The Strait of Hormuz in Perspective: One Global Chokepoint, Multiple Vulnerabilities, Compounded Effects

The Strait of Hormuz has been blocked by both Iran and the US. The result is a disruption of a large share of the supply of global crude oil and gas, but also petrochemical feedstock materials for fertilizers. While this energy and resource shock is truly global in reach, its impact is felt differently in different world regions, as this joint PRIF blog article shows. 

The Strait of Hormuz, a 34km-wide waterway, has been blocked by both Iran and the United States. The International Energy Agency in its April report calls the energy supply shock “the largest disruption in history.” This has not only affected a large share of the supply of global crude oil and gas but also materials like Helium with special uses in industry, or petrochemical products like ammonia, which is a widely used feedstock for fertilizers. The rise in oil prices represents only the most immediate mechanism through which shocks are transmitted and compounded across the world. Yet while this energy and resource shock is truly global in reach, depending on their reliance on fuel and fertilizer imports as well as the depth of national coffers, the impact is felt differently in different world regions. 

Should the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz and the wider conflict persist, the UN Development  Programme has identified a “triple shock” of compounding effects on energy, food, and economic growth that may potentially push up to 32 million more people into poverty across 162 countries. The World Food Programme has published calculations estimating that 45 million more people will be affected by hunger if the war continues into mid-year and oil prices remain above $100/barrel. The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook outlines several possibilities, including “a close call for a global recession”. The IMF’s chief economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas cautions that “every day that passes and every day that we have more disruption in ⁠energy, we are drifting closer towards the adverse scenario.” This is likely to affect particularly emerging markets and countries that have already been vulnerable to external shocks, with spikes in food prices and welfare losses. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy reports that the “aggregate global costs are moderate, but the burden falls disproportionately on the world’s poorest: the USA loses just −0.07%, while countries in South Asia and Africa face losses 10–20 times larger.” 

It is thus warranted to look closer into how this crisis ripples and rips through different economies and societies, with an eye also to emerging, compounding, and cascading second-order effects. When oil prices go up, food prices often go up, too. When gas prices go up, fertilizer prices often go up, too. With sowing season at the doorstep in the Northern Hemisphere, a lack of fertilizer or unaffordable fertilizer results in food shortages in the medium term. Additionally, this is neither the first nor the last maritime disruption and resulting energy shock, with the obstruction of the Suez Canal in 2021, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, water supply issues in the Panama Canal in 2023, and disruptions across the Red Sea from 2023 to 2025. The current “largest disruption in history” is thus adding to several intertwined layers of “polycrisis”, including the economic and health effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing debt crises throughout the Global South. If one only focuses on national contexts, the structural inequities, petrochemical interdependencies, and transnational risks can easily be lost. 

Current circumstances prevent humanitarian aid being delivered, further strain the social fabric in societies under pressure and potentially give fodder to protest movements hinging on high costs of living or similar economic grievances. This demonstrates the link between social cohesion, conflicts at various scales as well as food and energy provision. Conflict, energy and food security are closely interlinked. Investing in prevention and resilience today helps prevent humanitarian crises and further conflicts tomorrow and contributes to the fight against hunger. Like previous disruptions, calls have emerged across the different contexts to diversify partnerships and identify ways of decreasing dependencies. Interstate cooperation on the stockpiling of food and energy reserves is but one option. Investment in domestic renewable energy generation is yet another. The case of Pakistan is illustrative here: after the 2022 LNG crisis and largely unbeknownst to their government, Pakistani citizens started to buy and install cheap solar panels from China. Addressing the global debt crises will be particularly urgent for countries that now see a further strain on their fiscal leeway looming on the horizon. More broadly, the disruptions point to an emerging re-ordering of global relationships and dependencies between the Global North and South as well as between those wedded to fossil fueled energy and food systems, and those that want to or must seek alternatives, especially in Europe, Africa and Asia. 

Addressing the multiple vulnerabilities and compounding global effects, this blog article provides snapshots into the material consequences of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Offering windows into very different parts of the world, PRIF researchers invite us, on the one hand, to pause and take seriously how the effects emerge in similar fields but vary in their magnitude and across countries, with significant differences in their ability to respond to or absorb them. On the other hand, the contributions address issues of international solidarity and crisis, encouraging us to reflect on what can be learned from present challenges to better prepare for the future.

Sophia Birchinger, Patrick Flamm

Perspectives from Africa 

Reactions by the African Union and ECOWAS 

As continental and regional organizations, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) play a critical role in addressing the repercussions of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for the African continent. So far, these institutions have shown different public reactions.  

For the AU, the crisis is predominantly framed as a peace and security issue, recognizing broader impact of the Middle East crisis for security partnerships and conflict dynamics in the region. This is particularly true for the conflict in Sudan and in the broader Horn of Africa region, for which the war in Iran not only impacts battlefield dynamics, but will likely worsen the already severe humanitarian situation. Qualifying already as the world’s largest humanitarian, hunger, and displacement crisis, disruptions of fuel and fertilizer imports for an irrigation-dependent agriculture will sharply reduce food production and distribution, worsening shortages and intensifying hunger and food insecurity.  

The reactions of ECOWAS take a predominantly economic framing. For example, on March 23, the agriculture ministers held an extraordinary meeting “on the impact of the international crisis and soaring oil prices on the fertilizer sector and food security in West Africa and the Sahel”,  expecting disruptions in the upcoming planting season. This meeting also placed the current crisis in the context of existing agricultural challenges, such as soil degradation. A key question will be whether African regional organizations will be able to create a forum to voice repercussions and to develop strategies to mitigate economic, humanitarian, and conflict effects—a difficult task for institutions that are already strained amidst cuts to international funding.  

Elisabeth Warnck, Antonia Witt 

Beyond Supply: Africa’s Structural Energy Vulnerability in the Hormuz Moment 

The Hormuz closure can be read as a moment that makes Africa’s structural energy vulnerability visible across political contexts, yet the concrete ways its repercussions appear and are dealt with vary greatly. In Madagascar energy failures had already fed youth-led protests and anger over living costs in 2025, culminating in a military coup. The two-week energy state of emergency declared this April made external supply vulnerability visible through emergency politics, linking energy insecurity to state capacity. Kenya illustrates the ambivalence of externally financed resilience, where rapid World Bank support is containing the short-term conflict potential of rising fuel prices, but may shift vulnerability into external liquidity, debt, and lender‑driven policy conditions. As an oil producer with domestic refining ambitions, Nigeria doesn’t fit a simple import-dependence narrative. Still, the controversy around the World Bank’s petrol-import recommendation demonstrates that energy security is also a struggle over policy authority – juxtaposing external technocratic advice and state sovereignty over domestic industrial policy.  

Together, these cases suggest that African energy vulnerability is not merely a supply problem, but a multi-level structural condition, framed as exposure to global shocks and adjustment pressures, internally negotiated through emergency rule, fiscal constraint, and policy sovereignty. The Hormuz shock can therefore intensify grievances over prices and access, strain institutional trust, and make dependence on contested external prescriptions politically visible. 

Sandra Kebede 

“Double-Edged Sword”: Nigerian Media Narratives on the Strait of Hormuz blockade    

Nigeria presents a striking paradox amidst the Strait of Hormuz blockade. As Africa’s leading oil exporter, the country  should theoretically benefit from the increase in crude prices, yet it is instead grappling with fiscal disruption. Media coverage in the country reflects this tension: outlets like Vanguard and Daily Post amplify the Presidency’s “energy oasis” narrative, portraying Nigeria’s Dangote Refinery and the Naira-for-crude policy as a shield against global shocks. However, The PUNCH exposed a “crude paradox”; despite high exports, the refinery received only 26.9% of its required feedstock in early 2026 due to legacy “front-sold” volumes, pushing petrol prices above ₦1,000.  

The crisis extends beyond energy to a “quiet catastrophe” in agrifood, characterized by The Guardian as a “nitrogen supply shock”. With 30% of global fertilizer trade passing through the Strait, there has been a 50% price surge in the price of urea and ammonia. With the planting season just beginning, there is a real threat to regional food security. For Nigeria, the conflict is a “double-edged sword”; according to reporting in The Nation, while high global oil prices offer fiscal relief, the gains are neutralized by the soaring costs of imported refined products and industrial raw materials. Ultimately, this is a reset moment for a political pivot toward national energy sovereignty. Without it, Africa’s leading oil producer will remain a “refining-poor” giant held hostage to distant chokepoints. 

Jean-Baptiste Sebgo 

Beyond the Blame Game: Exposing Structural Vulnerabilities in Kenya

In the East African region, Kenya is considered a large economic hub. Media reports show how the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has affected the country’s economy, targeting both imports from and exports to the Gulf region. The latter include key goods such as meat, tea, and flowers, underscoring the need for the Kenyan government to find new markets for these goods. As for imported goods, fuel has been hit hardest, as Kenya heavily relies on supplies from the Gulf under a government-to-government oil deal.  

While fuel prices were expected to rise, the tremendous increase announced by the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) on the 14th of April raised public concern over why Kenya’s prices exceeded those of neighboring countries, fueling debate between the opposition and the government. On one hand, opposition figures argue that the government’s justification for raising fuel prices is a pretext to bypass domestic legal mechanisms for its own benefit. They contend that the government could instead use domestic measures to significantly reduce VAT on fuel, as done by other East African countries. The government, on the other hand, defends itself from these accusations, illustrating the introduction of the VAT Amendment Act, and the deployment of about 6.2 billion KSh (roughly 48.1 million USD) from the Petroleum Development Levy to further stabilize fuel prices. Media narratives suggest that high fuel prices reveal poor governance, especially the government’s lack of preparedness and long-term strategies for handling shortages despite past crises like COVID-19 and the Russia–Ukraine war, consequently resulting in recurring public dissatisfaction and protests. 

Hilda Milka Koyier 

The Gambia: Disproportionate Exposure and Effects Despite Subsidies 

The Gambia is emblematic of countries without domestic oil production, whose near-total reliance on imported petroleum products, combined with broader structural vulnerabilities, leaves them particularly exposed to external shocks. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz triggers a domino effect, renewing fiscal and household-level pressures after the loss of international cooperation funding while pandemic effects still linger.  

Increases in fuel prices directly affect electricity generation, transport, agriculture, fishing, and tourism—sectors that form the backbone of the country’s economy. The national electricity company NAWEC struggles to secure heavy fuel for thermal power generation, while regional West African energy infrastructure cannot offset the disruption. What has already resulted in power outages may expand into “long term load shedding”. Government figures indicate that, without subsidies, petrol prices would have risen by 22.8% and diesel prices by 47.4%. In response, the government absorbed about 4.27 USD million in fuel subsidies in April alone. For fertilizer, the Gambian government has not announced new fertilizer measures but its regular 2026 fertilizer subsidies of more than 11 million USD will likely need to increase.  

Despite subsidies, the price spikes are unbearable for many. Public transport fares have risen by about 50%, while shopkeepers use the blockade to justify price increases. In the longer run, subsidies deepen fiscal strain, adding to already high external debt, large import bills, and weak foreign exchange reserves. Overall, the crisis highlights how global structural inequalities disproportionately expose countries like The Gambia to external shocks. 

Sophia Birchinger 

Blockade at Hormuz: South African Ships Pass, People Pay 

Despite its distance, the shocks of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz are being felt heavily in the diesel-dependent economy of South Africa. Transport costs have surged, reflected in the 70% surge in the cost of jet fuel during a single week in March. With nearly 80% of South Africa’s freight moving by road and a rail network in collapse, rising transport costs are not just a logistics issue but directly worsen food insecurity by pushing the price of staple food out of reach. 

Utilizing petrochemical fertilizers, South Africa’s farming sector is highly sensitive to input cost shocks and supply constraints. With drought conditions forecast for late 2026, the risk compounds in lower yields and higher unit prices. 

Maize, a staple for low-income households, sits at the center of this vulnerability. A prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is not just an energy issue, it’s a food security risk, where geopolitical decisions made elsewhere are borne by vulnerable households on the other side of the world. 

Sarah McKee 

Perspectives from Asia and Europe  

India: Navigating the Impact on Everyday Lives 

Immediate effects of the war and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continue to ripple through the everyday lives of both India’s domestic population and its expatriate communities in the Gulf. For the latter, many fear job losses amid strikes and economic insecurity. To date, around 220,000 people have returned to India. Meanwhile, others stay put, risking their physical safety against the potential loss of income to support their families at home.

The closure of the Strait has led to shortages in gas, crude oil, and fertilizers. Prices for widely used LPG gas cylinders have skyrocketed, putting many at risk of being unable to cook for their families. Unable to afford cylinders, many workers in cities like Delhi working in urban construction or the garment industry, have returned home to neighbouring states. Because the government has introduced refill limits of 25 days for urban and 45 days for rural households, women in the latter face increasing constraints in an already ongoing LPG-distribution gap between rural and urban communities. While households with piped natural gas lines remain less affected, the looming shortage puts owners and employees of restaurants, dhabas, and caterers at risk. Farmers in particular fear the loss of nitrogen fertilizers needed for next season’s crop. 

Finally, in late March, well after the war’s compounding effects became apparent, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the public in speech to the lower house of India’s two-chamber parliament, calling on the country to prepare for ‘unprecedented times’. 

Madita Standke-Erdmann

Myanmar’s Fuel Shortages, China’s Strategic Leverage? 

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz has significant implications for conflict dynamics in Myanmar. For the military regime, which has relied on imported jet fuel from Iran, such disruptions could constrain its capacity to sustain air operations and therefore delay its efforts to retake territories lost to Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) since 2021.  

At the same time, the effects extend to rebel-controlled territories. EAOs typically access fuel through indirect, cross-border channels. Since March, China’s restrictions on refined fuel exports have contributed to rising gasoline prices in northern Myanmar, particularly in areas under EAO control, including Wa State under the United Wa State Army, Kokang under the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Mongla under the National Democratic Alliance Army. This situation represents a growing challenge for rebel governance, where the provision of basic goods and services is closely tied to local legitimacy. 

For Beijing, these developments open up additional leverage. Tighter fuel controls allow China not only to exert pressure on multiple actors and advance its preferred conflict management approach, but also to expand its economic influence, for instance by promoting alternative technologies such as electric vehicles in Myanmar. 

Xian Yaolong

Pakistan: Mediation Under Pressure 

Asian countries are by far the largest consumers of oil shipped through the Strait of Hormuz, collectively receiving 90% of these exports. However, the blockade of the Strait has had very different impacts on each of them. While wealthier countries in Northeast Asia have been able to partially cushion themselves from shocks by tapping into their large petroleum reserves, low- and middle-income economies along the continent’s Southern and Southeast peripheries have faced severe disruptions and inflation spikes.  

This vulnerability also partially explains the interest and mediation role which Pakistan has taken in the crisis. Pakistan has seen the largest rise in fuel prices, and the highest level in absolute terms, among all major Asian economies. Additionally, the loss of LNG imports has affected Pakistan’s electrical grid, which is now once again practicing “load-shedding”, i.e. temporary power supply cuts that predominantly affect poor, rural areas. Motivated by this precarious position and able to leverage its ties to conflict parties and major external actors like China, Pakistan has emerged as the lynchpin of diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. This shows that today’s geopolitical crises not only implicate the Global South but increasingly hinge on its agency. 

Pascal Abb  

Iraq’s Hormuz Dependency 

Due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq finds itself facing political and economic vulnerability due to its dependence on oil exports. As the second largest exporter of crude oil through the Strait, this route is vital to Iraq’s economy and access to global markets, leaving it with severely limited alternative export routes. The blockade has led Iraq to record its largest oil supply shut-in, from 4.3 million barrels to 1.2 million barrels a day. 

Initially, Iran granted Iraq a de facto exception, allowing Iraqi tankers to pass through the Strait. However, this was recently revoked as geopolitical tensions between Washington and Tehran intensified. This decision highlights how Iraq’s economic lifeline depends heavily on strategic decisions of the Iranian regime. These developments reveal not only economic dependency, but also Iraq’s limited strategic autonomy under external pressure. 

However, amid the war, Iraq intensified its search for alternatives. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey was reactivated to restore export flows, while Baghdad also expanded overland shipments toward Syria and revived discussions on additional pipeline options toward Jordan. The blockade reveals a broader pattern of Iraqi strategic dependency, rather than just a short-term response to the crisis. 

Mariam Al-Wally 

Fossil Reliance Exposes New Zealand to Fuel, Fertilizer and Foreign Policy Risks  

New Zealand generates over 85% of its electricity from renewable sources like wind, geothermal, and hydropower, yet its transport and agriculture sectors remain exposed to global fuel and fertilizer price fluctuations. While fertilizer demand is currently low due to the Southern Hemisphere’s fall season, fuel supply issues and rising prices have become a significant national concern against the backdrop of an already existing cost of living crisis. Lacking substantial domestic oil production and refining capacity, New Zealand is anxiously awaiting fuel imports, particularly from South Korea and Singapore. 

In response, the government has introduced a National Fuel Response Plan, which includes measures such as controlled driving and fuel purchase restrictions in the event of severe shortages. Meanwhile, several small South Pacific nations that are critically dependent on imported fossil fuels, as well as on the shipping of goods such as medicines, are increasingly seeking New Zealand’s support through diplomacy or potential fuel-sharing arrangements. The South Pacific is the strategically most important region for New Zealand, but Wellington’s recent rollback of climate and environmental measures have already attracted criticism from neighboring island states that are existentially threatened by a rise in sea-level. 

With 2026 being an election year, the right-wing government is keenly aware that its management of the energy crisis could be a major influence on voter sentiment. Officials have been very cautious in their communication, aiming to avoid alarming the public or invoking comparisons to the previous Labour government’s polarizing COVID-19 crisis response. 

Patrick Flamm 

The Strait of Hormuz and the Western Balkans: Reinforcing Existing Problems 

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz might not have immediate effects or direct military consequences for the Western Balkans (WB), but all of those countries are likely to experience economic and political spillover effects.  Above all, inflation rates in the region are already high—well above the EU average. In turn, wages are lower than EU average. Since the closure, and despite mitigation strategies such as tax reliefs or ban of fuel exports, rising oil and gas prices have led to a further increase of transport and household costs throughout the region, e.g. in Albania, where it is estimated that citizens currently need 7.2% of their daily income to buy a liter of diesel.  

While hydropower is an important source of energy generation in some WB countries, most still remain dependent on imported fossil fuels (see Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania for comparison). Storage capacity for oil stockpiles in WB are for the most part low or simply non-existent. This constitutes a significant problem for rural areas with limited railway infrastructures, where inhabitants are dependent on road transport.  

Politically, the global (economic) crisis offers itself for political leverage. In Serbia, president Aleksandar Vučić has already signaled that if the global situation does not stabilize then parliamentary elections expected to take place this summer (following over one and a half years of protests) may not take place. Long to mid-term, the crisis also has the potential to fuel further geopolitical fragmentation within the WB. 

Mina Trpkovic, Christin Stühlen 

 Concluding Reflections 

 (No) Lessons from the Past: Trump’s Athenian Moment  

What, if anything, can be learned from Trump’s war against Iran from a historical perspective? For many, it seems to confirm once again the return of a global “law of the jungle”.  This evokes the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, whose famous account of the Athenian siege of the island Melos in 416 BCE is often reduced to the idea that ‘the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must’.  

Yet Thucydides is frequently misunderstood. His lesson is not that might makes right, but rather that hubris invites downfall—which is precisely what befell Athens in the 5th century BCE.  

Emboldened by his rapid success in Venezuela, Trump’s war has created a new strategic problem: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. A historical parallel may be the Suez Crisis of 1956, which illustrated how the disruption of a strategic maritime chokepoint can generate systemic economic and political feedback effects.  

While the United States is arguably less directly vulnerable than Britain was in 1956, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz may gradually influence confidence in the dollar-based architecture of oil pricing. Furthermore, rising (energy) prices are now beginning to feed back into Trump’s own political camp.  

In sum, it may yet prove to be Trump’s Athenian moment. 

Hendrik Simon 

How Fighting Iran Sabotaged Peace for Ukraine 

One key to a robust ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine is to convince the Putin regime that continuing the war will threaten its political survival more than stopping it. Available evidence indicates that the Iran policy of the United States and other NATO states have undermined such prospects.

When attacking Ukraine in 2022, the Putin regime claimed it was preempting vaguely defined military threats stemming from Kyiv and NATO. The UN Charter prohibits states from using military force other than for purposes of self-defense. Russia violated this norm egregiously and its claims to self-defense have repeatedly been found to be spurious at best.

However, US justifications for the Iran war largely rely on their own spurious claims of preemption. Trump’s actions, and the lukewarm-to-nonexistent opposition by other NATO states, indicate that Western states will ignore international law when it suits their interests, reducing Western credibility and weakening Western attempts to garner support for Ukraine.

Furthermore, the rise in global energy prices has flooded Russia’s coffers and led to the US easing sanctions against Russia. With media attention shifting away from Ukraine, Trump is also under less pressure to deliver his long-promised results.  

Jonas J. Driedger 

Solidarity is a Two-Way Street  

It is difficult to demand solidarity when offering little in return. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, European diplomats have worked diligently to build and maintain support for Ukraine. While these efforts have achieved some success, most developing nations have hesitated to join sanctions that would raise fuel costs. Europe’s response to the Hormuz crisis makes clear why. 

As this blog post has discussed, the fuel shortages are creating major hardships all around the developing world. Yet Europe has made no effort to lead an international response: no coordinated fuel rationing, no lending to prevent a 1970s-style debt crisis, all while continuing to make cuts to overseas development budgets. 

Moreover, European leaders appear to believe their strong fiscal positions justify paying oil and gas suppliers to prioritize German motorists and industry over the basic needs of the world’s poorest. Protecting energy access in poorer countries would require energy-saving measures in Germany—difficult and costly actions. Yet if we are unwilling to address a crisis in the developing world, we cannot expect those nations to demonstrate solidarity with our own priorities. 

Sidney Michelini 

When Chokepoints Become Weapons 

The blockades of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate a wider reality in global politics: in an interconnected world, chokepoints can be turned into tools of coercion. Today, states weaponize interdependence almost routinely. They do so not only in military conflict and not only where geography gives them leverage, but also where they occupy pivotal positions in trade, technology or energy networks—from rare earths to semiconductors and oil and gas supplies. 

What the Hormuz blockades show especially clearly is that this weapon cannot be wielded with precision. It may hurt the intended target, but the damage rarely stops there. Its effects spread across regions and sectors to affect everything from food security to fragile states, commodity prices, or shipping and energy transitions. This might be an economic weapon, but its real-world consequences can be deadly. 

Governments will respond to this experience by intensifying their efforts to reduce dependencies and diversify supply chains. Yet rewiring the global economy without coordination is likely to increase tensions and result in its own collateral damage. Instead, this disentangling needs to be managed with care and pursued cooperatively. The challenge in responding to the weaponization of interdependence is not simply to reduce dependence, but to do so without deepening instability. 

Dirk Peters