon states. At this point, at the latest, the short-sightedness behind calls for the nuclear armament of Germany or a European conglomerate of non–nuclear-weapon states becomes apparent.

The development, production, and possession of nuclear weapons are prohibited under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Germany and all European states are parties, for all signatories except the US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Compliance is monitored through IAEA inspections of infrastructure for the civilian use of nuclear technology. Furthermore, since the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, a global monitoring system has been established that accurately detects the detonation of nuclear warheads, ensuring that such activities would not go unrecognized. Ultimately, foreign intelligence agencies and satellite-based reconnaissance are unlikely to overlook nuclear armament.

If the Federal Republic were to withdraw from the non-proliferation and test ban regimes, it would remain irrevocably committed, under international law, to renouncing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons under the Two Plus Four Treaty, signed in 1990 along with the victorious powers of World War II as part of German reunification. It goes without saying that the five NPT nuclear weapon states—and among them, especially the four signatory states involved in German unification—would not stand idly by while Germany acquired a nuclear arsenal over an extended period. All the more so since this arsenal would be directed against at least one of these states.

Not only Russia but also the US—which for decades has been fighting with all its might and significant resources against any further proliferation—would find this unacceptable. Even France and the United Kingdom, which armed themselves with nuclear weapons in the postwar era not least because of Germany, would see a red line crossed here.

Strategic Consequences of Breaking the Nuclear Taboo

Germany would face massive international isolation, including within Europe, with far-reaching sanctions and unprecedented political and economic damage. The Federal Republic, which was able to restore its sovereignty and military in 1955 only with the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris Agreements under the condition of its integration into European and transatlantic alliances, would probably lose most of its partners. The security benefits of nuclear armament, if it were even possible under these circumstances, would be highly questionable.

A North Korean or Iranian fate would be politically untenable for a democratic government like Germany’s. Depending on the progress and scope of a German nuclear weapons program (or one realized in cooperation with like-minded nations), military measures or (hybrid) interventions by special intelligence units seeking to neutralize it cannot be ruled out, at least on the Russian side.

If Germany or other European non–nuclear-weapon states were to acquire nuclear weapons, either alone or jointly, nuclear arms buildup in the Middle East and Southeast Asia would be virtually unstoppable. Debates similar to the one occurring here have been observed for some time in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. A collapse of the non-proliferation regime would seal the end of the nuclear order. This would most likely result in a spiral of proliferation and an ensuing nuclear arms race. In the context of intensified geopolitical rivalries, this scenario would entail high risks of military escalation for all parties involved, but especially for the states seeking nuclear weapons.

A Tempting Offer from Paris

If a new nuclear weapons program—whether independently or through cooperation—can be ruled out for these reasons, the option of a new partnership with an already established European nuclear weapon state remains. Since the United Kingdom possesses only submarine-launched intercontinental systems and obtains its missiles and much of the technology for its nuclear warheads from the US, France would be the only viable candidate for such an arrangement.

France possesses a sovereign nuclear arsenal of approximately 290 warheads. The majority (approximately 240) are submarine-based strategic weapons on ballistic missiles. A smaller portion (approximately 50) are air-based weapons deployed via the Rafale fighter jet and meant to serve as a pre-strategic last-warning deterrent.

In his 2020 address on France’s deterrence doctrine at the École de Guerre, President Emmanuel Macron proposed a “strategic dialog” with close partners regarding a European dimension for French nuclear weapons. Yet, only after Donald Trump took office in 2025 did Germany and other European countries (primarily Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark) engage in more serious discussions on the matter with Paris.

In his much-noticed speech on nuclear strategy in March 2026 at the Île Longue nuclear weapons base in Brittany, Macron presented a new concept of “dissuasion avancée” (advanced deterrence), announced a concomitant expansion of the French arsenal and deepening of cooperation with other nations, highlighting Germany as a key partner.

In doing so, he also acknowledged the possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons in other EU countries. Meanwhile, preparations are underway to expand the military base in Luxeuil-Saint Sauveur—located just 100 kilometers from the German border—to host nuclear-armed Rafale fighter jets. A bi-national dialog on how the “Force de Frappe” can become part of an independent European defense force and how an efficient division of labor can be achieved is set to be further advanced as early as 2026 in joint committees established specifically for this purpose. In addition to informational visits to nuclear weapons bases, military exercises between the French nuclear forces and the Bundeswehr are also planned.

Contrary to the assessments of most German experts, this expansion of nuclear deterrence in France enjoys cross-party support, even though opposition parties attach further conditions to this policy. The Rassemblement National, for example, believes that beneficiary states should make a corresponding contribution.

New Sharing, New Risks

But would France actually be willing to deploy its nuclear power in a crisis and thereby risk a nuclear escalation reaching its own territory? Certainly, an existential threat to Germany would also pose a vital threat to France. From a geographical perspective, a French security guarantee seems more credible than the American one.

However, this is precisely why it is also questionable whether France would issue a pre-strategic nuclear warning to Russia early enough to guarantee Germany’s survival, and thus risk a direct nuclear confrontation with a country whose strategic and sub-strategic arsenals far exceed its own. For this very reason, France has consistently ruled out scenarios of sub-strategic warfare and nuclear proxy wars for many years.

Admittedly, this would eliminate a significant risk associated with US-led nuclear sharing within a Franco-German nuclear alliance. But an overall risk assessment suggests that this gain would be overshadowed by a significant loss of control for Germany. While the fighter jets carrying B61 bombs under the nuclear sharing arrangement with the US would be piloted by German soldiers, Berlin would relinquish control over delivery systems in the French sharing model. The Rafale aircraft designated for the deployment of the relevant French pre-strategic arsenal, as well as the activation of the warheads, would remain under the exclusive command authority of the French president. He alone would authorize the nuclear warning shot intended with these weapons. French doctrine also clearly excludes active participation in the planning and development of operational scenarios, a practice allegedly carried out in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

The greatest risk of projecting French nuclear might beyond its own national borders, however, lies in the fact that, unlike the United States, France has significant deficits in the area of intelligence and, at the same time, has not established viable arms control agreements with its adversary to reduce risks and manage escalation. This shortcoming is all the more serious given that the new French nuclear strategy openly relies on non-transparency, ceases previous disclosures of capabilities, and thus exacerbates the security dilemma (the tendency toward non-cooperative behavior due to a worst-case mindset among rivals) from a disadvantaged position.

The combination of military buildup and opacity is not only risky in relation to other nuclear powers but can also have a negative impact on security cooperation with non–nuclear-weapon states, particularly within the framework of the non-proliferation regime and among countries in the Global South. Due to its uncompromising stance on nuclear issues, France chronically suffers from a poor reputation as a hardliner within the NPT, comparable to that of Russia, and receives little support for its initiatives. Germany would have to bear this strategic cost—without any guaranteed security policy gains.

Whether it involves continuing nuclear sharing with the US, national or European consortium-based nuclear armament, or establishing a new nuclear umbrella under French leadership—the German government is left with only unattractive nuclear options that carry very high risks. In weighing the right strategy, it must address these inconveniences for the sake of its own security interests.

For Germany, the most reliable approach to preventing any nuclearization of conflicts will probably not be to echo nuclear threats, but rather to strengthen its conventional deterrence. Combined with effective missile defense, risk-minimizing arms control, and decisive multilateral diplomacy—particularly with China and India—this offers the best available tool kit to curb Russia’s nuclear belligerence.

Editor’s Note: A German version of this analysis was published in the SPW magazine.