Despite the deadlocked military situation for Ukraine and the policy shift in the US, Germany and Europe still lack a negotiating strategy for a diplomatic solution. But only military support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia are not going to end the war on the most favorable terms for Kyiv. As difficult as it may be, positive offers are equally needed. Europe’s confrontation with President Trump’s diplomatic efforts will also not help to achieve more European sovereignty. Rather, we will have to negotiate with him and President Putin about the future of Ukraine and our own security architecture. Instead of panicking and investing solely in the military, European governments should therefore pull themselves together and, above all, seize the diplomatic opportunity to secure their fate.
Military Impasse & US Power Mediation
On the Ukrainian battlefield, the increasing Russian initiative had been apparent since the fall of 2022 and was undeniable by the spring of 2024 at the latest. The one-sided strategy of Europe and the US to weaken and politically bend Moscow through sanctions and military support for Ukraine has failed. Russia, a nuclear superpower, cannot be persuaded to change its behavior through coercion alone. Nonetheless, the West – caught up in the American, French, and German election campaigns –clung to a policy on Ukraine that led deeper into an impasse. Promising a radical political turnaround, including in international relations, Trump and his MAGA movement have triumphed not only in a historic election, but also in a major cultural struggle. Key elements of their foreign policy include a diplomatic exit from the war in Ukraine and a rebalancing of relations with Russia.
The Europeans underestimated Trump’s determination to keep his campaign promises and negotiate with Putin to end the war. J.D. Vance’s analysis in the New York Times and Keith Kellogg’s plan, which has been criticized widely in Europe, clearly outlined this policy shift early on. A reluctant Ukraine was forced to the negotiating table by means of power mediation. After the scandalous Oval Office meeting between President Trump and Zelenskyy and Vice President Vance, there was widespread outrage at the brutality of the Americans. It ranged from superlative indignation (Baerbock: “time of wickedness”) and conspirational suspicion (Merz: “deliberately provoked”) to idealistic self-aggrandizement (Kallas: “the free world needs a new leader”). Only a few pragmatic voices (e.g. NATO Secretary General Rutte or Prime Minister Meloni) recognized the fatality of an abrupt transatlantic rupture and called for cooperation. When Ukraine was exposed to the aggressor for a few days without American intelligence information and military assistance in missile defense, Zelenskyy relented and agreed to make concessions.
America’s partisanship in favor of Ukraine is a thing of the past. The White House now sees its role as that of a mediating superpower. Conditioning the vital American support on full cooperation from Kyiv had an immediate effect. US offers of economic incentives also appear to be of interest to both Ukraine (investment and civilian US personnel at strategic facilities) and Russia (energy cooperation, sanctions relief). At the same time, the question arises as to whether Washington’s mediating coercion is being used primarily at Ukraine’s expense. The recent proposal for a US-Ukrainian raw materials agreement and the early preclusion of Ukraine joining NATO without the prospect of substantial security guarantees both point in this direction. But the resumption of military and intelligence assistance to Ukraine and Trump’s tariff threats on Russian oil, when Putin contested Zelenskyy’s legitimacy as a negotiator and thus delayed a deal, also signal a willingness to exert pressure on Moscow.
Europe’s Diplomatic Failure
Since Trump’s election victory, Europe has failed to adapt its Ukraine policy to the new realities, develop a negotiation plan or ideas for a deal design that would integrate European and Kyiv interests within the parameters set by the US administration. Sacrificing its own diplomatic assets – such as the neutrality of Switzerland and Austria – to the orthodoxy of partisanship and militancy was a mistake. The future of Europe is now being negotiated in Riyadh, not in Geneva or Vienna. The economic sanctions imposed only negatively influenced Russia, instead of creating incentives for a change in behavior through complementary offers. Three years have also passed without using the potential that arose from NATO’s expansion to include Sweden and Finland, European rearmament and the stationing of American missile defense and medium-range capabilities to set impulses for dialogue on arms control, risk reduction, and escalation management.
It is therefore not surprising that Washington did not invite the Europeans to Saudi Arabia for exploratory talks or the subsequent shuttle negotiations on a partial ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Rather, it seems to be in the interest of the United States to discuss the bilateral strategic relationship with Russia separately for the time being and to keep the number of negotiators low. It may even be beneficial for the enforcement of a political conflict resolution to have the Europeans – divided and unable to negotiate – on the sidelines while the United States, Russia, and Ukraine set diplomatic facts.
Considering the short time that the talks have been going on so far, some points of intersection have been explored (a partial ceasefire on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea, plans for economic cooperation) and in some cases implemented (further prisoner exchanges, the return of fallen soldiers). Although it is well known how difficult these negotiations are, each step has been notoriously criticized in Germany. This follows a pattern: earlier diplomatic efforts during the war were likewise discredited from the outset (Turkish and UN initiative for a “grain deal” and the IAEA delegation in Zaporizhzhia). The otherwise rather cautious Defense Minister Pistorius recently dismissed the prospect of a 30-day suspension of attacks on energy infrastructure as a “zero outcome” because Ukraine’s critical energy facilities would enjoy the best protection anyway. Yet such attacks had previously been portrayed as particularly perfidious and destructive Russian warfare. And it is primarily the Americans who are providing this supposedly guaranteed protection.
Strategic Competence Required
The reflex-like repetition of such misjudgments illustrates how deeply ingrained the aversion of European governments (and think tanks) to diplomatic engagement and compromise has become in the Ukraine war. The continued reduction of strategic thinking to military means and sanctions has destroyed valuable options for action. Manipulating a dynamic conflict in the desired direction requires flexibility and a holistic strategic approach that uses the available toolkit of military, economic, and diplomatic means.
Success on the battlefield or at the negotiating table will not come without strategic competence. This means: thinking beyond contradictions (“both/and” instead of “either/or”) and thereby creating new options for action without restraint. On the basis of what is actually possible, political goals must first be defined and, in a second step, adequate means to achieve them must be derived. Only in this way can the Europeans escape their subordinate role and contribute to a viable peace plan for Ukraine and the continent. Without negotiating goals and strategies based on a sober analysis of the current situation and interests, they have little to offer at the negotiating table. It is time to create suitable bargaining chips and to clarify who will take the lead for Europe in the negotiations.
A European NATO and Realignment of Strategic Relations
So what can we do? Europe must seize the opportunity to actively shape the diplomatic process. It is not enough to invest in our own armed forces and expand the military-industrial complex. We also need security governance, efficient military decision-making processes, and coordinated operational infrastructure – such as provided by NATO. In other words, we need to Europeanize NATO. For this, the alliance would have to introduce procedures that make it possible to act without the US. Such a reform can only be achieved together with Washington. In the negotiations, we can build on an important convergence of interests with the Americans: the shared desire for more European autonomy.
This also includes independent arms control capabilities, direct military communication channels with adversary forces, and other risk-reducing arrangements. Today, the US has exclusive or predominant control over all of these assets. The development of European capabilities across the entire spectrum of escalation management must be the primary objective of negotiations with both the US and Russia. For example, direct military contacts could be established between European-led NATO command posts and Russian counterparts. These and other points of contact would help avoid misunderstandings and inadvertent escalation in a crisis, with or without the Americans. Further confidence-building measures, such as mutual notification of missile tests or major military exercises, would also serve shared strategic interests as Europe’s deterrent capabilities grow.
Reducing Nuclear Risks
Diplomatic efforts to recalibrate the strategic relationship between Europe, the United States and Russia are also needed to address the massive increase in the Russian nuclear threat. The presence of US forces, nuclear weapons, and missile defense systems on European soil gives us considerable bargaining power. To achieve reductions on the Russian side, it would be appropriate to propose adjustments to planned or already deployed US capabilities in Europe that have nuclear or strategic relevance. The planned deployment of Tomahawk missiles could become a bargaining chip. Priority should be given to the withdrawal of tactical capabilities in Belarus and Kaliningrad.
Generating Leverage on Territorial Issues
Regarding the territorial disputes, the UN General Assembly resolutions (ES 11/1, ES 11/4 and subsequent reiterations) are useful for Ukraine and the Europeans. In accordance with international law, these resolutions strongly condemn border violations and reject international recognition of Russian annexations. They strengthen Ukraine’s negotiating position by precluding any clarification of the occupied territories’ status under international law without Kyiv’s consent. Acceptance of a Russian Crimea and the prospect of lifting European economic sanctions could be used in negotiations to maximize Russian concessions on security guarantees and the legal status of other territories. Even allowing a limited supply of Russian natural gas to Europe shouldn’t be taboo, if European energy sovereignty is maintained and additional military guarantees for Ukraine are attached.
Negotiating the Future of European Security
Finally, it is also important to think about long-term conflict management and to establish an appropriate institutional framework. To complement possible peacekeeping forces and a robust European deterrence and defence posture, the military and security pillar of the OSCE should be revived and harnessed to supervise a ceasefire and maintain a military balance. This could include both monitoring missions and consultations to avoid a counterproductive arms race or destabilizing military activities. 50 years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, there is an opportunity for progress with Finland holding the OSCE Chairmanship this year and Switzerland taking over in 2026.
In order to coordinate a strong European contribution to the negotiations on Ukraine, a contact group of the main European actors (i.e. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, Spain, a Nordic-Baltic representative and a representative of the European Commission) could be established. This group should agree on a delegation that is both influential and representative in terms of European security policy (e.g. the „Weimar Triangle“). Given the urgency of the matter, the new German government should immediately initiate such a negotiating mandate and strategic shift. It must resolutely support all diplomatic efforts and skillfully exploit them in its own and Ukraine’s interest. Because the path to more European sovereignty and an independent Ukraine leads through an agreement with the United States and Russia.
Sascha Hach
Latest posts by Sascha Hach (see all)
- A Sober Perspective for the Negotiating Table: Europe Must Contribute Diplomatically to Ending the War in Ukraine and Shape the Withdrawal of the US - 9. April 2025
- Mit nüchternem Blick zum Verhandlungstisch: Europa muss die Beendigung des Ukrainekrieges und den Rückzug der USA diplomatisch mitgestalten - 4. April 2025
- Reducing Nuclear Threats: Why Talks on Ending the War in Ukraine Should Include Agreements on Nuclear Risk Reduction - 7. Januar 2025
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