The Trump administration’s recent actions have left many uncertain about the prospects and trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian war. False certainties and anxious interpretations abound. However, some clear tendencies have emerged from Trump’s first few months in office as well as from his last term. Europe’s leaders, while trapped between Trump’s geopolitical flailing, Putin’s ongoing war efforts, and a continent-wide surge in nationalist sentiments, have options at their disposal that could significantly shape upcoming decisions. A lot is at stake, and the time to act is now.
NATO in Turmoil
The Russian regime has already benefitted significantly from the Trump administration’s moves. For example, the United States has abruptly given up on effectively coordinating its policy toward Russia and Ukraine with NATO’s European members.
While often slow, inert and lacking strategic focus, such coordination had, in the past, minimized Russia’s ability to play NATO members off against each other. It also allowed NATO (and the EU) to pursue somewhat joint and effective policies that the Kremlin disliked intensely. After Russia annexed Crimea and started a semi-covert war against Kyiv in Ukraine’s East in 2014, US President Obama coordinated closely with European leaders, prominently with Germany’s Merkel, to set in place a sanctions regime against Russia and organize a diplomatic process for resolving the conflict. Similarly, when the danger of a Russian full-scale invasion became increasingly evident in late 2021, then-President Biden coordinated policy with Olaf Scholz even before the latter had officially taken office as German Federal Chancellor.
In sharp contrast to such discrete, effective and anticipatory coordination, the Trump administration started a negotiation process with Russia without any prior consultation of Europe, all the while declaring that European troops and money should secure whatever the negotiations yielded. Simultaneously, it also berated the very governments it expects to take these risks and commitments while publicly siding with many of Europe’s far-right parties that challenge these governments and very publicly oppose any support for Ukraine.
The Trump administration also refused to side with the EU and Ukraine on a joint draft for a UN resolution marking the war’s third anniversary and proposed a counter-resolution.
Ukraine in Peril
The Trump administration’s actions have severely weakened Ukraine’s negotiation position. New US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has signaled that Ukraine’s ability to regain its territories, at best, does not rank highly on the United States’ priority list.
Trump also started to align himself with Russian propaganda, calling Ukrainian president Zelensky an “unelected dictator” and claiming his approval rating was in the single digits (it was well over 50 percent and higher than Trump’s at the time). In a truly Orwellian moment, Trump also falsely accused Ukraine of starting the war.
The United States also pressured Ukraine to “repay” previous US aid (which had been given without any such demands, including under Trump’s first administration), while seeking to strengthen economic ties with Russia well before an agreement on Ukraine had been reached.
Putin at Ease
For the Russian regime, the Trump administration’s moves come at a most welcome time, as the war had seriously depleted some of the regime’s vital resources. While Russian forces gained ground in 2024 and early 2025, these advances were slow and miniscule from the broader perspective of the war, while taking a significant toll in blood and treasure.
The regime had also been forced to accept some rather public defeats: Syrian strongman Assad was forced to flee the country and Ukraine successfully conquered legal Russian territory in the Kursk region in 2024.
While many countries abstained from sanctioning Russia, the vast majority condemned its forceful annexations of Ukrainian territory, while virtually no other state recognized them.
The regime has made increasing use of mercenaries and North Korean soldiers while shirking full mobilization and severe welfare cuts to finance the war, all in overt efforts to avoid anti-regime unrest. Ongoing fighting and sanctions have severely worsened Russia’s macroeconomic outlook. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, most Russians have fairly consistently favored negotiations over simply continuing the war.
Rather than having to consider these pressures and commit to compromises, the Russian regime can now hope to realize nearly all its war goals and lock in these gains – at the likely expense of Ukraine’s rights, international law, and stability in Europe.
What European Leaders Can Do
Amidst the unfolding shock-and-awe approach of the Trump administration, unfounded certainties and vastly divergent interpretations abound. What we are currently facing undoubtedly bears the hallmarks of Trump’s personal convictions, erratic personality and transactionalist style. It is therefore likely that his administration is not effectively pursuing a focused, consistent, and long-term strategy.
Such a situation bears immense risk but could also provide significant political leeway.
This means that European leaders might be able to significantly influence key decisions that will probably affect Europe’s interests, values, and security for decades to come.
Appeals to Trump’s transactionalist and personalist style as well as proactive propositions on European contributions and commitments, which Trump and previous US presidents have long demanded, are probably more likely to succeed than other approaches.
Europe’s key states – particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany – would have to quickly create a shared understanding of priorities and policies so that an all-European strategy has a fighting chance to minimize the grave dangers the future holds.
Safeguarding International Law and Ukraine’s Territorial Rights
The prohibition for states to forcibly annex territories of other states is a cornerstone of the United Nations and the wider rules-based global order.
If Kyiv’s (former) supporters would coerce Ukraine into forfeiting its rightful claims to its own territory, a powerful precedent would be set, likely triggering disastrous long-term consequences, reigniting dormant territorial conflicts around the world, fueling predatory behavior, fears of attack, arms races, and the risk of escalation.
However, there might be a chance that a ceasefire without such concessions could be reached. One potential way would see Ukraine committing itself, under prespecified conditions, not to try to regain its territories by force. Importantly, Ukraine would not abandon its claims to them. Ukraine’s allies could support these claims and aid them with diplomacy and dedicated sanctions. This had been part of the original plan proposed by US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg. Europeans might be able to re-emphasize the strategic benefits of such an approach.
Protecting Ukrainian Democracy
Forcing Ukrainians to cede territory that is legally theirs under international law as well as under treaties signed by Russia and the United States would likely fan the flames of nationalist outrage, stab-in-the-back myths and revanchism in Ukraine. Continued attacks on Ukraine’s constitutional procedures and Zelensky’s legitimacy would exacerbate these threats to Ukraine’s already frail democracy.
Arguably the best way to bolster Ukrainian democracy is to emphasize its strategic value: a peacetime democracy will have the necessary checks and balances to help pursuing a long-term strategy of maintaining a good relationship with the West whilst seeking to resolve its many conflicts with Russia through diplomatic and non-military means. The reverse would be the case with an authoritarian regime that would most likely rely on nationalist and revanchist forces to maintain power, heightening the danger of renewed military clashes that could well draw in Europe and diminish whatever prestige Trump might have gained by overseeing a ceasefire. These strategic considerations might well dovetail with sentiments of those Republicans in the administration and Congress who are (still) committed to advancing liberty and democracy around the world.
Ensuring Stability in Europe
The Russian regime has repeatedly broken agreements to renew and ramp up aggression to gain advantages over Ukraine. Examples include the fighting surrounding the so-called Minsk process as well as the full-scale invasion of 2022.
A stable ceasefire must hence be undergirded by policies that reassure Ukraine of the safety of the territory it controls while deterring yet another Russian aggression. Not doing so would likely also increase the risk of escalation elsewhere in Europe, particularly for NATO members that share borders with Russia.
While Hegseth has unhelpfully demanded that the Europeans provide these assurances, but without American troops and without implied US-support via NATO, various frameworks could be proposed in which Europe commits to a significant share of these security assurances, using these commitments to ensure a second-order backing by the United States. A similar arrangement should be proposed for NATO members in the vicinity of Russia.
These measures could and should be accompanied with a framework in which Europe’s NATO members engage in strategic dialogue with Russia to maintain channels for crisis management and avoid inadvertent escalation. One can only hope that the Trump administration would realize that such European commitments, bolstered by second-order support from the United States, would help wind down US commitments in Europe and end hostilities in a sustainable way.
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Trapped between Trump’s geopolitical flailing, Putin’s continued war efforts, and a continent-wide surge in nationalist sentiments, European leaders will find it tough to embrace these policies, let alone make them reality. But failing to do so now is likely to leave everybody off way worse in the future. The time to act is now.
Jonas J. Driedger
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