The United States has long been the most vital ally for Ukraine in terms of military aid, economic support, and pressuring Russia through sanctions and diplomatic initiatives. Consequently, both Kyiv and Moscow look primarily to the United States when it comes to the international politics of the war. Due to the outsized role of the United States in this conflict, commentators have predicted that the course of the war would shift if Donald J. Trump would be elected US president on 5 November. But what is the merit of such forecasts?
While predictions on the politics of war are by their very nature difficult and often wrong, analysis of ongoing trends and of similar patterns in comparable cases can help to understand which policy Trump would likely prefer, which policy the United States would probably adopt, how this policy might affect the war, and how Germany and other European states should best prepare for this scenario.
Which Policy Would Trump Pursue?
Available evidence strongly suggests that, if elected, Trump will likely seek to minimize American involvement in the conflict by reducing military and economic support for Ukraine and pushing Kyiv to make concessions to Russia on territory and NATO alignment.
For example, in June 2024, Trump publicly described promising Ukraine NATO membership as a “mistake” and named it as a reason for the war. In April 2024, the Washington Post reported that Trump planned to pressure Ukraine to cede Crimea and Donbas to Russia, aiming for a “quick deal to end the conflict”. Security experts close to Trump have since confirmed this line of thinking. In his recent debate with opponent Kamala Harris, Trump declared that ending the war would be top priority, though not going into any details about what cost.
How Would a Trump Policy Influence the War?
While its exact war goals are still disputed, the Russian regime has consistently sought to prevent Ukrainian accession to NATO and to gain significant and long-term leverage over Ukrainian decision-making. Rather than scaling down these goals, the Russian regime extended them by annexing large swaths of additional Ukrainian territory seven months into the full war. This summer, Putin again remained steadfast on these war goals and demanded Ukraine cede even more territory as a precondition for an armistice.
The Russian war efforts show no signs of relenting. Indeed, the Kremlin is gearing up to increase pressure on Ukraine in 2025 and 2026.
As argued elsewhere, the Russian regime is unlikely to scale down its demands and stop its aggression if Ukraine’s major allies were to visibly scale back their support and pressure Kyiv to make concessions. Rather, the Russian regime likely see this as an opportunity to pursue even more gains for itself.
Diminished Western support and allied pressure for concessions would also put the Ukrainian government into a difficult position. Majority opinion is still firmly opposed to making any territorial concessions, having experienced constant Russian aggression and violations of agreements for ten years. Thus, if Zelenskyy were to cede territory at the behest of Western or Russian demands, Ukraine’s fragile state and democratic institutions could undergo political turmoil, societal unrest, possibly even a coup.
Furthermore, if Western states were to rule out NATO membership and not provide any other security guarantees to Kyiv, Ukraine’s leaders would have to worry that any other concession to the Russian regime would only weaken their own position while opening them up to renewed aggression and additional demands. Diminishing Western support and calls for land trades might motivate Ukraine to escalate rather than tone down its war efforts.
Indeed, part of Ukraine’s motives for its recent advances into Russia’s Kursk region might well have been to rekindle Western support and possibly gain a bargaining chip against Russia.
Trump Presidency = Trump Policy?
Actual policy under Trump would likely not be a direct implementation of his vague plans for Russia and Ukraine. Rather, it would be an inconsistent hybrid between current policy and Trump’s own preferences, with an added element of uncertainty on all sides about whether the current political course might change in the near future. There are several reasons for this.
First, many if not most US citizens would probably oppose drastic policy shifts. In a Pew survey in April this year, 49 percent of US adults supported at least the current level of US aid for Ukraine, with only 31 percent stating that “too much” aid was given. Only 49 percent of republicans and republican-leaning respondents found current aid was too much, while a considerable 34 percent found it about right or insufficient.
Second, Trump might face problems with lawmakers in parliament, whose support is needed for crucial elements of his plans. Current polls suggest that the Democrats might well retain their slight majority in the Senate come the November elections. If the Republicans gain a majority, it is unlikely to be a wide and comfortable one. And republican support would not be a given. In February 2024, 22 Republican Senators had voted for a Ukraine aid bill, defying Trump. In the house of representatives, “Republicans for Ukraine” continue to lobby for a staunchly pro-Ukrainian policy.
Third, Trump may not actually push for many of the policies he espouses. In public, he has hitherto managed to avoid strongly demanding land concessions or a withdrawal of Ukraine’s NATO candidacy, likely because he or those around him calculate that this would be unpopular, even among many of his supporters. Despite his threats, Trump has stated that the United States would not withdraw from NATO as long as European countries “played fair”, using a tellingly vague and flexible phrase.
Moreover, Trump does not even seem to have a long-term plan in place to enact policy. As of July 2024, the Trump campaign had not named a new national security team.
Furthermore, Trump might well be flattered into believing that he reached his goals without altering policy much at all. This would not be the first time. For example, he continues to claim that, during his first presidency, he got Europe to “pay its share” to NATO, referring to increased defense spending that was, however, in large part a result of heightened European security concerns after the start of Russia’s initial aggression in 2014.
Indeed, during his first presidency (2017-2021), the grand patterns of US policy toward Ukraine and Russia did not change.
What Does This Mean for European Policy?
Nonetheless, all the above suggests that a Trump presidency would likely worsen prospects for peace. But even with Kamala Harris as president, policymakers in Europe will have to prepare for a future with less US involvement in Europe, as the United States has long been in the process of reorienting resources and political attention to China.
Consequently, Europe might have to cooperate more with the United States in other areas if it wants to ensure favorable US policy toward Russia, especially under Trump, due to his transactional approach to diplomacy and his antipathies toward NATO.
However, more immediate action would also be required if European states want to increase the chances for a sustainable peace before and after the election. Russia’s renewed war efforts in this summer are probably co-caused by the prospects of diminishing support for Ukraine in the United States and in other key NATO states such as Germany. Hence, diminishing Russian hopes for coercing favorable outcomes by force should be a top priority.
This includes doubling down on “trump-proofing”, a measure by which the G7 states would grant Ukraine a $50 billion loan which Ukraine would repay by profits of Russian assets currently frozen on Western accounts. However, negotiations are currently stalling and might well not be concluded in time.
Furthermore, calls for peace negotiations, such as the recent one by German chancellor Scholz, should be accompanied by reliable signals for resolute support for Ukraine when it comes to withstanding Russian attacks, pressuring the regime, and providing further support in case Russia breaks commitments it makes in future negotiations.
These signals should be specific and not conditional on external factors, such as US behavior, as doing so would probably increase Ukrainian fears of abandonment and Russian hopes for military victory.
As an example of unhelpfully vague signaling: some within the German ruling coalition announced that due to the projected loan, Germany will massively decrease its own financial and military support for Ukraine in the future. As the fate of this loan is still uncertain, such statements sow uncertainty about German commitment in Kyiv and might spark hope in Moscow, likely incentivizing aggressive moves on both sides.
Provided that Russian and Ukrainian hopes for a military victory were to recede, the war parties might wind down hostilities or even negotiate a ceasefire to scale down the massive damage that the war continues to inflict on both. Any such agreement would be provisional and likely bracket the most contentious issues, such as territorial control. The journey to sustainable peace is, in any case, long, but waiting for the election will probably prolong it even more.
Jonas J. Driedger
Latest posts by Jonas J. Driedger (see all)
- How Another Trump Presidency Would Affect the Russo-Ukrainian War - 26. September 2024
- Was in der Zukunft der Ukraine liegt: Plädoyer für eine Verteidigungs- und Resilienzstrategie - 23. Februar 2024
- “Russian Self-Defense”? Fact-Checking Arguments on the Russo-Ukrainian War by John J. Mearsheimer and Others - 26. Juli 2023
