On March 5, 2025, the caretaker foreign minister of Syria, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, delivered a speech at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in which he promised that his government would eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons programme and bring the country back into compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). If implemented, this would end over a decade of Syrian violations of the CWC, offer the opportunity to hold those responsible to account, and reaffirm the global norm against chemical weapons. Deeds will have to follow these words, but this announcement at least allows for some cautious optimism in an otherwise gloomy international disarmament climate.
Background: Syria and Chemical Weapons
Reports about alleged chemical weapons attacks started to emerge from Syria in late 2012 and continued through 2019. Independent international investigations led by the UN and the OPCW confirmed 25 attacks with chemical warfare agents. A study by non-governmental experts assumes a significantly higher number of over 300 such attacks. In August 2013, the largest attack occurred in the southwestern area of Ghouta. Political pressure in its wake led to Syria’s accession to the CWC and obligated the country to declare and eliminate its chemical weapons programme, including all chemical warfare agents and weapons stockpiles, equipment and related facilities. All declared elements of the programme were destroyed under OPCW verification by 2016. However, chemical weapons attacks continued after Syria had acceded to the CWC, and from 2014 onwards OPCW inspections found indications that Syria may not have declared its entire programme and may have continued chemical weapons production. These suspicions were confirmed when the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) identified Syria as perpetrator of nine attacks carried out between 2014 and 2018. Three attacks were attributed to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
The use of chemical weapons is universally prohibited by international customary law, and as a state party to the CWC, Syria is prohibited from possessing chemical weapons. Despite the compelling results of international investigations, the government of former President Bashar al-Assad consistently denied having used chemical weapons. Russia, Syria’s closest ally, unequivocally supported the Assad regime, disseminating disinformation aimed at calling into question the OPCW’s professionalism, technical capability and expertise, independence, and credibility. Meanwhile, member states of the OPCW initiated by majority vote several steps to address Syria’s non-compliance. In 2018, they tasked the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to establish the IIT, a unit mandated to identify the perpetrators of confirmed chemical weapons attacks. States parties also invoked the CWC compliance procedures against Syria in 2021 and in 2023. This included revoking several of Syria’s membership rights in the OPCW, encouraging OPCW members to limit chemical trade with Syria to prevent further chemical weapons proliferation, and informing the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly of the matter. The OPCW does not have any enforcement power, and these actions exhausted the means foreseen in the CWC to bring a treaty member back into compliance. The UN Security Council, which could initiate enforcement measures in accordance with its mandate under the UN Charter, has been deeply divided over the issue and unable to proceed. The situation thus seemed stalled, with no solution in sight so long as Bashar al-Assad and his government remained in power and under Russia’s protection.
A Door Opens: The Fall of the Assad Government
The unexpected fall of the Assad government in December 2024 suddenly opened up new room for manoeuvre. The Islamist organisation Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), whose leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is now the de facto head of state of Syria, declared during their offensive against the Assad government that the group “had no intention or desire to use chemical weapons” and that they would “cooperate with the international community in everything related to monitoring weapons and sensitive sites”. Soon after HTS took control, the OPCW reminded the interim government of Syria’s obligations under the CWC, requested that it ensure the security and integrity of the remaining chemical weapons and facilities, and announced its readiness to deploy OPCW staff to Syria to provide support as soon as the security situation allowed. On February 8, 2025, OPCW Director-General Arias visited Damascus to discuss the future of Syria’s chemical disarmament. On March 5, 2025, caretaker Foreign Minister al-Shaibani addressed the OPCW Executive Council, expressing in his statement the government’s commitment to “dismantle whatever may be left from it [Assad’s chemical weapons programme, UJ], to put an end to this painful legacy and ensure Syria becomes a nation aligned with international norms.” If the current government follows through with this announcement, this could resolve the biggest compliance crisis the CWC has faced so far.
Disarming Syria’s Chemical Weapons: What Needs to be Done?
While no chemical weapons use has been reported since 2019, the OPCW is continuously investigating earlier allegations to confirm chemical weapons attacks and, if confirmed, to identify those responsible. These investigations will need to continue in order to process and cope with the use of chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war. Their results could also be used in efforts to hold the perpetrators of the chemical weapons attacks legally accountable and to provide assistance and redress to the victims of these attacks. According to an OPCW report dated March 3, 2025, the current government has promised to provide “full support and unfettered access” to the investigation teams.
Since 2014, OPCW inspectors have also identified inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria’s initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme which point to non-compliance with CWC obligations and which, despite intense efforts by the OPCW, could not be clarified so far, largely due to a lack of cooperation on the part of the Assad government. Unresolved issues, which the Assad government did not sufficiently explain or rectify, include possible evidence for undeclared stockpiles and production of chemical warfare agents. In reaction to the change of government, the OPCW has devised an action plan with steps to be taken by the current Syrian government, partly with assistance from the OPCW, to achieve chemical disarmament. This includes for the Syrian government to compile an inventory of the current chemical weapons programme and submit a new declaration; for the OPCW to verify the destruction of all remaining elements of the programme; and after the destruction phase for both to collaborate in preventing the proliferation and re-emergence of chemical weapons on a long-term basis. According to the report mentioned above, the Syrian government has already begun to implement this action plan. If it is serious about its commitment to chemical weapons disarmament, it will have to fully cooperate with the OPCW teams as requested, provide unhindered access to all sites and persons which OPCW inspectors deem relevant for their investigations, and bring forward all available information on any chemical weapons-related activities.
The recent outbreak of fighting with very high numbers of casualties and atrocities illustrates vividly how fragile the security situation still is in the country. Among many other implications, this shows the urgent need for the current government to take all necessary precautions to secure the remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and related facilities from unauthorised access by anyone, including terrorist groups, until they can be destroyed under OPCW verification.
Outlook
The announcement by caretaker Foreign Minister al-Shaibani at the OPCW signals the prospect of finally eliminating chemical weapons in Syria completely. This would remove a significant security threat and reinforce the global norm against chemical weapons. It would also alleviate previous concerns that the Syrian case might contribute to a ‘normalisation’ of chemical weapons, insofar as both the announcement and subsequent international reactions clearly demonstrate that chemical weapons possession remains a deviation from ‘normal’ and acceptable behaviour, while the renunciation of chemical weapons is obviously perceived as a way to gain international legitimacy and recognition. This underlines the continued validity and strength of the international norms against chemical weapons.
While there is thus reason for cautious optimism, expectations need to be managed pragmatically. First of all, it remains to be seen whether the current Syrian government will move further beyond rhetoric and cooperate fully with the OPCW to discover and eliminate the remaining elements of the chemical weapons programme. Second, even if this is the case, the task at hand is complex and challenging. It is unlikely that comprehensive records exist of the undeclared and undestroyed stockpiles and facilities, given that the Assad government carried out its chemical weapons programme in secrecy and publicly denied its existence. Identifying staff involved in the programme and inducing them to come forward with information might be difficult, as they may fear retribution and prosecution. Finally, some facilities assumed to be connected to the chemical weapons programme were damaged or destroyed in air strikes carried out by the USA, France and the United Kingdom in 2018 as well as by Israel in December 2024. Gaining a clear and complete picture of the current state of the programme will hence not be easy, even if the new interim government is acting in good faith. Having said that, the OPCW with its well-trained inspectorate, extensive experience from previous investigations in Syria, and good overview of the open questions that will need to be addressed, is in a good position to assess the quality and credibility of interactions, communications and information provided, and ultimately to verify the elimination of the remaining chemical weapons programme.
From a wider arms control perspective, the current situation shows the great value of having functioning disarmament and verification mechanisms in place, even during deadlocked situations when efforts to restore compliance seem fruitless under the circumstances. The OPCW’s early efforts to put effective mechanisms in place to deal with Syria’s non-compliance can now facilitate disarmament and verification activities, as well as support trust-building and confidence in the results of inquiry. Despite years of violations by Syria, international norms against chemical weapons were challenged but not weakened. Fully disarming Syria’s chemical weapons programme and restoring the country’s compliance with the CWC would be a crucial step to reaffirming these norms. The reported first steps seem promising, but the interim government will have to build trust in the sincerity of its intentions to respect international law and its obligations under the CWC. It should then receive the necessary and appropriate support in delivering on its promise to rid Syria of all remaining chemical weapons. In an international security climate in which disarmament norms are increasingly being challenged and coming under threat, this would be a very welcome and much needed positive development.
Una Jakob
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